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According to conventional wisdom, the petroleum industry is classified as a ‘resource based’ 
and ‘mature’ industry. It is subject to the ‘resource curse’ thesis, exhausted of ‘technological 
opportunities’ with limited capacity for knowledge based economic growth. This study 
questions the adequacy of this line of reasoning. Exploring the technological complexity of 
the sector, a complementary argument is presented. We show that the sector has recently 
experienced a surge in ‘technological opportunities’. However the ‘systemic complexity of 
the knowledge base’ has constrained many oil producing countries’ enjoyment of these 
opportunities. This view highlights the role of dynamics of knowledge base complexity as an 
important ‘cognitive’ barrier for building innovation capabilities in endowed countries. 
This study is based on the extension of a ‘Sectoral Innovation Systems’ approach, 
highlighting the role of technological regimes in catch-up possibilities and strategies. 
Knowledge base complexity is explored as an under-researched element of technological 
regimes. The research contributes in three ways. First, it introduces a dynamic and three-
dimensional view of knowledge base complexity at the conceptual level, and hypothesizes its 
implication for patterns of innovation and catch-up processes. Second, a quantitative 
methodology is developed to examine the proposed hypotheses. Third, the conceptual and 
methodological suggestions are empirically examined in the context of upstream petroleum 
industry. 
The findings propose that the sector has gone through phases of transformation and 
reconfiguration. The sector’s technological regime over the most recent period experienced 
high opportunities combined with rising systemic complexity of the knowledge base. We 
show that this trend in technological regimes is associated with shift of the sector from 
Schumpeter Mark I to II and with the emergence of major Integrated Service Companies as 
new system integrators coping with rising systemic complexity. We also observe that rising 
systemic complexity is associated with slow down and halt of geographical dispersion of 
innovation. The sector-wide cumulativeness stemming from systemic complexity creates 
high cognitive barriers to entry for latecomers. The very scarce examples of catch-up in a 
few advanced oil producing countries suggest that high innovation opportunities in complex 
industries are open mostly to countries with both advanced national innovation systems and 
accumulated production experience. For latecomer countries to benefit, their industrial 
policy needs to cope with increasing systemic complexity, mitigating its coordination costs 
and facilitating the integration of distributed catch-up processes. This highlights the key role 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background  
Resource based industries in general and the petroleum industry in particular are 
often understood as having limited capacity for growth and development. In addition 
to the well-known story of ‘resource curse’, they are also blamed for a capital 
intensive production function which restricts emergence of backward and forward 
linkages (Stevens, 2003; Nelson, 2008) and provides negligible developmental space. 
They are also classified as ‘mature’ sectors, exhausted of ‘technological 
opportunities’ for knowledge based economic growth. According to the standard 
measure of R&D intensity, oil and gas is usually classified as a ‘low tech’ sector. It 
appears near the bottom of the table of technology based classification, implying low 
innovation capacity (Acha 2002; R&D Scoreboard, 2009).  
This study questions the adequacy of this line of reasoning due to its inadequate 
attention to the nature of the knowledge base underlying innovation processes. 
Exploring technological regimes of upstream petroleum industry as an example, this 
research provides an alternative or complementary argument. In contrast to the 
established picture, what appears to be restricted knowledge based growth and few 
cases of technological catch-up is not lack of ‘technological opportunities’, but 
‘systemic complexity in the knowledge base’.  
This is not to deny economic, political economic or institutional transmission issues 
such as price volatility, Dutch disease, social and political conflicts related to the 
control of resources1
                                                          
1 These mechanisms and transmission channels are addressed in more detail in section 1.2. 
. These indeed may limit the advantages of recourse based 
industries for their associated countries, if they are not managed properly. Yet, the 
nature and characteristics of the knowledge base itself - such as complexity - can 
play an important role in preventing  resource holding countries’ from the benefits of 
innovation opportunities. This important factor may operate even in the absence of 
other preventing factors recognized in standard ‘resource curse’ explanations. In 
other words, both sets of factors can potentially affect knowledge diffusion and 
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technological catch-up in latecomer countries. The present study analyses knowledge 
base complexity; while ‘resource curse’ theories and catch up literature both tend to 
focus on contextual and institutional factors, neglecting the importance of the nature 
of knowledge in learning processes. 
Within the context of a Schumpeterian and evolutionary economic approach, this 
study sets ‘Sectoral Innovation Systems’ (SIS) (Malerba, 2005a & 2005b) as the 
broad analytical framework. It analyzes the relationship between knowledge base 
complexity as an important element of technological regime and catch-up in 
latecomer countries. The SIS framework was originally suggested to explain sectoral 
patterns of innovation. The main focus here is on the role of knowledge base 
complexity as an important but neglected aspect of technological regimes, though 
other dimensions may be touched upon when relevant. “The notion of technological 
regime provides a synthetic representation of some of the most important economic 
properties of technologies and of the characteristics of the learning processes that are 
involved in innovative activities” (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997, p. 83).  
One of the core messages of SIS literature is that technology related factors i.e. 
technological regimes play a key role in shaping sectoral patterns of innovations. It is 
shown that these patterns are systematically different across technologies and 
industries, but remarkably similar across countries (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 
1997). Technological regimes have often been defined as particular combinations of 
technological opportunities, appropriability, cumulativeness, and properties of 
knowledge base. The ‘properties of knowledge’ base which refers to characteristics 
of knowledge underlying innovative activities is itself a synthetic construct 
encompassing the degree of specificity, tacitness, ‘complexity’ and independence2
The original aim of the concept of technological regimes was to explain inter-
sectoral variations in patterns of innovation (Breschi and Malerba, 2000; Malerba 
and Orsenigo, 1997). It could also explain variations in geographical patterns of 
innovation, based on the assumption that there is some correspondence between 
sectoral and geographical patterns of innovation (Breschi, 2000). The role of 
.  
(Breschi et al., 2000,  p. 391).  
                                                          
2 These dimensions are defined in the chapter 3. 
3 
 
technological regimes in shaping international geographical pattern of innovation 
also recognizes similar arguments (Malerba and Montobbio 2003). The SIS 
framework has recently been extended to the analysis of technological catch-up 
processes highlighting the importance of sectoral differences in catch-up possibilities 
and strategies (Malerba and Nelson, 2010).  
Nonetheless, systematic efforts to understand the role of knowledge base complexity 
in SIS studies in general, and in the context of latecomer countries in particular, are 
neglected. Only recently, catch-up theories began to pay attention to the role of 
technological regimens and the nature of knowledge in learning processes (Park and 
Lee, 2006; Kim and Lee, 2008). Even in these studies, technological complexity is 
overlooked, while the impacts of other characteristics of the knowledge have been 
relatively more researched. It is surprising that the role knowledge complexity has 
not been addressed in the catch-up literature, given the intuition that knowledge 
complexity could be a serious learning barrier for latecomers. In addition, lack of 
attention to underlying knowledge generation processes in resource based industries 
offers further attraction for academic research. 
This thesis sits between the two gaps. On the one hand, knowledge base complexity 
in SIS literature is a relatively neglected area compared to other elements of 
technological regimes. On other hand, there is a lack of adequate understanding 
about the dynamics of the knowledge base in resource based industries. Upstream 
petroleum industry is considered relevant to both gaps. The analysis of the 
knowledge base of this sector could contribute to both literatures. On the one hand, it 
increases our understanding of the dynamics of knowledge base complexity in SIS 
literature. On the other hand, it feeds into the natural resource based development 
literature, providing a deeper picture of the opportunities and challenges involved in 
these sectors with regard to underlying knowledge and innovation processes.  
Dominant approaches in the resource based development literature tend to provide an 
exogenous and static picture of natural resource industries, where the role of 
knowledge and innovation is relatively neglected (Andersen, 2012). These 
approaches are inadequate to explain the varieties of performance of resource based 
economies (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). Also, they seem to have reached stalemate 
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in providing fruitful policy implications, given the tendency to reject valuable 
opportunities involved in resource based industries (Bridge, 2008). Such weaknesses, 
along with recent changes in the global economy (Morris et al., 2011) have pushed 
researchers to question the assumptions of conventional wisdom and look for 
alternatives.  
Alternative approaches are yet to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework 
and policy insights. However some common elements could be integrated under an 
emerging research program which could be ladled as a ‘knowledge’ (Lorentzen, 
2008a) or ‘learning’ (Wright, 2001; Andersen, 2012) approach to resource based 
development. According to these new approaches, the performance and contribution 
of natural resource sectors to the economy is not something given, but a function of 
learning, innovation and knowledge accumulation in society. As a result, 
understanding knowledge generation and diffusion processes and the factors 
supporting or inhibiting them are on the top of this emerging research agenda.  
The central aim of this thesis is to contribute in this promising research area through 
innovative analysis of the dynamics of the knowledge base of upstream petroleum 
industry and the associated sectoral, organizational and geographical patterns of 
innovation. The analytical focus is on complexity of the knowledge base, as an 
important but under researched area in the analysis of industrial and geographical 
dynamics. It is believed that a more systematic and dynamic conceptual and 
theoretical articulation of knowledge base complexity - what I call a dynamic three-
dimensional perspective - and its application in the context of a resource industry, 
offers a number of important contributions. It increases our understanding of the 
nature of knowledge base development in the industry and revises the conventional 
view of the industry life cycle. In addition, its integration into available theoretical 
frameworks offers analytical value. In particular it helps explain the dynamics of 
modes of governance of knowledge (at sectoral and organizational level), 
international geographical patterns of innovation and catch-up processes.             
This introductory chapter is organized in six sections. After the background 
described above, a brief review of dominant theoretical approaches to the challenges 
of resource based development and their analytical drawbacks are presented in 
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section 1.2. Alternative approaches which broadly guided this thesis are reviewed in 
section 1.3 under the label of ‘learning’ or ‘knowledge’ view to natural resources. 
These are emerging partly as a response to the key challenges to conventional 
wisdom, and partly as a result of resurgence of natural resource industries on the 
global economy agenda. Section 1.4 explains the specific research questions this 
research aims to answer. Section 1.5 puts forward the research design employed to 
answer the research questions. The final section describes how this report is 
organized.                
1.2. Motivation: challenges of resource based development and its 
theories 
The literature on natural resource based development is dominated by the so called 
‘resource curse’ thesis. Basically, it highlights the economic constraints of resource 
industries and theorises their possible harmful effects on industrialization, structural 
change and economic development (Auty, 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 
1995). According to this conventional view, specialization in natural resource 
industries is not a reliable option for economic development. Not only are natural 
resource industries themselves unable to provide a technological dynamism required 
for industrialization of the economy (or ‘technologization’ according Perez, 2008) 
and sustainable growth, they can also crowd out other sectors of the economy, 
decrease their competitiveness and shrink their size. Harmful effects could even go 
beyond economic sectors and hit the institutional set up of a country, distort the 
political processes, engender the formation of rentier states, and gradually lead to 
rentier societies characterised by a culture which stifles innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
This negative view of resource industries as relatively unattractive sectors has both 
historical roots and more recent extensions and developments. It dates back to the 
beginning of economics. Adam Smith warned against encouraging investments in 
mining projects which in his view “absorb both capital and stock” instead of 
replacing capital and generating profits from their stocks (Smith, 1776, 562). 
However this view became central to the development agenda in 1950, when 
structural economists attributed poor economic performance of African and Latin 
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American countries to their specialization in natural resources. At least three 
explanations have been suggested for this poor economic performance, each of them 
highlight different aspects of inherent nature of natural resource sectors.  
First, Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) argued that weak economic performance of 
commodity exporters is due to the decline of Commodities-Manufactures terms of 
trade, or relative price of commodities compared to industrial manufactured 
products. This overall declining trend is linked to both demand and supply related 
factors. On the demand side, it is argued that commodities have a low elasticity of 
demand which prevents exporters from benefiting from demand expansion in 
commodity markets. Moreover, their growth rate is also slower than manufactures, 
because technological progress in manufacturing tends to be resource saving, 
substituting with synthetic materials. On the supply side, it is argued that natural 
resource industries are not technologically dynamic, because “they do not provide 
the growing points for increased technological knowledge, …and…direct 
Marshallian external economies” (Singer, 1959, p. 476). In addition, if they 
experience some limited technological progress, it mostly benefits consumers in 
foreign countries and not producing countries, because it translates to reduced prices 
not higher demand or profits. The combination of these factors contributes to the 
formation of long term decline in terms of trade. 
The second challenge is the high price volatility on top of decline in terms of trade, 
which makes resource exporter economies very vulnerable. It harms resource based 
economies through abrupt changes in governments’ revenues, exchange rates, and 
local investment due to the high levels of uncertainty it creates (Nurske 1958). Some 
scholars argued that the damaging effects of these rapid fluctuations are even worse 
than the long term, but predictable, decline in the terms of trade (Cashin and 
McDermott, 2002).  
The third argument refers to the weak capacity of natural resource industries for 
forward and backward linkages to the local economy. This is related to their capital 
intensive production function and their enclave geographical nature. It has been 
argued that their limited linkages to other sectors of the economy constrain learning, 
limit technological spill-overs and external economies, and provide little 
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opportunities for job creation and skills development (Singer, 1950). Whatever 
beneficial impacts that potentially arise from these limited linkages, are also largely 
reaped in the home countries of large foreign companies. This transfer happens 
because of the special organization of their production process where foreign 
companies tend to import most of the inputs and capital equipment required in the 
production process, and export raw outputs for further processing in their home 
countries (Morris et al., 2011).      
A more recent wave of these ideas was reinforced with a series of empirical 
econometric studies arguing for negative association between resource abundance 
and economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Auty, 1990, 1993; Gylfason et 
al, 1999). This range of explanations has extended more economic type explanations, 
like Dutch disease, towards more political-economy types, in which resource rents 
may distort decision making in institutions and political processes. The key 
difference of these explanations from previous ones is that they extend the scope of 
their analysis beyond what happens within natural resource sectors. The focus is on 
the damaging impacts of resource sector on wider environment and other sectors of 
the economy and society. For example, Dutch disease theory explains how the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by expansion of commodity exports 
could lead to a contraction of tradeable sectors.  This is because of the attraction of 
capital and labour away from manufacturing to the booming resource sector. In this 
view, the challenge is not just the resource sector itself, but its damaging impacts on 
the competitiveness of the other sectors of the economy which reduces its diversity 
and long term growth.     
Although this conventional wisdom to resource based industries convincingly 
explains the challenges of natural resource based development, it has been 
challenged based on at least three different grounds. The challenges to conventional 
wisdom partly come from a misreading of the history of resource based development, 
partly from excessive generalizations and also partly from recent changes in the 
global economy. First, they misread the history, because the literature simply ignores 
the historical examples of successful resource based industrialization where these 
sectors are described as a blessing rather than a curse (Stevens, 2003). As a result it 
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is unable to explain the variety of performance of resources based countries (Morris, 
et al., 2011). 
Second, they tend to over generalize, because sometimes worst criticism of the worst 
forms of natural resource based industrial activity are generalized to other natural 
resource industries. However in many cases, they do not necessarily share the 
common characteristics (Marin et al., 2009). In its excessive form, the scope of 
generalization extends from sectors to countries and also over time. Finally, recent 
changes in global economy have raised new challenges for the application of 
conventional wisdom to the current area, even if they have been historically 
acceptable. For example, the historical downward trend of Commodities-
Manufactures terms of trade has been recently reversed due to the increasing 
structural demand for commodities (Kaplinsky, 2006). In addition, it is argued that 
fracturing or segmentation of global value chain created new innovation 
opportunities (Morris, et al., 2011; Perez, 2008).  
Lack of sufficient attention to these analytical challenges and unexamined 
assumptions in the ‘hard version’ of conventional wisdom has resulted in the 
widespread idea that natural resource industries are not a good platform for economic 
development.  They are often described as low-tech, mature, undifferentiated sectors 
with low capacity for forward and backward linkage and innovation. The policy 
implication of this view is simply to ignore them in the development agenda and 
avoid as much as possible that economic development is based on these sectors.  
Such an approach is clearly inconsistent with the experiences of several of today’s 
advanced countries such as USA, Canada, Australia and Norway which leveraged 
their natural resource sectors in the industrialization process (Wright and Czelusta, 
2004). In addition, the policy lessons that can be drawn from this kind of analysis for 
many today’ natural resource based countries are very limited. It is not enough to 
understand how the natural resources might be a curse, but requires policies that 
could help countries avoid it or transform it to a sustainable blessing. Nonetheless, 
the perception of natural resources as a finite and exogenous good to the economic 
system which is subject to diminishing returns obscures the provision of more 
fruitful explanations and active policy suggestions. What seems missing is an 
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evolutionary-institutional research approach with a dynamic perspective in which 
natural resource industries and their contribution to the economy are indigenized, as 
a function of a number of knowledge related factors and variables (Andersen, 
2012a).      
These are the promises of a revised version of conventional wisdom which combines 
lessons from resource curse with deep analysis of successful resource based 
industrialization that considers ongoing changes in the global economy. The premise 
is  that “in order to understand the role of natural resources in economic 
development, they must be understood as dynamic, and as being subject to processes 
of natural resource creation, extension and obsolescing that are characterised by 
learning and capability building”(Andersen, 2012a, p. 291). Contributing to this 
emerging research agenda was one background driver of this PhD thesis. This 
research began with a broad motivation to provide a new understanding of the nature 
of resource based industries, and the opportunities and challenges involved in 
resource based economic development. The next section touches upon the main 
aspects of this emerging research agenda and locates this thesis in it.    
1.3. Learning or Knowledge approach to resource based industries 
This section argues how some important challenges to conventional wisdom in the 
analysis of resource based development could be resolved. Evolutionary economics 
and the Schumpeterian analysis of innovation provide valuable insights. They justify 
the application of the Sectoral Innovation Systems approach in natural resource 
industries, to avoid sectoral generalization and to take into account the role of 
technological and learning regimes in the dynamics and transformation of the 
industries. After a brief review of recent applications of the SIS approach in natural 
resource industries, its position in this thesis is described.     
It is no surprise that a large share of revisions to conventional wisdom concerning the 
natural resource industries is drawn from the evolutionary perspective and the 
economics of innovation. Long term economic development in this framework is 
seen as the outcome of learning processes which involve co-evolution between 
technologies, organizations and institutions (Nelson, 1982; Kim and Nelson, 2000). 
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According to this view, learning and the accumulation of technological capabilities is 
the key to industrialization of the countries. 
What is important for economic growth is the creation of new resources in the 
economy, not just allocation of available resources. This perspective is applicable to 
all kinds of circulating resources in the economy including natural resources. In other 
words, resources are not considered as something fixed and given, but contingent on 
the capabilities and capacities distributed in society and economy. As a result, there 
is nothing inherently wrong in natural resource industries. Consequently, they may 
play an important role in economic development, provided they induce learning and 
innovation. What make countries poor are not natural resources, but absence of 
learning and weak innovation systems (Andersen, 2012a & 2012b). 
Therefore in the revisionist approaches to conventional wisdom, learning is the key 
defining variable for understanding the variety of performances among resource 
based countries. The analytical aim is to understand the learning processes attached 
to resource industries and the factors which may inhibit or stimulate them. It is also 
crucial to understand how learning happens in natural resource industries and how it 
affects innovation and structural change in the economy through co-evolutionary 
processes. This new orientation allows for the application of insights of evolutionary 
economics and the Schumpeterian approach to innovation in the analysis of resource 
based industries and their role in economic development. This capacity comes from 
the fact that deep understanding of learning and innovation processes has been 
sought for more than four decades. In particular, the innovation systems approach is 
highly relevant, because it takes into account the systemic and interactive nature of 
learning and innovation, and provides implications for innovation policy (Edquist, 
1997 & 2001).   
Among innovations systems approaches, the sectoral approach (Malerba, 2002; 
2005) is specifically relevant to the analysis of natural resource industries because of 
features to be explained in more detail in chapter 3. It avoids sectoral generalizations 
and aims to explain how learning and innovation may differ among sectors. It also 
takes a dynamic and endogenous approach to learning and innovation. These features 
offer the capacity to address the challenges of conventional wisdom, as described 
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above. Technological regimes and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation are 
introduced as key analytical concepts in this approach. In addition, technological 
regimes are considered as important factor in shaping geographical patterns of 
innovation and catch-up processes.  
The need for a sector-specific, dynamic and endogenous approach to understand the 
role of natural resources in economic development has spurred a number of studies 
of natural resource based developments, both historical and more recent. Some of the 
more recent studies take an explicit SIS approach, while some older research 
implicitly applies some of its features. Here is a review of these kinds of studies 
which is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.  
In a historical study of the US mineral economy, David and Write (1997) show how 
the rapid expansion of mineral sectors led to the expansion of manufacturing creating 
increasing returns to scale and positive feedback mechanisms. A key driver for this 
resource led growth was the establishment of incentives, institutions and 
infrastructures which promoted learning in mineral sectors and the application of 
created capabilities in other sectors of the economy. A similar approach was 
extended to the successful development of mineral sectors in Australia and also 
South American and African countries (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Again, the 
general lesson from these studies is the key role of learning processes in achieving 
the economic potential of natural resources, rather than to blame the inherent nature 
of natural resource industries. 
Consistently, missed opportunities in Latin American countries compared to other 
successful endowed countries are attributed to lack of learning, not to the inherent 
unproductive nature of natural resource industries. Maloney (2007) argues that 
deficient learning and innovation capacity is responsible for missed opportunities, 
because of low investment in skills and technology infrastructure. Low incentives for 
learning and innovation were created by inward looking industrialization and 
protectionism. 
In contrast, Finland and Sweden present more recent cases which reaped the 
economic opportunities of natural resource sectors such as timber and iron ore. 
Blomström and Kokko (2007) show how these Scandinavian countries upgraded the 
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technological level of their raw material industries, combining natural resource 
intensity with knowledge intensity in innovative internationalized clusters. Nokia is 
presented as a tremendous success story of transition from natural resources to high- 
tech industry of electronics and telecommunications. All of these examples correct 
the one sided story of resource curse, showing the possibility of economic 
diversification alongside, not away from natural resources (Lorentzen, 2008a). What 
adds to the importance of natural resource based industries in the process of 
economic development is the fact that for some less developed countries, they are the 
only available source of comparative advantage, with no other viable starting point 
(Deaton 1999)  
All the above studies suggest learning as a key process and knowledge as a key 
resource for successful natural resource based development, the idea first developed 
by innovation scholars (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). Nonetheless, the sectoral 
innovation systems approach is only applied implicitly in these studies. The explicit 
application of innovation systems approaches in the context of natural resource 
industries in general and its sectoral approach in particular is very new. This field is 
emerging out of the combination of resource based development theories and insights 
from innovation systems approaches. 
The increasing importance of natural resources in the global economy, rapid increase 
in their prices, and the social and environmental concerns attached to them, have 
speeded up expansion of this new field. New studies include both historical and 
current examples from both advanced and developing countries. They are not limited 
to academic research, but include a strong policy element with particular focus on 
natural resource rich regions such as Africa (Morris et al., 2011), South America 
(Perez, 2008; Marin, et al., 2009) and North America (Sharpe and Long, 2012). This 
seems to be a rapid race among regions to increase their fortune from this emerging 
opportunity. 
Perhaps Lorentzen (2008b) is the first systematic attempt to apply innovation 
systems approaches in resource industries. The aim was to explore the drivers of 
learning, knowledge intensification and lateral migration of know-how and 
capabilities in the resource sector to other industries. The study covers comparative 
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case studies of five resource industries in Africa and Latin America. Once again, as a 
response to the resource curse idea, the study confirms that resource based 
development is a possible, but difficult strategy. The authors call for further sectoral 
case studies, because in their view knowledge intensification differs from one sector 
to the other. Therefore, it is important to understand under what conditions 
knowledge intensification could be a successful strategy for industrial diversification. 
Deep investigation of more cases should also clarify the effectiveness and efficiency 
of public policy in support of knowledge intensification process through better 
understanding of the knowledge base of resource industries. Another step forward 
was the publication of a collection of sectoral innovation systems in developing 
countries in which three out of ten cases were of natural resource industries (Malerba 
and Mani, 2009). They included pulp and paper in Brazil, Salmon farming in Chile 
and biofuels in Tanzania. The most recent case is the study of sugar cane in Brazil 
(Andersen, 2012b) which argued for the necessity of learning and building learning 
capabilities in order to enjoy the fruits of resource industries in less developed 
countries.         
However, by definition, the sectoral innovation systems approach avoids sectoral 
generalizations. I chose to study the sectoral innovation system of upstream 
petroleum industry, as this sector is for many the main culprit and classic example of 
resource curse. There is a general agreement that many oil producing countries have 
not been able to follow knowledge intensification strategies to upgrade their 
technological capabilities and diversify their economies. On the other hand, there are 
other oil producing countries which actually did manage successfully to exploit their 
petroleum sector and diversify their economies.         
Accordingly, the overarching question which informs the research in this thesis is: 
Can the new ‘learning’ approaches to resource based industries  provide a 
complementary explanation for the oil producing countries’ struggle to enjoy the 
innovation opportunities emerged in upstream petroleum industry, given the 
limitations of the conventional  ‘resource curse’ view? 
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1.4. Research questions and the contributions 
The aim of this research is different in scope and orientation from previous studies of 
sectoral innovation systems of petroleum industry (Acha, 2002, Sæthe et al., 2011; 
Engen, 2009; Dantas and Bell, 2009). Previous studies confirm that the petroleum 
industry offers technological dynamism. Norway (Sæthe et al., 2011; Engen, 2009) 
and Brazil (Dantas and Bell, 2009) are among a few oil producing countries which 
successfully combined oil production with technological innovation and related 
industrial diversification. While those studies analyze how Norway and Brazil caught 
up and developed their technological competencies in the petroleum sector, the main 
concern of this research is to understand why many other countries with oil 
production have made minimal contributions in technological innovation. What 
factors have prevented these countries to catch up in technological capabilities?  
In order to answer this question, this study uses a broad coverage of sectoral 
innovation system both at global level and over time. It does not just focus on a 
specific country, although the innovative contribution of different countries is 
inevitably analyzed. The study takes a historical perspective over a relatively long-
time period (1970-2005). This allows understanding the temporal context and path 
dependencies in industrial dynamics.   
Basically, there are two ways to answer the overacting question. One is to focus on 
the context of individual countries and find the internal and structural factors which 
stifle learning processes - for example looking at poor policies or unsupportive 
institutions. The second way is to look at the characteristics of what needs to be 
learned or the nature of knowledge. Some kinds of knowledge can easily be obtained. 
Other kinds are difficult to learn. The aircraft industry is an example where it is 
difficult to learn knowledge. Although the aircraft industry has been a commercial 
industry for a long time, few countries have the technological capability for 
production and innovation in this sector. Obviously, these two ways to answer the 
question are complementary and do not exclude each other.       
This study answers the overarching question by taking the second route. This is 
partly because I am more interested in finding an explanation for the scarce incidence 
or distribution of learning among oil producing countries, rather than focusing on a 
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particular country. Also, the second type of analysis seems lacking in the literature. 
Only a few studies focused on the role of technological regimes or nature of 
knowledge in the shaping the geography of knowledge and catch-up processes (for 
example Park and Lee, 2006). The catch-up literature is largely dominated by the 
former type of analysis. It tends to focus mostly on the institutions or policies which 
may inhibit or stimulate learning. This orientation ignores the fact that the nature of 
knowledge and its characteristics in different industries may play an important role in 
increasing or decreasing the ‘cognitive’ barriers to entry and shape the organization 
and geography of knowledge.  
My first intuitive idea came from my own personal experience in the industry. I also 
completed a review of the historical evidence about the upstream petroleum industry 
presented in the chapter 4. My guiding hypothesis was that the increasing 
technological complexity I observed in upstream petroleum industry matters in 
explaining low catch-up. In other words, my early hypothetical answer was that 
increasing technological complexity, not low innovation opportunities, has prevented 
latecomer countries from knowledge base development in upstream petroleum 
industry. This broad hypothesis turned to three main research questions which guided 
my systemic investigation of the patent data for the answers. My objective is to 
produce sensible answers to these three questions:    
1- How has technological complexity in the upstream petroleum industry 
evolved over time? 
 
2- How is the governance system of sectoral knowledge base adapted to the 
dynamics of technological complexity? And how have different firms 
responded or adjusted to the dynamics of technological complexity? 
 
3- What are the implications of dynamics of technological complexity for 
the international geography of innovation and catch-up processes? 
The first question explores whether patent data supports the idea that upstream 
petroleum industry has become technologically more complex. The second question 
investigates how firms’ technological and innovative behaviour may change or be 
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adjusted according to the dynamics of technological complexity. The third question 
explores how change in technological complexity affects the geography of 
knowledge and innovation at international level and shapes catch-up possibilities. 
The second question is a mediatory question, linking the first and third question 
through exploration of firms’ technological behaviour. This is based on the belief 
that dynamics of complexity could only affect the geography of innovation and 
knowledge through firms’ strategy towards knowledge and organization of 
innovation (fig 1.1). These are firms who decide how and where to perform their 
innovative activities.  As a result, we are unable to understand deeply the impact of 
technological complexity on geography of innovation, unless we understand the 









The three main empirical chapters of this research (5, 6, and 7) are organized      
according to these three research questions. In each chapter, the relevant literature is 
reviewed, appropriate hypotheses are proposed, appropriate quantitative 
methodologies are developed to examine the hypotheses, and the findings are 
presented. 
This thesis offers three main contributions. At the theoretical level, it proposes a 
dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity. We argue 
that this view offers analytical values for explaining patterns of innovation at 
  
 
Figure  1-1 Relationships between research questions 











sectoral, organizational and geographical levels, while it also clarifies some of the 
conceptual ambiguities and theoretical inconsistencies about the impact of 
technological complexity in the literature. The second contribution is methodological 
where we develop a quantitative methodology to capture dynamics of knowledge 
base complexity and examine its association with patterns of innovation using patent 
data. Third contribution is empirical. The application of suggested methodology in a 
resource based sector is an empirical extension of studies of sectoral knowledge 
bases, as the third contribution.  
1.5. Research design 
This study is performed based on case study research strategy. This strategy is often 
suggested to answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions.  It is suitable to study relatively 
contemporary events when the phenomena under study could not be the subject of 
experimental control (Yin, 2003). This strategy seems relevant to answer our 
research questions in this thesis which include both how and why type questions. The 
questions are about recent phenomena which because of its nature are out of 
experimental control. This case study has both descriptive and explanatory parts. In 
order to answer the first question, we attempt to describe the dynamics of 
technological complexity in upstream petroleum industry. In addition, the study also 
has explanatory elements. The dynamics of innovation opportunity and technological 
complexity has been explained with reference to historical and contextual factors 
such as oil prices and quantity and quality of technological demands. In addition, 
firms’ knowledge governance and innovation strategy, and their geographical 
implications are explained with reference to the dynamics of technological 
complexity.       
The upstream petroleum industry could be seen both an extreme and as a critical case 
justifying this single case study (Yin, 2003). It is a critical case for the analysis of 
dynamics of technological complexity in resource base industries and its impacts, 
because the rising complexity in this sector is illustrative.  It is an extreme case in the 
sense that it is a classical example and role model of many resource curse theories. 
For many, this industry is the main culprit in making resource based development 
unproductive or even counterproductive, as explained in the section 1.2. If the 
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inadequacy of this line of reasoning is questioned with reference to this case, the way 
becomes open to ask this question for other cases.  
The upstream petroleum industry could also be seen as an extreme case with the 
regard to the application of suggested data used and the methods employed. As will 
be explained in the next chapter, I analyse the dynamic of technological opportunities 
and complexities and using quantitative methods based on patent data. The main 
advantage of the patent data is that it is the only easily available database of 
technological innovations which systematically collects and classifies data for all 
industries with broad geographical coverage and over a long period of time. The long 
term nature of the phenomena under study and wide geographical dimension of the 
questions (patterns of catch-up among different countries) suggests that patent data 
are a very relevant and valuable data source for this study. However, patent data have 
their own drawback and limitations which are discussed in the next chapter. 
Petroleum industry could be seen as an extreme case for the suitability of data and 
methods used in this study. This is because patents are not the main method to 
protect innovation in this sector. If patent data and the proposed methodology are 
found relatively powerful in these minimal conditions, we are more confident to 
apply them for other sectors with higher knowledge and patent intensity.  
I rely on theoretical propositions as the general analytical strategy for this case 
study, in which pattern matching and time series analysis are used as the main 
analytical techniques (Yin, 2003). In order to answer the main three research 
questions, I developed correspondent theoretical hypothesises relying on the 
background literature. In order to examine these hypothesises, I developed a set of 
measures and proxies to produce several time series and observe the dynamics of a 
set of variables over time. These variables are employed to capture the dynamics of 
knowledge base complexity, firms’ knowledge governance and innovation strategy, 
and international patterns of geographical innovation. Finally the observed empirical 
patterns are matched with theoretical prepositions and the questions are answered 
based on the degree of match or mismatch between theory and data. I also examined 
some of the available theories with respect to their analytical power in explaining 
observed patterns. This allowed moving one step towards explanation building (Yin, 
2003). I suggest a conceptual extension of knowledge base complexity with a 
19 
 
dynamic and three-dimensional perspective could increase the analytical power, if 
combined with some of the available theories.    
This research runs at three levels of analysis and could be called an embodied case 
study (Yin, 2003). The dynamics of knowledge base complexity is analyzed at the 
level of the upstream petroleum industry where all the patent data is aggregated. The 
dynamics of governance of knowledge is analyzed at firm level. The analysis of 
geographical patterns of innovation is performed at countries’ level. As explained in 
the previous section, these analytical levels are inter-related and their integration 
could increase the coherence and depth of this case study.          
1.6. The structure of the thesis 
The thesis began in this chapter by introducing my motivation for, and the 
significance of the topic, presenting the background literature, the research gap and 
the research questions. It explained how the overarching question of this study was 
developed from observation of the challenge of resource based development, and 
also the challenges of resource based development theories. Addressing these 
theoretical challenges, as explained, is the job of an emerging research strand which 
takes a ‘learning’ or ‘knowledge’ approach to resources based development. In order 
to contribute to this emerging area, three operational questions are developed with 
regard to the dynamic nature of knowledge base complexity and its role in sectoral, 
organizational and geographical patterns of innovation.  A case study of the upstream 
petroleum industry is suggested as the suitable research design which will allow 
answers to the research questions from patent data.  
In chapter 2, I articulate the research design including the research strategy, the 
rational for the choice of the upstream petroleum sector, the data sources used and 
the analytical strategy applied in this research. It is argued that the upstream 
petroleum industry is a critical as well as extreme case providing a suitable setting to 
answer the research questions and examine the suggested conceptual and 
methodological framework. The advantages and limitations of the patent data for 
innovation studies in general, and my databases for this research in particular are also 
addressed in chapter 2.            
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In chapter 3 I develop an analytical framework concerning the dynamics of 
technological regimes and associated patterns of innovation in sectoral innovation 
systems (SIS). It is shown that the sectoral innovation systems approach is inherently 
and conceptually defined as a dynamic framework analyzing the different drivers of 
changes and transformations in different industries. However, the mode of empirical 
analysis of the relationship between technological regimes and sectoral patterns of 
innovation, particularly in quantitative econometric studies, is dominated by static 
cross-sectional research designs. The provision of a dynamic reading of the concepts 
of technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation, and their relationship in 
this chapter paves the way for the empirical analysis of this dynamic framework in 
subsequent chapter. In addition, I introduce two other concepts of industry life cycle 
(ILC) and industry architecture (IA) in the chapter and discuss their relevance to SIS 
framework.        
In chapter 4, I present data on the upstream petroleum industry from a sectoral 
system of innovation perspective. First, I briefly review the dynamics of the industry 
architecture as the background to understand the industrial dynamics and 
transformations of the sector. In this analysis which is mainly based on secondary 
data, it is shown how the vertical division of labour between different types of 
upstream companies (operators, integrated and specialized service companies) has 
evolved over time in response to the internal dynamics and external environment. 
This dynamic picture is completed by presentation of innovation trends, its drivers 
and its impact on the performance of the sector. The knowledge base of the sector 
and the configuration of major innovators in the sectoral innovation system of 
upstream petroleum industry are analyzed based on the original patent data base of 
this study. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the results chapters where the relevant background literature 
to each research question is introduced and the correspondent hypothesises are 
developed. Also, the statistical methods for the examination of hypothesis and the 
proxies are introduced. Finally, the empirical results are presented and their 
implications for theory are discussed. Each chapter is allocated to one of the three 
research questions, respectively. 
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In chapter 5 and in response to the question of evolving knowledge complexity (Q1), 
a dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity is 
introduced. The ingredients of this view, which is in line with the dynamic reading of 
technological regimes presented in chapter 3, are drawn from the developments 
presented in the economics of knowledge. However the combination is a novel 
conceptualization of this study.  In addition, three proxies are proposed in order to 
capture the three dimensions of dynamics of knowledge base complexity in upstream 
petroleum industry. The findings suggest that we could take a new ‘knowledge 
based’ approach to the industry life cycle model, where different phases are 
recognized according to the characteristics of the structure of the knowledge base, 
rather than ‘horizontal structure’ of the industry.         
In chapter 6 and in response to the question of governance of knowledge base 
complexity (Q2), two complementary operational frames are developed which 
respectively capture the dynamics of sectoral and organizational patterns of 
innovation. The former which is based on the Schumpeterian patterns of innovation 
is more concerned of the relative role of the size (small vs. big) and experience (new 
vs. incumbent) of agents in the innovation process. The latter is more concerned of 
vertical division of knowledge between different types of players and their 
innovation strategy with regard to rate (growth vs. de-growth) and direction 
(specialization vs. diversification) of knowledge generation activities. Chapter 6 
finally discusses how the shifts in both sectoral and organizational patterns of 
innovation of innovation are associated with the dynamic of knowledge base 
complexity.  
In chapter 7 and in response to the question of geographical implications of the 
knowledge base complexity (Q3), an operational frame is suggested to capture the 
dynamics of geographical patterns of innovation. In addition, a methodology is 
developed in order to examine whether technological catch-up in general, and for 
which type of countries in particular could be observed in upstream petroleum 
industry. At the end of chapter 7, the association of dynamics of geographical 
patterns of innovation and catch-up processes with dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity is discussed.           
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Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, links them together and locates them in the wider 
academic discourse on the role of resources based industries in economic 
development. It also addresses the practical and policy implications of the findings 
for natural resource producing countries. Finally, it explains the limitations of this 
research and presents some suggestions for future studies extending different aspects 
of the current research.               
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2. Chapter 2: Research design 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the research design and methodology. In chapter 
1, I explained the background and motivation of the research followed by overarching 
and operational research questions of the study. This chapter explains how these 
questions will be answered addressing the overall research strategy and data collection 
and analysis methods. 
The next section introduces the ‘case study’ approach as the relevant research strategy 
for this research with regard to the nature of research questions and phenomena under 
study. Section 2.3 explains why upstream petroleum industry was selected and what the 
implications of this choice are. In section 2.4, the data analysis methods are explained. 
In section 2.5, we introduce the nature of patent data in general, because patent data is 
the primary data source used to answer the research questions. We discuss briefly the 
advantages and limitations of patent data. Section 2.6 specifically speaks about the 
patent databases (Derwent and PATSTAT) used in this study. It describes the features 
of both databases and how they are combined to create a relevant dataset for this 
research. The concept of international patent family (IPF) is also introduced in the 
section 2.6, as the statistical strategy which selects more valuable patents and enables 
cross country comparisons. Finally, I explain how imperfections in the dataset are 
treated to produce reliable results. Section 2.7 summarises the chapter and concludes. 
2.2. Case study as the research strategy   
This study is performed using a case study research strategy. This strategy is often 
suggested to answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions with regard to relatively contemporary 
events when the phenomenon under study is not the subject of experimental control 
(Yin, 2003). More specifically, Yin (2003) distinguishes case study research as an 
empirical enquiry investigating: 
• a contemporary phenomenon when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear, and 
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• various data sources are used.   
This strategy seems relevant to answer the research questions in this thesis which 
include both how- and why-type questions. The questions are about a recent 
phenomenon (dynamics of complexity and some of relevant impacts) which because of 
their nature are out of experimental control. In other words, it has happened in a natural, 
not experimental setting. As a result, we are not able to control neatly all the contextual 
variables influencing the phenomenon. However, multiple data sources (historical, 
qualitative, and quantitative) allow us to explore the important contextual factors and 
analyze their possible impacts over time.       
This case study has both descriptive and explanatory parts. In order to answer the first 
research question, we attempt to describe the dynamics of technological complexity in 
upstream petroleum industry. In fact, this is our ‘how’ type question where the aim is to 
describe the evolution of technological complexity.  In addition, the study also has 
explanatory elements. The dynamics of innovation opportunities and technological 
complexity are explained with reference to historical and contextual factors such as oil 
prices and quantity and quality of technological demands, or sectoral technical 
imperatives. In addition, we aim to explain firms' knowledge governance and innovation 
strategy, and the geographical patterns of innovation and catch-up processes, with 
reference to the dynamics of technological complexity.       
In order to answer the research questions, a few research hypothesises are proposed 
according to the background information about industry evolution and theoretical and 
empirical literature. These hypothesises play the role of our first ‘guess’ about the 
reasonable answers to the research questions and guide our data collection and analysis 
stages.   
While the primary data source for this study is patent information, a variety of 
secondary sources (such as scholarly publications, business and industry reports, 
companies’ websites, professional journals and the views of industry analysts are 
employed to get deeper insights). Patent data is the only rigorously classified 
information about technological innovation covering both long time periods and a wide 
range of countries, all of which are essential to answer my research questions. The 
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combination of quantitative data and qualitative information in this study breaks the 
prejudiced view of the case study as an exclusively qualitative method.  This study 
shows how quantitative methods can be used effectively in case studies, both to 
examine existing theory and as an input to build new theoretical accounts. 
2.3. The choice of the case 
The upstream petroleum industry can be seen as both an extreme as well as a critical 
case justifying this single case study (Yin, 2003). It is a critical case for the analysis of 
the dynamics of technological complexity in the resource base industries, because a 
glance at the drivers of change in the sector illustrates the transformation of the sector 
towards higher levels of complexity. However this study allows rigorous examination of 
this raw idea with empirical evidence. In addition, this industry exemplifies several 
phases of transformation and reconfiguration, providing a very relevant setting for the 
analysis of dynamics of technological regimes and patterns of innovation.  
The dynamics of new discoveries and depletions alongside geopolitical change also 
create a highly dynamic geographical setting for this industry which provides a suitable 
test bed for the analysis of dynamics in the geography of innovation. The industry has 
been subject to technology policy interventions such as local content and technology 
transfer schemes in many countries in order to increase the local socio-economic 
benefits of upstream projects (Klueh et al., 2009). As a result, it is an interesting case to 
see the extent to which these measures resulted in the formation of innovation 
capabilities and catch-up in latecomer countries.          
Upstream petroleum industry can be seen an extreme case in the sense that it is a 
classical example and role model of many resource curse theories. For many, this 
industry is the main culprit in making resource based development unproductive or even 
counterproductive, as explained in the chapter 1 section 1.2. If the inadequacy of this 
line of reasoning is questioned using this case, it is perhaps easier to question the 
adequacy of this line of reasoning in other resource base industries.    
The upstream petroleum industry can also be seen as an extreme case with the regard to 
the application of suggested data used and the quantitative methods employed. As 
detailed in the next chapter, this study proposes to analyse the dynamics of 
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technological opportunities and complexities using quantitative methods based on 
patent data. The petroleum industry can be seen as an extreme case because if patent 
data and the proposed methodology are found relatively powerful in these minimal 
conditions, we are more confident to apply them for other sectors with higher 
knowledge and patent intensity.  
However, generalization from case studies is not expected to be ‘statistical’, but it is 
more of an ‘analytical’ type (Yin, 2003). Upstream petroleum industry is not a typical 
and replicable sample of other resource based industries to allow application of 
statistical generalization logic from sample to the population. Nevertheless, we expect 
to draw some ‘analytical’ general lessons from this study. That is, we expect under 
similar conditions, that the dynamics of technological complexity will express similar 
and consistent impacts in other industries. Nonetheless, this is subject to empirical 
investigation. 
2.4. Data analysis methods 
I rely on theoretical propositions as the general analytical strategy for this case study, in 
which pattern matching and time series analysis are used as the main analytical 
techniques (Yin, 2003). In order to answer the main three research questions, I 
developed correspondent theoretical hypothesises relying on the background literature 
(the hypotheses are presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7) and general insights about the 
historical evolution of the industry. These theoretical propositions play an important 
role in selection of relevant proxies, organizing the data collection processes and 
specifying relevant and non-relevant data.   
In order to examine the proposed hypotheses, I developed a set of relevant measures and 
proxies which capture dynamics of a set of variables over time. Empirical measurement 
of these variables produces time series that allow the hypotheses to be examined. 
Observed empirical patterns are matched with predicted theoretical prepositions. The 
research questions are answered based on the degree of match or mismatch between 
suggested theoretical propositions and empirical observations.  
The first set of variables refers to three dimensions of knowledge base complexity 
which answers the first research question. I discuss the proxies suggested for the 
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breadth, depth and systemic complexity and illustrate their dynamics in chapter 5. We 
expect to observe the reflection of dynamics of knowledge base complexity in 
governance system of knowledge across the sector and firms’ innovation strategy. This 
could answer the second research question. As a result, two other sets of variables are 
proposed to capture the dynamics of governance of knowledge under two different 
analytical frameworks in the chapter 6. One of these is based on Schumpeterian patterns 
of innovation analyzing the relative role of big vs. small and incumbent vs. new firms in 
the knowledge generation and innovation process. The other refers to the different 
firms’ innovation strategy in terms of rate and direction of innovation (specialization vs. 
diversification). The expected association of dynamics of knowledge governance with 
the knowledge base complexity are examined based on the empirical observation of 
these measures.  
We also expect to observe the reflection of dynamics of complexity in the evolution of 
geographical patterns of innovation and catch-up processes. This is because we expect 
firms to follow different geographical strategies when they face change in knowledge 
complexity. In order to examine this idea, to answer the third research question, another 
set of variables are proposed to capture the dynamics of geography of innovation in 
upstream petroleum industry. In addition an operational definition is presented to 
explore catch-up countries in the sector, using relative shifts in the countries share of 
innovation processes. This allows us to find out the catch-up countries, analyze their 
innovative behaviour over time and examine their association with dynamics of 
knowledge complexity.       
After evaluation of suggested hypothesises, I also examined some of the available 
theories with respect to their analytical power in explaining observed empirical patterns. 
This allows us to move one step towards explanation building (Yin, 2003). I suggest a 
conceptual extension of knowledge base complexity with a dynamic and three-
dimensional perspective could increase their analytical power, if combined with some of 
the available theories. These theoretical extensions are discussed in the final section of 
the results chapters of 5, 6 and 7. 
This research runs at three levels of analysis which is usually called embodied case 
study (Yin, 2003). The dynamics of knowledge base complexity are analyzed at the 
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level of the sector where all the patent data are aggregated. The dynamics of governance 
of knowledge is analyzed at firm level. The analysis of geographical patterns of 
innovation is performed at country level. As explained in the previous section, these 
analytical levels are related and their integration could increase the coherence and depth 
of this case study.   
2.5. Patent data 
Patent data are unique and rich information for studying innovation and technical 
change, although it has its own limitations. A patent is a legal document issued by 
governments for inventions characterised by a step of novelty and potential commercial 
application. This legal document grants a temporary monopoly right to the inventor to 
protect it and make profits on the commercial application of innovation in different 
markets. In turn, the inventor is obligated to publicly disclose the information of the 
invention for the benefits of the society. This information nowadays is often published 
on government’s patent office websites. The requirements of the legal process for patent 
applications imply the formation of qualified patent databases with the detailed 
classified information on the nature of invention (its novels aspect, technical fields, 
industrial applications, etc.), and its assignee and inventors. As a result, patent data have 
for many years been an invaluable source of information for empirical studies of 
innovative activities and technical change since long time ago (see Schmookler, 1966, 
for one of the earliest studies). It is also accelerated recently by the availability of 
powerful computational technology. 
The advantages and limitations of patent data for the analysis of innovative activities is 
a widely discussed issue in the literature (Pavitt, 1985; Basberg, 1987; Griliches, 1990; 
Archibugi and Planta; 1996; OECD, 2009). There are several advantages in patent data 
chief, for example: 
• Because patents are the direct outcome of inventive process with expected 
commercial value, appropriate indicators could be drawn to capture the competitive 
and proprietary aspect of technological innovation. 
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• Because patent application process is costly and time-consuming, on average it is 
most likely to be sought for those inventions whose benefits are expected to be more 
than the costs. This feature filters out low quality inventions. 
•  Patent statistics are available for long time periods across sectors with wide 
geographical coverage which allows for effective cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies. 
• They are systematically categorised in very detailed hierarchical classification 
systems providing information about the direction of technical change, in addition to 
the rate of innovation.     
However, it is particularly important to consider the limitations and disadvantages such 
as systematic biases in the data which may produce distorted results, if they are not 
treated properly. The main disadvantages are: 
• Not all inventions are legally patentable. The classic example is software which is 
often protected by copyright. Moreover, the patenting scope may differ from one 
country to another depending on their particular patent law.      
• Although some international agreements have become effective, in the end patents 
are binding within national territories. Because of different institutional structures in 
different countries which affect the length, time and effectiveness of protection, the 
inventor’s interest may differ in terms of the countries where they seek protection.  
• Patents are not the only or even the major tool to protect inventions. There are 
alternatives such as lead time and industrial secrecy. 
• The patenting propensity is different among firms and industries. For some 
industries, a patent is a major competitive tool, while for some other industries it is 
not. 
As a result, patents are only imperfect measures of innovation order. We should 
consider these limitations in our analysis. For example, countries with a basic level of 
technological capability can experience considerable progress in innovation which is not 
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reflected in patent statistics. The type of knowledge produced at these capability levels, 
though very important, cannot lead to patentable innovations because of its imitative 
nature. In addition, patents are biased towards advanced manufacturing and therefore 
underestimate innovation services. Firms and countries that are specialized in service 
segments of a sector may seem less innovative in patent data, in spite of the knowledge 
intensive nature of innovation in services. Last but not least, patents could rise in some 
countries simply because of introduction of incentives, not because of technological 
innovations.    
Although these limitations suggest that patents are imperfect proxies for innovative 
activities, we believe that results of this study are not seriously affected. This is because 
almost all of the conclusions in this study are drawn based on the analysis of the trends 
rather than actual levels of the suggested variables. Therefore, we expect imperfections 
to shift levels up or down without influential impact on the trends.  
Patents are only a small part of the codified and patentable knowledge within each 
sector, often produced by highly advanced firms operating at the technological frontier. 
Therefore, patents might not convincingly capture many innovative and knowledge 
related aspects of industries which cannot be observed through patent data. 
Nonetheless, I have used patent data to draw conclusions in a relatively minimal and 
conservative manner. In my analysis of the knowledge base of the sector, patent data 
are only used to trace knowledge and the intensity of interaction between different 
technical fields. It is highly unlikely that the knowledge base of the sector has 
experienced a different pattern from that shown by patent data. A similar argument 
applies when industrial organization and governance of knowledge is considered, 
because follower firms often imitate innovation strategies (Barreau, 2002).   
Regarding the catch up analysis, it is important to note that patents have not been used 
in this thesis as an indicator of technological catch-up for particular countries. It is clear 
that patent data can considerably underestimate technological progress in latecomer 
countries, as they are moving below the level of patentable innovation focused as they 
are mostly on imitative strategies. The geographical analysis suggested is based on 
changing distribution of innovation among different countries where the implications 
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for catch-up countries are analytically drawn. With regard to the possibility of cross-
country comparisons, I explain in the next section how the employment of patent 
families could reduce the margin of error and produce more reliable results.           
2.6. The upstream petroleum industry patent dataset 
Regarding the topic and the nature of this research, the data sources used should meet 
several conditions to allow the required analysis. First, it is preferred to provide a 
classification system which recognizes the upstream petroleum industry and its sub-
sectors as a particular class and/or several sub-classes. This characteristic makes the 
process of finding related patents to the upstream petroleum industry easy, rapid and 
accurate. The keyword search strategy within patent titles, abstracts and claims is an 
alternative method which is more time- consuming, technically more complicated, and 
is not as accurate as a classification based method.  
Second, the dataset should have sufficient global coverage to provide a worldwide 
picture of the technological base of the whole industry. Limited country coverage could 
bias the following analysis to the specific situation of selected countries which is not 
necessarily generalizable to other countries. More importantly, wide geographical 
coverage is necessary to analyze the dynamics of geographical patterns and catch-up in 
innovative activities. 
Third, since catch-up processes usually happen in long time cycles, the data sources 
should cover long enough periods. Fourth, this research requires information about the 
countries of patent applicants and inventors for the analysis of catch-up processes. Fifth, 
the data source should also facilitate the recognition or building of patent families, 
either by providing pre-constructed family records or through the provision of priority 
information which is necessary for building patent families. Patent families are crucial 
for cross-country patent analysis to avoid multiple counting of the same invention when 
registered in different countries, to remove home advantage bias and to choose more 
valuable patents (Martínez, 2010b).  
In my research, I could not get access to a single database meeting all these 
requirements. Therefore, a combination strategy was chosen to build a dataset from two 
different databases matched by patent publication numbers for each patent issuing 
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authority. The Derwent Innovation Index and PATSTAT are the two databases 
employed in combination to provide all the information required for this research. A 
brief introduction to each database is introduced in section 2.6.1 followed by the 
combination procedure implemented in order to create the required dataset for this 
research in the section 2.6.2. Also, the choice of international patent family (IPF) as the 
basic unit of micro data is explained in section 2.6.3 as a statistical strategy to select 
more valuable patents and produce reliable cross-country comparison results. In 
addition, section 2.6.4 explains how imperfections in the data, such as missed country 
and company ownership structure, are treated.     
2.6.1. Derwent Innovation Index and PATSTAT databases 
To my knowledge, the Derwent Innovation Index3
In addition, each subsection is subdivided to groups in a hierarchical manner known as 
Derwent Manual Codes (DMC). The unique advantage of Derwent classification for 
this research is that the subsection H01 is allocated specifically to upstream petroleum 
industry. In addition, this section is subdivided into H01-A to H01-G sub-sections to 
differentiate between various segments of the upstream value chain (Appendix II for the 
definitions of the Derwent Manual Codes of the section H). There might be some 
patents which are assigned to several sections and classes at the same time because of 
the multi applicability and functionality of inventions. 
 is the only patent database which 
provides a reliable patent classification for the upstream petroleum industry. It employs 
a clear definition and also recognizes different sub-sectors of the upstream value chain. 
This classification allocates the specific section of H to the petroleum industry in its 
Chemical Patent Index (CPI). It also subdivides patents to 9 sub-sections from H01 to 
H09, known as Derwent Class Codes (DCC), for different segments of the value chain 
from upstream to downstream and final products (Appendix I for the definitions).  
The H01 Derwent class defined as “obtaining crude oil and natural gas - including 
exploration, drilling, well completion, production and treatment” clearly covers the 
upstream section of the value chain. Also, “general off-shore platform and drilling 
                                                          
3 I am very grateful of Thomson Reuters for providing free access to Derwent Innovation Index for the 
purpose of this research. 
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technology is included together with the treatment of tar sands and oil shales”4
In addition to the Derwent classification system, this database also provides the 9-digit 
International Patent classification (IPC) codes attributed to patent documents. This 
allows recognition of the technical field(s) in which the inventions are performed. This 
classification is the source of diversification/specialization studies, as will be done in 
the chapter 6 in this research. While the IPC classification is mainly based on functions 
and technical fields of the inventions, the Derwent classification system is more based 
on the industrial application of the technologies.   
. The 
patent families registered in this class form the raw data for this study. 
The other advantage of the Derwent Innovation Index is that it provides patent 
information in family records which are constructed manually by experts. This feature 
again saves time and effort to build families from raw data, while offering higher 
accuracy when family building process is done manually by experts. I explain the 
advantages of using patent families in the section 2.6.3 
The main drawback of Derwent database, however, is the lack of country coverage of 
patent applicants and patent inventors. This is a serious limitation for this research, 
given the strong geographical element in the research questions and the need to analyze 
catch-up processes. PATSTAT which is the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical database 
is selected to compensate for this drawback. This database has been prepared 
specifically for the statistical analysis of innovative activities. It provides a wide range 
of information about patents including their applicants and inventor, and their original 
countries.  
While Derwent covers patents issued in about 40 countries, PATSTAT provides patent 
information for more than 80 countries, doubling the geographical scope of patent 
publication authorities. The time coverage of both databases is more or less similar 
starting from the early 1960s up to 2009. The other difference is that PATSTAT 
provides simple DOCDOB and INPADOC extended families, while Derwent families 
are expert based manually constructed. The definitions and advantages of family-based 




data will be explained later in section 2.6.3. Table 2.1 compares both databases from the 
perspective of five criteria mentioned before.  
2.6.2. The extraction and combination process 
The number of records extracted from Derwent database in section H01 (upstream 
petroleum industry) was 115104 patent families for the data entered between 1965-2009 
into the database. The Derwent entrance year which has some delays to the priority year 
(Wilson, 1987) has been the base for creation of the master set. The number of families 
is formed from 326357 patent publications (because every family could have multiple 
publications depending of the number of countries in which registered) of which 
317445 were found in PATSTAT patent publication table. In other words, only 8912 
patent publications were not found in PATSTAT either due to time mismatches between 
the two databases or errors in patent numbers. 




2-Global coverage About 41 patent issuing 
authorities 
More than 81 patent 
issuing authorities 
3-Time coverage Since early sixties up to 
2009 
Since early sixties up to 
2009 
4- Applicants and 
inventors information 
Just names Full information including 
country  
5-Patent families Manually constructed 
family based on priorities 
and technical content 
Simple and extended 
family based on the 
priorities 
 
Matching patent publications in the two databases was complicated and very time 
consuming, because patent publication numbers in the two databases follow different 
numbering format rules from one country to the other. Therefore, the first stage was to 
explore the publication number format for each country in both databases and then 
transform the Derwent publication number formats to PATSTAT publication number 
formats country by country. This process allows finding the equivalent records in the 
publication table of PATSTAT. The specification of publication number formats for 
each country in each database is provided by database producers. Extra complication 
Table  2-1 Comparison between two Derwent and PATSTAT databases 
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comes from the fact that numbering formats have changed several times over time for 
some countries, and therefore the different transformation formulas are used for the 
same country during different time periods5
Table 2.2 illustrates the degree of match between the two databases by publication 
authority country (The total number of patent publications by each country on Derwent, 
the number of correspondent publications found and not found in PATSTAT, and the 
percentage of the patent publications of Derwent which are found in PATSTAT). 
.  
There are some countries such as India, Czechoslovakia, Philippines, Korea, Mexico 
and Hungary where their patent publications present low match percentages. This 
mismatch should not be problematic as long as the other members of the same family of 
these publications are found in the database, because members of the same family are 
common in other information such as inventors and applicants of the patent. Given the 
selection of international patent families which are published in several countries (will 
be explained in the next section) for cross-country comparisons, I am confident that the 
results are not affected by this mismatch. This is because; it is very unlikely that all the 
publication information of international patent families in different countries is missing. 
For example if the publication information of an international patent family in India is 
missing, the publication information of the same family in other countries is very likely 
to complete the dataset.     
Mapping the publications records obtained from PATSTAT into Derwent patent 
families could clarify how many patent families with matched information we have. 
This process shows at least one publication in PATSTAT is assigned to 113454 
Derwent families out of total 115104 families. In other words, in only 1650 families out 
of 115104 (less than 1.5 percent) has the matching process been unsuccessful. Hence, 
all the subsequent analysis is based on these matched records. 
 
 
                                                          























2.6.3. Derwent International Patent Families 
“A patent family is a set of either patent applications or publications taken in multiple 
countries to protect a single invention by a common inventor(s) and then patented in 
Table  2-2 The degree of match between Derwent and PATSTAT records 
Country 
Code 









AR  ARGENTINA 11 11 0 100.0 
AT  AUSTRIA 291 291 0 100.0 
AU  AUSTRALIA 15164 15909 745 95.3 
BE BELGIUM 590 590 0 100.0 
BR  BRAZIL 5881 5917 36 99.4 
CA  CANADA 26033 26060 27 99.9 
CH  SWITZERLAND 173 174 1 99.4 
CN CHINA 14755 14832 77 99.5 
CS CZECHOSLOVAKIA 37 202 165 18.3 
CZ  CZECH REPUBLIC 91 122 31 74.6 
DD GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 664 674 10 98.5 
DE FEDERAL REPUBLIC GERMANY 15121 15179 58 99.6 
DK  DENMARK 1300 1314 14 98.9 
EP European Patent Office 30706 30787 81 99.7 
ES  SPAIN 1359 1402 43 96.9 
FI  FINLAND 764 773 9 98.8 
FR  FRANCE 8674 8674 0 100.0 
GB UK 26171 26208 37 99.9 
HU HUNGARY 309 468 159 66.0 
IE IRELAND 58 81 23 71.6 
IL ISRAEL 205 209 4 98.1 
IN INDIA 0 1267 1267 0.0 
IT ITALY 1133 1250 117 90.6 
JP JAPAN 9425 9518 93 99.0 
KR KOREA 418 1320 902 31.7 
LU LUXEMBURG 7 7 0 100.0 
MX MEXICO 2171 4644 2473 46.7 
NL NETHERLANDS 2974 2979 5 99.8 
NO NORWAY 19056 19308 252 98.7 
NZ NEW ZEALAND 381 394 13 96.7 
PH  PHILIPPINES 20 95 75 21.1 
PT PORTUGAL 139 169 30 82.2 
RO ROMANIA 976 1030 54 94.8 
RU RUSSIA 12191 12330 139 98.9 
SE SWEDEN 1063 1164 101 91.3 
SG SINGAPORE 390 430 40 90.7 
SK  SLOVAK REPUBLIC 61 61 0 100.0 
SU SOVIET UNION 21670 22631 961 95.8 
TW  TAIWAN 174 316 142 55.1 
US US 70032 70463 431 99.4 
WO WO 25345 25360 15 99.9 
ZA SOUTH AFRICA 1462 1510 48 96.8 
Total 317445 326357 8912 97.3 
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more than one country. A first application is made in one country – the priority – and is 
then extended to other offices”6
Given the availability of Derwent families in my database which defines families based 
on the similarity of their technical content, my analysis in this research is based on 
Derwent families
 (EPO, 2012). Although the definition seems straight 
forward, it is operationalised in different ways, because patent documents often have 
several priority countries which are entered into database in different times (Martinez, 
2010a). 
7. One advantage of Derwent family is the control of the quality of 
created families by experts, reducing the margin of error compared to automated 
computer based algorithms (Martinez, 2010a). In PATSTAT, two other types of simple 
DOCDOB and INPADOC extended families are introduced which are created based on 
priority information and by an automated process8
In general, several advantages have been mentioned for using patent families instead of 
single patent information in statistical analysis of innovative activities. To avoid  double 
counting, to remove home advantage bias, to provide a more reliable base for cross-
country comparisons and to estimate patent values are among the most important 
advantages (Martínez, 2010b) which are relevant to different parts of this study. 
. Because Derwent families go 
through the quality control process by experts and also provide a more relevant 
definition in terms of similarity of technical content of family members, they are 
selected as basic information records of this study.    
There are several options to filter out the families that we do not intend to include in the 
analysis.  Some authors believe that it is better to build patent indicators using single 
patent office patent families, because different legal and administrative procedures in 
different patent offices distort the data and make the comparison difficult (OECD, 2009 
p.60). This means that, in the analysis of the technological underpinning of the upstream 
petroleum industry, we rely only on the patents issued by just one patent authority. 
However, reliance on single office patents has its own weaknesses. In addition to home 
                                                          
6 http://www.epo.org/searching/essentials/patent-families.html 
7 For the details of the definition see: http://www.epo.org/searching/essentials/patent-
families/thomson.html 
8 For the details of the definition see: http://www.epo.org/searching/essentials/patent-
families/definitions.html  
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advantages bias (over representation of local companies compared to foreign 
companies), patents issued by each country usually reflect the market conditions for 
those technologies which are attractive for that country. Therefore two kinds of errors 
might occur, if the aim is to analyze the inventions at the global industry level. First, we 
do not know how attractive and therefore generally applicable those technologies are in 
other markets. Second, the analysis would not include those technologies which are 
created and applied for in other countries but did not seek protection in the selected 
target country.  
To reduce these kinds of errors when there is no a ‘unified global patents systems’, one 
suggestion is to focus on a ‘representative’ country which is usually supposed to be US 
patent office (USPTO)9
Nonetheless, the application of single member families which are issued in a single 
patent office has another weakness, in addition to the home bias problem which 
mentioned before. This problem seems applicable to all analysis based on single 
member families including US families. It treats both less valuable domestic families 
(which their protection has been sought just in one country and may have negligible 
economic value) and more valuable non-domestic families (which their protection has 
been sought in several countries and may have higher economic value) equally. In other 
words, there might be some country specific mechanisms at work promoting low quality 
patenting behaviour where for example the cost of national patenting is very low and 
. It is argued that claims submitted in other countries, are often 
also applied for in USPTO at the same time for international recognition and seeking 
protection in the largest and most advanced market (Schwartz, 2003; Huang et al., 
2003). The extent to which this hypothesis is valid for the upstream petroleum industry 
is not clear, particularly because part of technologies used in this industry are location 
specific and compatible with specific geological conditions of particular markets. In 
spite of this weakness, patents registered in the US patent office are still popular in 
cross-country comparisons (e.g. Park, and Lee, 2006; Jang, et al., 2009). This is because 
attractiveness of the US market is a strong incentive for many companies to protect their 
inventions either as the first option or as the second designation following their home 
country.  
                                                          
9 US patent office 
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covered by governments. In these kinds of cases the possibility of low quality patents 
which are never converted to innovation is high. In opposite, if protection for a patent is 
sought in other countries which usually involve high costs, it is safe to expect higher 
returns to that invention.  
To address this weakness, several restrictive criteria have been suggested to exclude less 
valuable families and focus the analysis on the more valuable families providing a more 
reliable base for international comparisons.  
Three types of suggested restrictions are non-domestic, transnational, and triadic 
families with the following definitions (Martinez, 2010a, p. 20):    
1. ‘Non-domestic’ families are those which have at least two members from 
different patent offices and therefore exclude pure domestic families with one 
member from just one single country. 
2. ‘Transnational’ families are those including at least one PCT (Paris Convention 
Treaty) or one EPO application  
3. ‘Triadic’ families, are defined as those which have at least one USPTO, one 
EPO and one JPO (Japan Patent Office)  patent application as family members  
As it is clear from the definitions, the first one is less restrictive, the last one is too 
restrictive and transnational families take a middle position in terms of inclusiveness. 
To decide which definition of patent family fits better with the aims of this study, we 
should consider the advantages and limitations of each filter and the degree to which 
they could provide a more reliable, but at the same time inclusive analysis for the 
upstream petroleum industry. I exclude the third definition, because it is too restrictive. 
It is not very relevant to the operation of upstream petroleum industry, because Japan is 
not perhaps a very important market of upstream related technologies.    
The patterns of the transnational families alongside of its two constituents (PCT and 
EPO families) and also US and non-domestic families in upstream petroleum industry 
are illustrated for comparative purposes in figure 2.1. As mentioned before, 
transnational families could solve the problem of home advantage bias to some extent, 
because all countries have the foreign status in these offices. Despite this advantage in 
transnational concept, comparison with US or non-domestic families in figure 2.1 
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suggests that the long history of technological activities in the upstream petroleum 
industry before 1990 will be lost, if we concentrate only on transnational families. This 
is because these international patenting regimes were set up relatively late.   
Also, in spite of considerable data availability during 90s, the transition period to these 
international routes of invention protection which continued until 2000 does not allow 
for reliable international comparisons before this time (Frietsch and Schmoch, 2010).  
In other words, the late beginning of the working of both international routes offices 
around 1978 and different long delays in adoption of theses international routes for 
patenting by different countries make meaningful comparisons difficult, particularly 
before 2000. As a result, differences between countries might be due to different 
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On the other hand, non-domestic families and US families illustrate an overall similar 
pattern, covering inventions from the early 1970s. This suggests that before 
establishment of PCT or European routes, the US patent office was mainly playing their 
role as the ticket to international protection. Regarding this situation, reliance on non 
Figure  2-1 Trends of different types of patent families in upstream petroleum 
industry 
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domestic families may not be as unbiased as the transnational families for cross country 
comparisons particularly in the case of US patents, but this is the only available source, 
if the analysis should cover the period before 90s.  
Within the framework of this limitation, I suggest using the combination of ‘non 
domestic’ and ‘transnational concepts’ to be able to take advantage of both in this study. 
It means while we reduce home country bias (which is dominant in US families), we 
also have the advantage of long coverage of the data since 1965. I define this 
combination as ‘international patent families’ (IPFs) created by the aggregation of non-
domestic and transnational families. The trend of international patent families overlays 
non-domestic trend, as by definition, transnational patents should be a part of non-
domestic families. Nonetheless, in theory they might be a bit different, since the 
transnational families which have not still reached to national level are not included in 
operational definition of non-domestic families. This is because they should be 
registered at least in two countries.  
In sum, all the data and analysis presented in this study is based on IPFs drawn from the 
Derwent families database, unless stated differently. This combination partly 
compensates for home advantage bias, selection of more valuable patents, but at the 
same do not lose pre-1990s records of inventions when no international routes had been 
established for patenting. The trend of this data is shown as the dotted line in the figure 
2.1. 
2.6.4. Dataset imperfections  
There are two types of imperfections in our dataset which need special treatment. The 
first imperfection is the registration of firms’ inventive activities under different names 
in the dataset. This may create problems for our firm level analysis. This happens 
largely because different affiliates of the same company, particularly their branches in 
different countries may apply for patents independently using their official local names. 
The result is the attribution of the inventive activities to different company names which 
are in fact different affiliates of the same entity. The second problem is the large size of 
missing data (about 50%) in the PATSTAT inventors’ country. This large share of 
missing country data could distort our geographical analysis, if is not treated properly. I 
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managed to overcome both imperfections with acceptable precision levels as explained 
below. 
The Derwent database has partly solved the first problem by attribution of a 4-letter 
assignee code to major patentees with more than 1000 patents. They get the same 
assignee code if they are owned by the same entity, even if they patent under different 
names (Derwent, 2011). Using these 4-letter assignee codes could aggregate the 
inventive activities of big companies linking different affiliates to the same entity.      
Part of the problem however remains, because of the smaller patentees which do not 
have standardized codes. Their invective activities may be underestimated in the 
analysis, as their patents may be dispersed under different names. A process of manual 
matching for the entities with more than 30 patents was performed in order to reduce 
this problem. In other words, I searched for different names of the companies with more 
than 30 patent and grouped different affiliates together with a manually created code. 
This complementary procedure is expected to have reduced the margin of error to a 
large extent.  Nonetheless, given the reliance of my analysis on trends rather than 
absolute levels, the remaining imperfections should not affect the results.  
In order to solve the second problem and reduce the number of missing countries in my 
dataset, I implemented a relatively complicated procedure which is explained in 
appendix III. Three sources (of priority country, assignee country and main inventions 
country of patent assignees) are used in combination to estimate the inventor’ country 
with minimum margin of error. After the application of this procedure, only about 10% 
of the patent families remained with missing inventors’ country. We assume this 10% 
could not seriously change the results if is randomly distributed among countries.          
2.7. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I addressed different aspects of the research design through which the 
research questions are to be answered. I argued that a case study approach is the 
appropriate research strategy for this research, because it is focused on the 
contemporary phenomenon of dynamics of knowledge bases complexity in a natural 
setting. In addition, the nature of research questions which are of a ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
type suggests the case study as a suitable method. 
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With regard to the choice of the single case of upstream petroleum industry as the 
empirical setting of the study, I argued that this sector can exemplify both a critical and 
extreme case. It is a critical case for the analysis of dynamics of complexity and its 
impacts, because the sector has experienced some dynamics towards technological 
complexity. The industrial dynamics and transformations of the sector, in terms of 
structure and geography, provide a rich setting for study of industry evolution and the 
role of complexity in these transformations and reconfigurations. The sector can also be 
seen as an extreme case in two senses. First, it is often seen an extreme case and main 
culprit for resource curse, relative to other resource based industries. It is also an 
extreme case in terms of the quantitative methods applied based on the patent data. As a 
result, it can facilitate the replication of similar studies both in terms of the topic and 
method in other natural-resource industries.     
The broad analytical strategy for this research is pattern matching whereby the 
theoretical predicted prepositions are examined against empirical observations. Patent 
information is suggested as the primary source for this research providing rich 
information about the rate and direction of innovation and knowledge generation in the 
sector. The legal requirements of the patent authorities imply relatively high quality of 
the wide range of the data. This includes detailed classification of inventions as well as 
the location of inventors and applicants for a relatively long time period. While these 
advantages offer a good opportunity to answer the research questions, we need to be 
careful about some caveats in the patent data. The concept of international patent 
families is introduced to reduce two main challenges of patent data. This filter not only 
selects the more valuable patents which are important in analyzing innovation 
capabilities, it also reduces the home advantage bias that involved in studies based on 
families from single patent offices.            
Finally, it is explained how the dataset of international patent families in upstream 
petroleum industry created, tidied up and its imperfections are amended to provide a 
more reliable source of the data for this research. I explained that the Derwent database 
is chosen first, because it has a classification system which particularly recognises the 
upstream petroleum industry as a specific sub-section (H01) and also provides its 
records in qualified Derwent family format. The information of inventors’ and 
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applicants’ country which are not available in Derwent database is drawn from 
PATSTAT database which are matched and combined according to publication 
numbers. The amendment of missing country data through the combination of other 
sources and grouping of the companies with different names and affiliates in the dataset 
were the final stages. They reduce the imperfections in the dataset creating a reliable 
raw data for the analysis performed in this thesis.  
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3. Chapter 3: Sectoral Innovation Systems approach and dynamics of 
knowledge base complexity 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the sectoral innovations systems (SIS) approach as the broad 
analytical framework for this research. It explains the advantages of the framework in 
general and its relevance to the study of innovation in upstream petroleum industry in 
particular. It explains the building blocks of the SIS framework and also the main 
theoretical concepts employed in sectoral studies.  As such, the role of technological 
regimes in sectoral and geographical patterns of innovation is discussed. Two important 
features make SIS a relevant framework for this study. First is its attention to the role of 
knowledge base complexity as one of the important dimensions of technological 
regimes. Second is its dynamic perceptive on the nature of sectors.  
The central argument is that sectoral innovation systems should be analyzed in a 
dynamic perspective. In this framework, shifts in technological regimes over time could 
change the dominant sectoral and geographical patterns of innovation. While this 
dynamic relationship is conceptually acknowledged in the literature (Malerba, 2002, 
2005a), empirical analysis of this connection is dominated by a static cross-sectional 
mode of analysis (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1997). Likewise, the knowledge base 
complexity has been introduced as one of the dimensions of technological regimes. 
However, it has been relatively neglected in empirical studies of sectoral systems. This 
study extends the SIS literature in both respects by empirical examination of the role of 
knowledge base complexity incorporated within a dynamic analytical framework.   
Recent evidence has clearly documented that the creation and development of ‘high-
technologies’ are no longer the exclusive business of ‘high-tech’ industries (Robertson 
and Patel, 2007). Over the last two decades, ‘low-tech’ industries have become major 
contributors to the development of ‘high-tech’ knowledge side by side with advanced 
new industries. This contribution has not been just by creating a large and passive 
demand, stimulating adoption and diffusion of new technologies created in other 
industries. In fact, global corporations in traditional business areas have been actively 
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involved in development and introduction of new technologies. This role is visible even 
in paradigm changing technological domains such as ICT, biotechnology and new 
materials. Therefore, recent research10
Likewise, the traditional distinction between ‘mature’ and ‘emerging’ industries has 
been put into question, based on new evidence on innovativeness of old and traditional 
sectors (Acha and Brusoni; 2005). This distinction is largely based on conventional 
industry life cycle model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) which tends to conceptualize 
industries as “mortal corpus” (Acha and Brusoni; 2005). This approach assumes 
technological opportunities are being exhausted over time. 
 on innovation in traditional industries considers 
the low-tech high-tech distinction among industries as sometimes misleading. This 
classification implicitly underscores the innovative power of ‘old economy’ sectors 
(Robertson et al., 2009; Robertson and Patel, 2007; Mendonça, 2009).  
However, there is considerable evidence that this model was proposed based on 
industries of the first half of the twentieth century. This is not necessarily valid for the 
dynamics of many of today’s industries either in traditional sectors such as tyres (Acha 
and Brusoni; 2005; Brusoni and Sgalari 2006) or in modern sectors such as 
telecommunication and biotechnology11
Given these broad trends, we need a dynamic analytical framework which puts learning 
and innovation at the centre of analysis. First, it should take into account the 
technological complexities of the current status of industries. The innovative capacity 
and technological complexity of so-called mature and traditional industries such as the 
upstream petroleum sector are sometimes overlooked. Indeed, we may need to revise 
 (Grebel et. al., 2006). Although they develop 
over phases of change and transformation, it does not necessarily mean they lose their 
innovation and knowledge intensity over time. In contrast, there is pervasive evidence 
that mature industries are no less innovative than new industries (McGahan and 
Silverman, 2001). They can reinvent themselves from within and regain their innovation 
and growth capacities, after many years (Klepper, 1997).         
                                                          
10 For wider literature look at special issue of Research Policy Volume 38, Issue 3 on ‘Innovation in low 
and medium-technology industries’ (Robertson et al., 2009) 
11 In fact, it might not be accurate to look at some these modern sectors, as ‘industries’, because they are a 
bundle  of general purpose technologies with pervasive applications in other sectors 
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our old classification devices in the light of new phenomenon. Second, we should take 
into account different systemic factors that shape and influence leaning and innovation 
processes creating industrial dynamics. Third, we need to take a flexible and dynamic 
approach to the definition of sectoral boundaries, given the increasing and changing 
interdependencies among different industries.  
The concept of Sectoral Innovation Systems (SIS) was put forward to provide a 
multidimensional, integrated and dynamic analytical framework in line with these 
requirements. The SIS approach is a broad and flexible tool to study the dynamics and 
transformation of the sectors. Nonetheless, it does not assume a uniform pattern of 
development over which all industries are supposed to proceed. In contrast, it 
emphasises the differences among industries shaped by different technological and 
learning regimes. In particular, its focus on the role of knowledge and learning 
processes in transformation of the sectors and its flexibility for the definition of sectoral 
boundaries is very relevant. On top of these methodological features, knowledge base 
complexity - which is the focus of this research - is considered within SIS framework as 
one of the elements of technological regimes. This chapter aims to introduce the SIS 
approach and some related concepts.  The central emphasis is on dynamic perspective to 
knowledge base complexity as an important factor in shifting Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation and SIS transformations.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the SIS approach and 
its theoretical roots, features and main building blocks. A related sectoral classification 
of the patterns of innovation based on Schumpeter is presented in a dynamic perceptive 
in the section 3.3. The notion of technological regimes is the subject of section 3.4, as a 
core explanatory concept in SIS framework which shapes the Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation. The dynamics of knowledge base complexity is explored in the section 3.5 
as an under researched area in SIS approach. Section 3.6 discusses the links between 
technological regimes and geographical patterns of innovation. Section 3.7 summarises 
the analytical framework and key concepts discussed in the chapter as a template which 
integrated subsequent empirical and theoretical chapters.                 
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3.2. Sectoral innovation systems (SIS) 
This part introduces the Sectoral Innovation Systems (SIS) approach and explains its 
main theoretical contributions. It also briefly introduces Industry Life Cycle (ILC) and 
Industry Architecture (IA) as two related but different concepts to SIS, which are used 
in this research.   
“A sectoral system of innovation and production is a set of new and established 
products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market 
interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products” (Malerba, 2002, 
p.248) 
The concept of SIS draws from the traditions of evolutionary economics and systemic 
approaches to innovation. Attention to knowledge and learning processes, central focus 
on competencies and the dynamic approach come from the evolutionary camp. In this 
dynamic approach, SIS also has broad relevance to the industry life cycle literature 
(Utterback, 1994; Klepper, 1996) as well as the  research stream on long-term evolution 
of industries, as could be found in the writings of Schumpeter, Kuznetz and Clark 
(Malerba, 2002).  
It borrows its systemic approach from innovation system literature (Edquist, 1997), 
which focuses on actors, their relationship and interactions, and their institutional 
environment in which they operate. This concept is best understood as complementary 
to other similar concepts. National innovation systems focuses on national boundaries 
(Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1993) and regional/local innovation systems 
takes a regional boundary (Cooke et al., 1997). Technological systems focus on 
networks of agents involved in the generation, diffusion and utilization of particular 
technologies (Carlsson and Stankiewitz, 1995; Hughes, 1984; Callon, 1992). Although 
they vary in terms of analytical boundary, they consider the systemic nature of 
innovation processes. 
While SIS has many commonalities with these concepts in terms of its core analytical 
approach, it departs from all of them in its delimitation boundary at sectoral level. 
Accordingly, the central question that this approach tries to answer is “How and why 
innovation differs across sectors?” (Malerba, 2005a, p.14). In this view, sectors are 
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often defined based on related or substitutable product groups which serve a given or 
emerging demand with an underlying common sector specific knowledge. Building on 
these intellectual traditions, SIS provides a multidimensional, integrated and dynamic 
view of sectors in order to understand and explain structure and organization of 
innovative activities (Malerba, 2002). 
This approach often proposes three main building blocks to define and analyse sectoral 
systems: (for more information: Breschi. and Malerba 2000; Malerba, 2002, 2004, 
2005a & b) 
• Knowledge and technological domain 
• Actors and networks 
• Institutions 
The role of demand and user-producer interactions in the innovation process is also 
considered important in the innovation process. 
Knowledge and technological domain: 
The specific knowledge base, technologies and inputs are important elements of a 
sector.  In fact, they can set the boundaries for the sector in a dynamic perspective. 
Accordingly, as the knowledge base and working technologies of a sector change, its 
boundaries also change over time. In addition, complementariness and technological 
interdependencies are also important in defining relationships between sectors. The 
particular focus of SIS approach on the role of knowledge base and its characteristics in 
shaping the structure and organization of innovative activities is its attractive and 
relevant feature for this research. I will elaborate more about the knowledge base in the 
next chapter. 
Actors and networks: 
A sector is composed of heterogeneous actors of both firm and non-firm organizations 
(individuals, universities, research organizations, etc.). They are involved in the 
generation and introduction of innovations and production of goods and services. In the 
SIS approach, they are characterized by specific sets of beliefs, objectives, expectations, 
capabilities and learning processes. They may have different types of interactions and 
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relationships with each other from communications, knowledge exchange, and 
cooperation, to competition or command.  These relationships form the networks in 
which actors may have both market and non-market interactions. 
The types of networks and the structure of relationships may differ among sectors. They 
are shaped by knowledge base characteristics, learning processes, underlying 
technologies and their complementarities and interdependencies. The structure and 
pattern of innovative activities may change over time in the same sector, as a 
consequence of changes in the knowledge bases and relevant learning processes. In 
other words, the role of different actors and their relative position in the innovation 
network may change when new divisions of labour emerge.        
Institutions:  
Institutions are defined as norms, rules, laws, common habits and practices which shape 
actors’ cognition, actions, interactions and behaviour. They include both formal types 
such as rules which are legally binding or informal types which are established and 
accepted through practices.  
In addition to the three above mentioned building blocks, demand is often considered as 
a key part of the system. It is shaped by different types of users, their goals and learning 
processes, and their interaction with other types of agents. User-producer interactions 
are considered very important in the innovation process. Transformation of the nature of 
demand could play a very important role in the dynamics and evolution of systems, as 
will be seen in the case of upstream petroleum industry in the next chapter.  
SIS is a dynamic system which may change and transform over time in response to 
several processes. According to the evolutionary view (Nelson, 1995; Metcalfe, 1998), 
two very general processes of variety creation and variety selection could be identified. 
This variety creation and selection could refer to products, technologies, firms, 
institutions as well as actors’ strategies and behaviours with regard to R&D and 
innovation. More specifically, a sectoral system may experience evolution and 
transformation due to co-evolution of its various elements. For example, particular 
interactions between technology, industrial structure, institutions and demand are 
addressed in the literature (Nelson, 1995; Metcalfe, 1998). In this dynamic view, 
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transformation of existing sectoral systems as well as emergence of new ones is at the 
centre of analysis.  
For example, integration and creation of interdependencies between previously 
separated knowledge and technologies could change the configuration of the system and 
relationship between actors. It may lead to creation of new actors and removal of old 
ones (Malerba, 2005b). Of particular interest in this research is to analyze how changes 
in the knowledge base and learning processes could induce the process of change in 
sectoral systems of upstream petroleum industry.  Changes in the innovative behaviour 
of the agents and their relationship with each other are of particular importance. In 
addition, analysis of the role of demand in these dynamics and its transformation is 
important in understanding the dynamics of SIS in upstream petroleum. 
The transformation of SIS is related to other concepts which need clarification, because 
they are used in this research. The first is Industry life Cycle (ILC) and the other is 
Industry Architecture (IA). In fact, ILC is often regarded as one the main intellectual 
roots of SIS approach, since its early conceptual development (Malerba, 2002). 
Particularly, attention to the dynamics and transformations of sectors and the role of 
innovation and technical change in industrial dynamics in SIS approach partly come 
from this concept. Nonetheless there are some important differences. While ILC tend to 
takes a universal and uniform approach to cyclical developments of industry, the SIS 
approach highlights tentative differences between industries created by their 
technological regimes like appropriability conditions and their institutional 
environment. These conceptual and methodological differences give privilege to SIS for 
the purpose of this study, although the dynamic aspect of ILC remains valid in 
innovation systems approaches.  
ILC models are also proposed to explain cyclical regularities and industrial dynamics in 
parallel with the stages of PLC model, focusing on structural changes of industries in 
terms of number and size of the firms. In this framework, an industry is often created by 
a technological breakthrough within an existing industry or from other sources such as 
scientific discoveries (Klepper, 1997). At early stages, industry is very unstable and 
entry barriers are low, therefore large numbers of firms enter the industry. During the 
second phase when dominant design emerges, a shakeout happens as the number of 
 52 
entering firms decline and many firms leave the industry. A few most innovative 
pioneering firms and successful imitators tend to dominate the industry, thanks to 
increasing return to scale and become long-term survivors.  Shakeout wipes out those 
who are unable to cope with novelties and discourage new entrants. While product 
innovation is dominated in early stages, it is gradually replaced with process innovation. 
In the maturity phase of the sector, innovation rate declines (Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975).  
Niosi and Zhegu (2008) proposed that two categories of variables are left unexamined 
by ILC models. However the advantage of SIS approach is that it puts emphasis on 
these two categories of variables which deeply shape cycles of industrial dynamics and 
are important in understanding deviations from standard ILC models. The first category 
is institutions or what Nelson and Sampat (2001) call ‘social technologies’ which 
include social and organizational practices and public policies. According to their view, 
development of industries could be better understood as co-evolution of physical and 
social technologies. While ILC models pay attention to physical technologies in driving 
industrial dynamics, they neglect the role of institutional framework or social 
technologies. ILC models also have not analyzed the role of characteristics of 
knowledge and technologies underlying different sectors as the second neglected set of 
variables in evolution of industries, despite innovation are the starting point of these 
models.  
However as explained before, incorporation of both sets of variables i.e. institutions and 
technological regimes are the privilege of the SIS approach. At the methodological level 
and in contrast with ILC models, the SIS approach does not seek a uniform pattern of 
evolution through which all industries are supposed to proceed. Instead, it emphasises 
systemic understanding of the different factors that may push different industries in 
different directions. “One could characterize the ILC model as a search for one 
universal pattern of industrial evolution, and the SSI perspective as a tentative to 
underline the differences that institutional environments and technological 
developments impose to each industrial sector” (Niosi and Zhegu. 2008, p. 7). When the 
term ‘industry life cycle’ in upstream petroleum industry is used in this study, it does 
not assume the development of the industry according to standard ILC model. But, it 
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simply refers to observed cycles of the industry evolution which does not necessarily 
follow the conventional model.   
The Industry Architecture concept (IA) (Jacobides et al. 2006; Brusoni et al., 2009) is 
another notion close to the SIS approach. This concept is introduced in response to 
inadequacies in the conventional view of industry where the boundaries are implicitly 
fixed and given. Although the general questions the two concepts are seeking to answer 
are broadly different, they have some common methodological elements. While SIS 
approach is more concerned with structure and organization of innovative activities in 
different industries, IA focuses more on the analysis of vertical structure of the sectors 
in their production processes and organization of the value chains. The concept of IA is 
aimed to capture the rapidly changing boundaries of industries and shifting ‘roles and 
rules’ in the course of time (Jacobides et al. 2006). The dynamics of IAs capture 
evolutionary changes and pay attention to the stable but evolving relationships between 
different players along the value chain. It seeks to understand what makes sectors swing 
between integration and disintegration and how knowledge integration happens in the 
production processes (Brusoni et al., 2009). 
I use the term IA in this research to describe the evolution of the vertical division of 
labour among different agents in upstream petroleum industry in the next chapter. The 
comparison of the above definition with that provided for sectoral systems of innovation 
(and production) reveals several similarities. Encompassing different agents involved in 
a sector - as a set of related industries - and their heterogeneous knowledge and 
capabilities,   focusing on dynamics and transformation  and paying attention to the role 
of institutions, are the their major methodological commons. They also both pay 
attention to interactions between division of labour and division of knowledge in 
shaping industrial dynamics, although IA seems more concerned with  the former. In 
my view, if SIS is used in its broad expression (sectoral systems of innovation and 
production) it covers the notion of IA. Although these commonalities provide 
opportunities for more integration of the two concepts, I prefer to use them separately in 
this research to distinguish between production chain, and knowledge and innovative 
activities. Of course, the relationships between the two and their interactions are 
recognized and acknowledged, when necessary. 
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Some methodological issues are implied in the application of SIS framework which I 
consider in relation to the case of upstream petroleum industry in this research. They 
include level of aggregation, geographical boundaries and product boundaries of 
sectoral system (Malerba, 2005b). In terms of level of aggregation, this approach is 
flexible about the unit of analysis at higher or lower levels of firms and other actors 
such as groups of firms or firms’ subunits. As will be seen later, in the case of upstream 
petroleum industry, I used aggregated data both at sectoral level (sectoral patterns of 
innovation) and at the level of particular types of companies.  
Likewise, geographical boundaries of sectoral systems could be set at local, national and 
global levels and may also change over time, depending on the objectives of the study. 
In upstream petroleum industry both national and global levels of analysis have been 
used in order to capture catch-up countries, changing relative position of different 
countries and dynamics of international geographical patterns of innovation. In other 
words, innovative behaviour of catch-up countries is analyzed. In addition, we explore 
the geography of innovation at global level and analyze the role of different countries in 
shaping global dynamics of innovation.     
SIS approach is flexible in product boundaries from narrow to broad scope. The 
advantage of a broad definition is that interdependencies, linkages and transformations 
spanning wide ranges of products, processes, actors and functions are taken into 
account. This study applies a broad definition, covering all activities involved in 
exploration, development and production of oil reserves and other supporting activities 
classified in upstream petroleum industry. It is clear from these methodological features 
that SIS should not be viewed as “a rigid and closed framework, but as a broad and 
flexible framework, encompassing different elements and variables, according to the 
focus of analysis” (Malerba and Mani, 2009, p. 12). This study is in fact a clear example 
of these methodological flexibilities and its value for understanding different 
dimensions of sectoral dynamics.  
These methodological flexibilities and dynamic, systemic and integrated perspectives 
have attracted many scholars to study SIS of different industries both in advanced 
(Malerba, 2004) and developing (Malerba and Mani, 2009) countries. This framework 
also proved useful to study the international performance of countries in different 
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industries and understanding the factors behind their relative success or failures (Coriat 
et al., 2004). Analysis of sectoral systems could provide valuable insights for the design 
of technology and innovation policy at sectoral level. One main advantage of this 
approach for policy analysis is that it takes into account sectoral specificities and even 
different impacts of horizontal polices on different sectors (Malerba, 2003). This 
approach seems compatible with the new industrial policy approach (Rodrik, 2004, 
2007) which emphasises the role of policy in provision of sector-specific public goods 
via relevant institutional design.  
3.3. Sectoral patterns of innovation 
One of the core messages of the SIS approach is that sectors differ in terms of patterns 
and organization of innovation. Technology related factors or technological regimes are 
considered in shaping sectoral patterns of innovations in different industries. This 
argument is supported by showing that these patterns are systematically different across 
technologies, but remarkably similar across countries (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 
1997).  
A range of empirical studies has been performed in order to evaluate these ideas.  The 
main proposition is that industries and technologies differ in terms of pattern and 
structure of innovative activities. Within this broad claim, two complementary aims 
have been followed. First, is to distinguish between different technologies and industries 
in terms of their patterns of innovation. The result of these efforts usually has been the 
suggestion of some kind of taxonomies or typologies to distinguish between structures 
of innovative activities in different industries. In addition, researchers tried to 
understand the factors which could explain these various innovation patterns across 
industries. In other words, “how and why innovation differs across sectors?” (Malerba, 
2004, p.380). The concept of technological regimes is introduced as a set of industry 
specific factors to explain variation of patterns of innovation among different sectors.  
Inspired by the works of Schumpeter, one of the simple but powerful and heavily 
researched taxonomies is the distinction between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter 
Mark II sectors. Schumpeter identified two major patterns of innovative activities, 
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although the labels of Schumpeter Mark I and II were coined subsequently by Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982).  
Schumpeter Mark I was originally introduced in The theory of economic development 
(Schumpeter, 1934). It is characterized by creative destruction where new firms play a 
major role in innovative activities and barriers to entry in technological activities are 
low. New entrepreneurs continuously launch new companies and bring new ideas to the 
sector. They may introduce new forms of production and distribution which could 
disrupt the established practices in the sector and wipe out the quasi rents of previous 
innovators.  
In contrast, creative accumulation is the main characteristic of Schumpeter Mark II. 
Large established firms play major role in technological activities. It is challenging for 
new small innovators to enter into these industries. With regard to this new type, 
Schumpeter discussed the prevalence of the role of large firms and their big R&D 
departments in introducing new technologies in his next book , Capitalism, socialism 
and democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). Accumulated technological capabilities in large 
firms coupled with their production competencies and financial resources could create 
high barriers to entry for new firms.  
These two types are also labelled as widening and deepening by other scholars who 
tried to find empirical verifications for these two major patterns of innovation.  In a 
widening context, the innovation base of the industry is expanded by entry of new 
innovators while technological advantages of large firms are contentiously challenged 
and eroded. In contrast, the deepening context is characterized by the increasingly 
dominant role of a few large firms which accumulate innovation and technological 
capabilities over time. These two approaches became the subject of series of articulated 
empirical studies. (for example Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; 1996; 1997; Breschi et al., 
2000 among others). 
One of the central concerns of economics of innovation from the beginning has been 
empirical evaluation of these two archetypical patterns of innovation. Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1995, 1996, and 1997) launched empirical investigation of the very existence 
of these two patters of innovation, while they extended the notion of Schumpeterian 
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patterns of innovation at the same time. They explored the two patterns of innovation 
based on four indicators. Concentration and asymmetries (captured by the Herfindahl 
index) of innovative activities within firms, innovation size of the firms, stability of the 
ranking of innovators over time, and relative share of new innovators in comparison 
with the incumbents are the four indictors to distinguish between the two archetypical 
patterns of innovation in different sectors.  
As these indicators are used in the chapter 6, I briefly introduce them. The first indicator 
was suggested to understand whether innovations are concentrated within a few firms or 
distributed more evenly among large number of firms. The second is meant to explore 
whether small firms or large firms produce the bulk of innovation in any industry or 
technological area.  These are the two traditional indicators which are usually used in 
the analysis of the so called Schumpeterian hypothesis. The third indicator is aimed to 
capture the degree of stability or, turbulence in the innovation system. High stability is 
interpreted as the dominance of creative accumulation and low stability and high 
turbulence is an evidence for the dominance of creative destruction. The statistical 
analysis of these indicators produced quite reliable results, finding a meaningful 
relationship observed within these variables on the one hand, and distinguishing two 
archetypical Schumpeterian patterns of innovation on the other (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1995; 1996; 1997; Breschi et al., 2000).  
According to these four indicators, Schumpeter Mark I industries are defined as low 
concentration, small innovation size, and low stability in the ranking in conjunction 
with high new entries. Conversely, high concentration of innovative activities, large 
innovation size, high stability and low new entries characterize Schumpeter Mark II 
sectors. The two models could also discriminate empirically between traditional 
industries with characteristic pattern similar to Mark I, while modern industries like 
chemicals and electronics were found more similar to Mark II (Malerba, 2007).  
Two other important conclusions are drawn from the cross-sectoral comparison of 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation in different technological classes. First, it is 
concluded that Schumpeterian patterns of innovations are technology or industry 
specific, because of the observation of strong similarity in the same technology class 
across countries. It suggests that some common features of technological environments 
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could largely be responsible for the formation of patterns of innovation. These features 
of technological environment which are labelled as technological regimes are 
considered relatively invariant with respect to other features of the environments such 
as prices.  Second, despite the existence of these similarities across countries, country 
level variations in the same technological class are also sometimes quite significant. 
This is suggested to be the impact of particularities of national systems of innovation, 
their historical and institutional environment, or some special historical background of 
firms or industries (Malerba, 2007).          
Although this line of research achieved very important results, the findings suffer from 
two limitations. First, the methodology used does not allow for the observation of 
variations within technological classes and industries, because of the analysis at 
aggregated levels. Rather it forces every technological class or industry to be dropped 
just into one of the archetypical patterns of innovation. There is no theoretical reason to 
constrain thinking about the existence of combinations with both patterns in some 
industries. Second, the methodology employed does not allow for the observation of 
temporal variation in sectoral patterns of innovation within industries, simply because 
the time dimension is removed. Although authors clearly accept that the patterns of 
innovation may have changed over time, they again assume an average behaviour over 
the time for every single technology class (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
These limitations and assumptions have been addressed in more recent studies, but this 
gap is yet to be covered by more comprehensive studies. For example, Corrocher et al. 
(2007) observed the co-existence of both Schumpeterian patterns of innovative in ICT 
industry. Grebel et al (2007) also provided similar evidence, arguing the co-existence of 
large diversified and new technology firms within innovation networks in knowledge 
intensive industries like biotechnology and telecommunication. They actually 
emphasised the critical function of innovation networks which combine both 
“entrepreneurial and managerial routs to innovation, or as Schumpeter Mark I and II” 
(Grebel et al, 2007 p.66) for creation and diffusion of new knowledge in the knowledge 
economy. In their view, both patterns could be seen as complementary where new 
technology firms contribute in technical knowledge; while large firms are important in 
provision of organizational and market knowledge.                      
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Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) suggested the study of “changes in Schumpeterian 
patterns occurring during a technology and an industry life cycle” (P. 470) highlighting 
the importance of second limitation in the literature.  In other words, inter-temporal 
shifts in sectoral patterns of innovation is considered as an under researched issue. In 
the next article, they elaborated more, acknowledging the possibility of change in the 
nature of technological regimes over the course of time. “Some of these features of 
knowledge may change during the evolution of a specific sector or technology (degree 
of codification, independence, and complexity)” (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997. p. 97 
emphasis added).  
In a “theoretical-appreciative discussion” a few years later, they tried to push the 
boundaries of the research further linking technological regimes and patterns of 
innovation with a dynamic flavour. They concluded “... discussion of the relevant 
dimensions of knowledge ... are necessary for an understanding of innovative activities 
at sectoral level and their links with industrial evolution” (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000. 
p. 311, emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, this dynamic and inter-temporal approach to the nature of technological 
regimes and its possible association with evolution of sectoral patterns of innovation 
seems still to remain at the level of “theoretical-appreciative discussion” (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 2000. p. 311). Later in a review article about innovation and industry 
evolution, Malerba (2006, p. 14-15) concluded that “change in knowledge and 
knowledge base… goes to the heart of the evolution of the industries and of the factors 
affecting the change in industrial structure” (emphasis added). To the best of my 
knowledge no empirical quantitative study has addressed this relationship in an inter-
temporal mode of analysis, some years after cross-sectional studies provided empirical 
evidence12
                                                          
12 There are some valuable attempts to model the industry evolution and dynamics using history friendly 
(Malerba et al., 1999; Malerba et al., 2001, Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002; Malerba et al., 2008) and agent-
based models (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005) drawn from complexity theories. What is more missing is 
empirically grounded studies which analyze the dynamic relationship between technological regimes and 
sectoral patterns of innovation using quantitative methods.  
.  
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It is helpful to understand why this dynamic approach remained underdeveloped, in 
spite of repeated reminders about its importance and its methodological consistency 
with SIS approach. There are some possible ideas. First, although it is theoretically 
accepted that technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation may change 
over time, the concepts are often operationalised as a static variable. By definition, 
technological regime is usually considered as an invariant variable. This simply resulted 
in the prevalence of framing of the inter-sectoral questions instead of inter-temporal 
inquires. 
Second, change in patterns of innovation and technological regimes may take long 
periods of time and therefore it require long time-series.  Until recent times, these kinds 
of longitudinal data have not been easily available. In fact for the short time periods in 
which previous studies were designed, it was reasonable to assume that technological 
regimes and patterns of innovation have been constant. Third, it might not be 
analytically easy to tease out these dynamic and co-evolutionary relationships. “This is 
a very difficult task to accomplish, even for a single case study, let alone the 
identification of regularities and laws of knowledge change in sectors” (Malerba, 2006 
p. 14-15, emphasis added). 
Given the lack of these kinds of dynamic quantitative studies in SIS literature, we 
extend this line of reasoning by introducing a dynamic mode of analysis. This mode of 
analysis could unravel the organizational implications of change in technological 
regimes over time. The focus of this thesis however is on dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity, among other dimensions of technological regimes. This mode of analysis 
requires a dynamic reading of the concept of technological regimes, not to be 
considered as an invariant variable in long run. Rather, the methodology should be 
designed in a way to capture the dynamics of technological regimes and knowledge 
complexity.  The next section reinterprets the concept of technological regime in a 
dynamic approach.  
3.4. Technological regimes in dynamic perspective 
I have already defined the concept of technological regimes at a general level, as one of 
the core concepts which SIS literature suggests to explain variation of sectoral patterns 
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of innovation in different industries. In this part I describe the background of the 
concept and its main elements in the literature and how it could be viewed as a dynamic 
concept. If technological regimes are to be accounted as a variable over time, we need 
to understand how and why different elements of technological regimes may change 
over time. This dynamic reading of technological regimes allows exploring dynamics of 
knowledge base complexity as one of constituents of technological regimes and 
associated dynamics in sectoral patterns of innovation. 
The notion of technological regimes was first introduced by Nelson and Winter (1982) 
referring to the knowledge environment in which firms operate, or in which their 
problem-solving activities take place (Winter, 1984). They distinguished between 
science based and cumulative regimes, defined by their particular opportunity and 
appropriability conditions. The idea of technological regimes was further developed by 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1990, 1993) and was introduced as a synthetic concept 
constituted of several elements. In a more operational form, four main elements have 
been suggested which their combination defines different technological regimes. They 
include technological opportunity, the appropriability of innovations, their 
cumulativeness, and knowledge base properties (Breschi et al., 2000; Breschi and 
Malerba, 2000). 
The ‘Properties of knowledge’ base which refers to characteristics of knowledge 
underlying innovative activities is itself a synthetic construct encompassing the degree 
of specificity, tacitness, ‘complexity’ and independence (Breschi et al., 2000). This is 
where SIS is directly connected to the topic of this thesis, because knowledge base 
complexity, alongside other elements of technological regimes, is considered important 
in defining sectoral patterns of innovation.  
Technological opportunities refer to the likelihood of innovation in a particular sector 
resulting from a given amount of money invested in search processes. An industrial 
environment characterized by high technological opportunities provides strong 
incentives for innovation.  As a result, firms and other actors may come up with higher 
investments in innovation and frequent technological breakthroughs (Breschi, et al., 
2000). Industries considerably differ in terms of their technological opportunities and 
the rate of technological progress. Some industries express rapid technological progress, 
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while others are relatively slow in terms of innovation. According to Klevorick et al. 
(1995: 186-188), technological opportunity determines “the productivity of R&D” or 
“the set of possibilities for technological advance.” The concept was proposed to 
explain the different R&D intensity and technological progress in various industries 
based on the nature of technology.  
Technological opportunities stem from three main sources. However the level and 
significance of these sources may vary in any particular industry. First, the pool of 
technological opportunities may be expanded based on progress in scientific knowledge 
and techniques. Second, technological developments in other industries could contribute 
to technological opportunities. Third, positive feedbacks of technological opportunities 
in terms of resources could contribute to technological opportunities in subsequent 
periods (Klevorick et al., 1995).   
Given that each of these three sources may change over time, it is clear that 
technological opportunities could be defined as a dynamic concept. Over the life cycle 
of the industry, technological opportunities may significantly change. The standard ILC 
model assumes that opportunity conditions are depleted when industries get mature 
(Klepper, 1996). However, some empirical statistical analysis (McGahan and 
Silverman, 2001) case studies in mature industries (Acha and Brusoni; 2005) and 
research on innovation in low- tech industries (Robertson et al., 2009 & 2007; 
Mendonça, 2009; Hirsch-Kreinsen, et al., 2006; Von Tunzelmann and Acha; 2005) 
show that this is not necessarily the case. In other words, no simple relationship 
between industry life cycle and technological opportunities could be established. 
Technological opportunities could be influenced by multiple interactive factors. I 
analyze the dynamics of technological opportunities in upstream petroleum industry in 
chapter 6 and provide some explanations for the dynamics of observed pattern. 
Appropriability of innovations reflects the possibility of protection of innovation from 
imitation through various strategies to pay off the costs and earn profits. If these 
protection strategies could be effectively exercised, industries have high appropriability 
conditions. In contrast, appropriability would be low if there are widespread spillovers 
and there is no effective compensation mechanism. Companies employ different range 
of strategies to capture the benefits of their innovations.  They include patent or other 
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intellectual properties, vertical integration and control of complementary assets, or even 
shaping the ‘industry architecture’ (Teece, 1986; Levin et al.; 1987; Jacobides et al. 
2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007). 
This dimension of technological regimes also could be viewed as a dynamic concept. 
The level of appropriability could be seen as a function of firm’s strategies (like choice 
of patent or secrecy), their environment (such as patent laws and regulations), and 
nature of knowledge to be protected (such as tacitness). As a result, the level of 
appropriability of innovations in an industry might vary from time to time depending on 
change in these factors. 
Cumulativeness captures the degree to which today’s available knowledge and 
innovative activities form the foundation of future innovations. A high degree of 
cumulativeness creates some kind of path dependency and imposes challenges for 
jumping the stages of technological development. Cumulativeness and path dependency 
could appear at different levels. At the technological level it refers to the cognitive 
features of a particular technological domain and learning processes involved in that 
field. Cumulativeness at firm level arises when a continuous stream of innovations 
relies on competencies of specific firms. For example costly innovation processes, 
indivisibility of R&D projects and cognitive interdependencies between different 
technological domains or segments of the industry create advantages for large firms. 
This leads to higher barriers to entry for newcomers or small players. When the relevant 
knowledge base of a sectors is widely available for industry participants but not for 
outsiders, sectoral or industrial level of cumulativeness are present. Finally, if the 
stream of innovations depends on innovative capabilities of firms located in particular 
geographical territories (regions, countries, and so on), cumulativeness appears at a 
geographical level (Breschi, et al., 2000).  
Cumulativeness also may change over time and therefore could be conceptualized as a 
dynamic concept with temporal dimension. The literature on technological and 
industrial discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and technological paradigms 
(Dosi, 1982) have documented shifts in cumulativeness over time and the implications 
for industrial organization in the sector. Studying technological discontinuities in three 
industries, Tushman and Anderson (1986) found two important classes of technological 
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continuity. ‘Competence-enhancing’ discontinuities emerge where the industry 
experiences a radical innovation, yet largely based on existing accumulated knowledge. 
On the other hand, ‘competence-destroying’ discontinuities similarly introduce 
significant technological novelty to the sector, but based on knowledge and skill which 
are new to the sector and largely different from prior know-how. “While competence-
enhancing discontinuities build on existing experience, competence-destroying discontinuities 
require fundamentally new skills and technological competence. (p. 460)” As a result, 
competence-enhancing discontinuities are associated with higher knowledge 
cumulativeness which tends to favour incumbent firms. Competence-destroying 
discontinuities, by definition, reduce or remove the knowledge cumulativeness. 
Consequently, they tend to favour new firms equipped with new technical competences 
which are dissimilar to the previous knowledge of the sector. This situation may                               
offer opportunities for leapfrogging in catching-up countries, because there is not much 
advantage for incumbents compared to newcomers (Perez and Soete, 1988).  
Knowledge base properties: The degree of specificity, tacitness, independence and 
complexity are main properties of the knowledge base which are discussed in the 
literature of technological regimes (Breschi and Malerba, 2000). Specificity refers to the 
scope of applications of particular knowledge domain. Tacitness refers to the extent to 
which knowledge is not articulated in standard formats such as blue prints. Degree of 
independence which is often defined versus systemic knowledge base refers to the 
extent that relevant knowledge to the innovative activities could be easily isolated.  
Like other dimensions of technological regimes, these properties of the knowledge base 
could also change over time. The degree of specificity may change as available 
knowledge find new applications and inter-industry knowledge flows increase. Degree 
of tacitness also may change as a result of codification practices over the technology life 
cycle, new instrumentation and computational capabilities (Arora and Gambardella, 
1994) or facilitation of ICT (Steinmueller, 2000). 
The main point for this dynamic reading of different dimensions of technological 
regimes is the possibility of significant change over time. Therefore, we could 
reasonably expect the dynamics of sectoral patterns of innovation to present some kind 
of association with the dynamics of technological regimes. This is in fact the dynamic 
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extension of SIS approach where the concept of technological regimes is perceived as 
an important determinant of sectoral patterns of innovation. This could be seen as the 
overarching or grand hypothesis of this research. We aim to examine this broad idea in 
upstream petroleum industry at three sectoral, organizational and geographical levels, 
but with particular focus on knowledge base complexity among other dimensions of 
technological regimes.      
3.5. Literature gap:  dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
The complexity of knowledge base is the particular dimension of technological regimes 
with which I am most concerned in this research. From the perspective of literature on 
technological regimes (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Breschi and Malerba, 2000), a 
knowledge base is defined as complex if (a) it involves integration and combination of 
different scientific and technological disciplines and (b) requires a variety of 
competences (such as R&D, design and engineering, manufacturing, production and 
marketing) for innovative activities. 
Given the definitions provided, a close relationship between complex (vs. simple) and 
systemic (vs. independent) could be understood. The more systemic a knowledge base 
is, the more difficult to isolate the impacts of different parts of the system. Therefore 
innovation process requires access to and integration of different knowledge sources, 
wider competences and technological capabilities. This means that the underlying 
knowledge base is also complex.  Due to this conceptual closeness, I use the term 
complexity in a broad sense which also captures the systemic nature of the knowledge 
base. This issue will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5.   
Although knowledge base complexity is introduced as one of the important dimensions 
of technological regimes in the SIS approach, it is almost neglected in subsequent 
empirical research. Within the dynamic interpretations of technological regimes 
presented in previous sections, this section calls for the analysis of the relationship 
between the dynamics of knowledge base complexity and patterns of innovation. In 
fact, the topic is at the intersection of two main gaps explored in the literature. On the 
one hand, there is the missing dynamic mode of analysis in the literature as explained in 
the previous section. On the other hand there is the lack of enough attention to the role 
 66 
of knowledge base complexity, compared to other elements of technological regime. 
This is of particular importance in the context of latecomer countries where complexity 
could prevent technological catch-up. In addition, some conceptual ambiguities and 
theoretical inconsistencies in the analysis of geographical implications of complexity 
suggest an attractive space for academic contribution. Summarising the relevant 
research about dynamics of knowledge complexity, this section shows how this issue is 
relatively neglected in the literature.    
From previous research (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Breschi et al., 2000) we know 
that technological regimes provide satisfactory explanation for cross-sectional variation 
of sectoral patterns of innovation. Theoretically, we also expect inter-temporal variation 
of sectoral patterns of innovation associated with dynamics of technological regimes. 
Nonetheless, previous empirical research has only shown that a static relationship 
between technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation in cross-sectional 
studies is statistically significant. Quantitative and statistical analysis of the dynamic 
relationship between technological regimes and patterns of innovation has been largely 
neglected in previous research.  
Theoretical relationships between different dimensions of technological regimes and 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation have been widely discussed in the literature 
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; 1996; 1997; Breschi et al., 2000). From the analytical 
point of view, each dimension of technological regime could have particular impact on 
patterns of innovation. For example, ceteris paribus, a high degree of tacitness could 
lead to high concentration of innovation in some industries, because it limits knowledge 
spillovers to other firms. However, in reality different combinations of various 
dimensions of technological regime (opportunities, appropriability, cumulativeness, 
tacitness, complexity, and so on) could create different patterns of innovation. 
Previous studies established the relationship between technological regimes and patterns 
of innovation in an inherently static research design. This approach is not able to 
explore the dynamics of technological regimes and the associated sectoral patterns of 
innovation by definition. Nonetheless, there is now a priori theoretical reason that we 
could not expect the relevance of dynamic conceptualization of this relationship. In 
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other words, if one or several dimensions of technological regimes change over time, 
they are very likely to shape the ways in which firms organize their innovation 
processes. For example if codification of knowledge reduces the degree of tacitness and 
therefore facilitates knowledge transfer, we expect innovation processes to become 
more distributed.  
In addition to this static mode of analysis, partial coverage of technological regimes is 
another limitation in current statistical studies (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; 1996; 
1997; Breschi et al., 2000). While technological opportunities, appropriability and 
cumulativeness of knowledge are included in the analysis, tacitness, independence and 
complexity are often excluded. This could be attributed to the lack of reliable data and 
relevant proxies to capture these elements. In particular, the role of knowledge base 
complexity has not been addressed. This gap offers an attractive area for contribution. 
We need to understand how change in technological complexity might alter the patterns 
of innovation. This dynamic approach could have important strategy and policy 
implications, as both firms and governments need to adapt their approaches and 
decisions according to the relevant changes in the nature of technology. 
Although, this kind of dynamic approach is largely missing in quantitative and 
statistical studies, some qualitative case studies (Vale and Caldeira, 2008, Iizuka, 2009) 
have recently taken a dynamic approach.  The dynamics and transformation of sectoral 
systems are analysed based on changes in knowledge complexity. These qualitative 
studies could provide valuable insights and a clue for the formulation of relevant 
hypothesises. For example, the analysis of the footwear industry has shown how 
transformation of the traditional knowledge base of the sector to a complex system 
changed the organization of innovation. Driven by fashion and increasing importance of 
design, this knowledge complexity shaped more complex organization of innovation 
associated with increasing tacitness, cumulativeness and appropriability (Vale and 
Caldeira, 2008). Similar dynamic approaches have been recently also applied in the 
context of developing countries (Malerba and Mani, 2009). The relationship between 
change in the knowledge base and organization of innovative activities are addressed in 
evolution of salmon farming industry in Chile (Iizuka, 2009).  Although these studies 
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address the transformation of patterns of innovation in relation with change of 
technological regimes, our understanding of these industrial dynamics are still limited.  
This research aims to contribute in this gap in three ways. The first contribution is 
conceptual and theoretical. Among other elements of technological regimes, complexity 
has not been addressed in quantitative studies mentioned above - even in existing inter-
sectoral research - although it has recently gained the attention of scholars both in 
economics (such as Beinhocker, 2006) and economics of innovation (such as Antonelli, 
2011). In addition, there are some conceptual ambiguities about the definition of 
complexity, and theoretical inconsistencies about its impacts in the literature, which will 
be explained in chapter 5 and 7. I propose that a dynamic and three-dimensional 
perceptive to knowledge base complexity which distinguish between breadth, depth and 
systemic complexity could resolve some of these issues.  
Second, this study proposes a quantitative methodology for exploration of the dynamics 
of knowledge base complexity and patterns on innovation and the possible links 
between the two. In fact this is an extension of available static methods discussed above 
into inter-temporal analysis. In other words, I examine whether statistical quantitative 
methods which are employed in inter-sectoral studies could also reveal the association 
between dynamics of knowledge base complexity and patterns of innovation. The final 
contribution of this research is empirical. This research is an attempt to apply the 
suggested methodology and conceptualization to the case of upstream petroleum 
industry, as a relevant case.      
3.6. A dynamic perspective to geographical patterns of innovation  
In parallel to early developments in the analysis of relationships between technological 
regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation, discussions about geographical aspect of 
innovation patterns have also been on the research agenda. I have already mentioned in 
section 3.4 that cumulativeness could occur at local level due to geographically bounded 
externalities and creation of self-reinforcing mechanism which promotes spatial 
clustering (Breschi, 2000). In addition, effective knowledge exchange over distance 
could vary, depending on the properties of the knowledge base and their influence on 
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the ways in which firms organize the spatial boundaries of their innovative activities 
(Breschi and Malerba, 2000).  
Some studies have explored the link between sectoral patterns of innovation and 
international technological specialization providing supporting evidence (Malerba et al., 
1997; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Malerba and Montobbio, 2003). The application of SIS 
framework has been recently extended to the analysis of catch-up processes highlighting 
the importance of sectoral differences in catch-up strategies (Malerba and Nelson, 2010, 
Kim, Lee, 2008). In other words, sectors may differ in their potential for catch-up, as 
their learning and technology regimes may or may not be in favour of newcomers. 
Broadly speaking, what is common in these studies is their direct or indirect claims 
about possible links between technological regimes and geography of innovation. In 
other words, it is assumed that technological regimes could be an important factor in 
shaping geographical patterns of innovation.      
Breschi (2000) is a key study in addressing the theoretical relationships between each 
individual dimension of technological regimes and its geographical implications. His 
central claim is that technological regime does not only affect the way in which 
innovative activities are organized at sectoral level; it could have important 
consequences for the organization of innovative activities at spatial and geographical 
levels. In other words, learning, innovation and competition processes may occur 
among regions and countries in which companies are located. Therefore, there could be 
a close relationship between sectoral and geographical patterns of innovation. Similar to 
archetypical Schumpeterian patterns of innovation, two archetypical spatial patterns of 
innovation are introduced. They are high and persistent concentration (or concentrated) 
vs. low concentration (diffused) at geographical level. Each is expected to emerge under 
different technological regimes. The empirical findings support that technology specific 
factors (i.e. technological regimes) play a key role in shaping geographical patterns of 
innovation. 
Similar to sectoral patterns of innovation, such a theoretical relationship between 
technological regimes and geographical patterns of innovation is also expected to be 
valid inter-temporally. If the combination of dimension of technological regime changes 
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fundamentally over time, relevant and consistent changes at geographical level are also 
expected. For example, if cumulativeness of technologies is reduced, we expect to 
observe lower geographical concentration of innovative activities.  
There are several studies which document fundamental transformations of knowledge 
bases of different industries: both traditional sectors such as footwear (Vale and 
Caldeira, 2008), tyre (Acha and Brusoni, 2005), salmon farming (Iizuka, 2009); and, 
modern sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, telecommunication equipment and 
services, and software (Malerba, 2005b). Nonetheless, the reflections of these changes 
in the knowledge base are studied more at a sectoral level and very rarely at a 
geographical level, either nationally or internationally.  
Vertova (2002) is an exception, dealing with historical changes in the geography of 
innovation in different sectors. In her analysis, geographical concentration versus 
diffusion are analysed in both innovation growing and declining sectors.  Four different 
technological trends are explored. In her terminology, a technological leadership trend 
is characterised by geographical concentration of innovative activities in high 
innovation growth sectors. This trend is explained based on supportive national 
innovations systems in particular countries. By contrast, innovative activities of low 
innovation opportunities sectors may become geographically concentrated in country 
specific trends due to specific geographical relevance of those sectors.  A technological 
pervasiveness trend is associated with geographical diffusion in high growth sectors. It 
emerges due to widespread application of general purpose technologies in many 
industries. Conversely, a technological maturity trend is the feature of low opportunity 
sectors which have become available to many and therefore express geographical 
diffusion. She emphasises that both country related and technology related factors could 
be influential in changing geographical patterns of innovation, but she does not go into 
detailed analysis of these dynamics in different sectors.         
With particular focus on complexity among other dimensions of technological regimes, 
the present study aims to explore the association between the dynamics of knowledge 
base complexity and geographical patterns of innovation. This particular choice has 
mainly a theoretical reason. From a theoretical point of view, it seems that increasing 
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complexity of the sector is one of important cognitive barriers for entrance of 
companies from late comer counties, although high technological opportunities could 
potentially offer knowledge based path to industrial development. On the other hand, 
greater technological complexity could also force companies to disperse their innovative 
activities globally in order to get access to advanced knowledge produced in globally 
distributed centres of excellence (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007). These geographical 
aspects are discussed in chapter 7.   
3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter Sectoral Innovation Systems (SIS) is introduced as the broad analytical 
framework of this study with the capacity to address the role knowledge base 
complexity in dynamics of patterns of innovation. Technological regimes and sectoral 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation are described as the main theoretical concepts in 
the SIS approach. Their relationship has been the subject of theoretical analysis and 
empirical examination. Empirical evidence has broadly supported the critical role of 
technology and knowledge related factors in shaping Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation.           
In spite of the relative success in dealing with the relationship between technological 
regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation at conceptual and empirical levels, two 
important aspects have been relatively neglected. First, almost all quantitative empirical 
studies have taken an inter-sectoral design assuming technological regime as a time-
invariant variable. Nonetheless, it is broadly accepted in the SIS approach that both 
technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation could, in principle, change 
over time. In fact, this dynamic perspective and attention to the transformations of 
sectoral systems over time has been introduced as one of the methodological benefits of 
the SIS approach, although it is somehow neglected in subsequent quantitative studies.  
Second, knowledge base complexity is an under researched element of technological 
regimes from both conceptual and empirical aspects. Although conceptually, a dynamic 
reading of all elements of technological regimes is presented, the focus of this research 
is on knowledge base complexity. This is mostly because of its theoretical relevance to 
the questions of this research on the one hand, but also due to the lack of deep 
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understanding of the role of complexity in shaping patterns of innovation on the other. I 
think knowledge base complexity requires special treatment in academic debates around 
SIS. Not only are there conceptual ambiguities and theoretical inconsistencies about the 
role of knowledge base complexity in patterns of innovation. It is also a relatively 
neglected element, even in existing empirical inter-sectoral studies of the relationship 
between technological regimes and patterns of innovation.  
In order to show the broad relevance of the SIS approach for this study, a dynamic 
reading and interpretation of different elements of technological regimes and sectoral 
patterns of innovation are provided in this chapter. In addition, it is mentioned that 
geographical patterns of innovation could have close connections with technological 
regimes and be framed in a dynamic view. In other words, change of technological 
regimes over time could have implications for and reflections in both sectoral and 
geographical patterns of innovation. The dynamics of geographical patterns of 
innovation is important to be understood, because the aim of this research is to explore 
catch-up processes in upstream petroleum industry and their possible connection with 
dynamics of technological complexity. 
The review of present studies about relationship between technological regimes and 
patterns of innovation in sectoral innovation systems, presented in this chapter, shows 
that this study could extent SIS research in two important aspects. First, it is a new 
attempt to extend the quantitative methods used in inter-sectoral studies of the 
relationship between technological regimes and patterns of innovation in inter-temporal 
dynamic mode of analysis. This enables us to better understand the evolution and 
transformation of sectoral innovation systems. Second, the role of knowledge base 
complexity, as one of the less studied dimensions of technological regimes in shaping 
the dynamics of sectoral innovation systems, is deeply explored.  
Furthermore, industry life cycle (ILC) and industry architecture (IA) are introduced in 
this chapter, as two related concepts to SIS. I clarified in which sense they are used in 
this thesis and how they differ from the SIS approach. While ILC in its conventional 
sense tends to propose similar trajectories for all industries, SIS puts emphasis on the 
importance of differences among industries in terms of their learning regimes and 
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patterns of innovation. The notion of Industry architecture (IA) is another related and 
overlapping approach to SIS describing changing vertical division of labour over time. 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the literature background and the main 
concepts used in this research. This chapter not only revealed the gap in SIS research, it 
also provided a template in which all subsequent chapters are located and their 
relationship is clear. The next chapter can be seen as the twin of this current chapter 
where the key features and dynamics of upstream petroleum industry are introduced 
using sectoral systems and industry architecture concepts. The dynamics of knowledge 
base complexity of upstream sector is addressed separately in chapter 5, because it is a 
core concept of this research. Sectoral and geographical pattern of innovation are the 
subjects of chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Chapter 8 combines the results and 
summarizes the main conclusions of the research.    
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When Colonel Drake was drilling the first oil hole in 1869 in Pennsylvania (Babusiaux 
et al.; 2004 pp. 6), he never imagined he was launching a new era. An industry emerged 
which for some became a nice blessing, but for others brought curse (Stevens, 2003). 
The modern industrial era was built upon this black gold as the source both of energy 
and raw material for many economic activities. Its supply security became one of the 
main concerns of the international community. This is why the struggle for oil has been 
a source of many wars (Babusiaux et al.; 2004 pp. 4; Kaldor, 2007).  
Although petroleum has been introduced “as necessary to the economy as blood to the 
human body” (Babusiaux et al.; 2004 pp. 4), the industrialization experience of some 
countries like Japan and Korea shows that what matters is not necessarily oil ownership, 
but control over its supply. On the other hand, the resource curse story (Stevens, 2003) 
suggests that this industry can be the source of many misfortunes, if not managed 
properly. Nonetheless, some of today’s advanced countries have benefited hugely from 
their oil reserves. The benefits are not limited to enormous revenues, but include that 
industrial and technological capabilities emerged out of this industry and spilled over to 
other parts of the economy (Wright and Czelusta, 2004).             
Technological innovation has been proved to be a sustainable source of competitiveness 
and economic growth. This is not just the case for modern sectors, but equally important 
for so called ‘mature’ or resource based industries like the petroleum industry. If the 
natural resource based countries are to enjoy the long term benefits of their resources, it 
is necessary to revise the conventional view of resource industries and understand their 
capacity for innovation and technical changes. This is the core message of the 
‘knowledge’ or ‘learning’ approach to natural resources industries, as explained in the 
chapter 1. This chapter applies a sectoral innovation systems framework to the upstream 
petroleum industry and articulates the main drivers of innovation in different periods. 
The information provided is largely from secondary sources and published articles, 
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although innovation trends, major innovative players and the knowledge base of the 
industry is analysed according to the patent data that I have collected.   
After a brief historical background in section 4.2, the main characteristics and value 
chain of the industry are introduced in sections 4.3 and 4.4. Next, a broad picture of the 
dynamics of upstream industry architecture (IA) is presented in section 4.5. I explain 
how the roles of different types of players have been defined and have evolved and 
emphasise the main driving forces behind the evolution of the industry. 
In section 4.6, I focus on the transformation of the sectoral innovation system (SIS) of 
upstream petroleum. The aim is to explain the dynamics of innovation over different 
periods and the consequences of technological innovation in the sector. In addition, the 
knowledge base of the industry is explored and the main actors involved in innovation 
processes introduced.  
We find that the systemic and dynamic nature of SIS/IA frameworks provide a more 
comprehensive picture of industry evolution which the standard industry life cycle 
model is unable to show. The SIS approach captures both supply and demand factors 
and their evolving interaction, combined with industry architecture dynamics to analyse 
the industrial dynamics of the sector. We found that the upstream petroleum sector has 
gone through three main phases of transformation. These can be distinguished by 
different industry architectures and innovation systems. In addition, the analysis 
confirms the contribution of advances in scientific and technological knowledge and 
industrial innovation in development of the knowledge base. The main innovators are 
major players from within the sector, confirming this sector as an active and dynamic 
SIS which does not fit into the standard industry life cycle model.    
4.2. Historical background13
Historically, the Standard Oil Company dominated the American oil market from its 
creation in 1870 until 1911. A vertically integrated strategy, from upstream to 
downstream, was the tool used to control this profitable business. This legacy was an 
important barrier to easy entry of new companies. Large financial obligations created an 
oligopolistic market structure first in US and then at international level. However, 
  
                                                          
13 This historical background is largely drawn from Babusiaux et al (2004 ) 
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Standard Oil was broken into smaller companies (New Jersey as Esso then Exxon;  New 
York as Mobil; California as Chevron) following US antitrust policy. Together with 
four other newly created companies (Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-
Persian which later became BP in 1951), they formed ‘majors’ controlling a majority of 
the world oil production chain. The term ‘seven sisters’ were coined to describe the 
close relationships between these Anglo-Saxon companies. Their hegemony came to an 
end in 1980s after more than half a century, when national oil companies emerged and 
upgraded their position 14
The Great War taught some governments how important oil independence was for 
victories in international affairs. Anglo-Persian and Royal Dutch Shell were key for 
energy independence in British and Netherlands governments. Similarly, the French 
government established CFP (Compagnie française des pétroles), later named Total in 
1991(Babusiaux et al.; 2004, p.17). After the Second World War, some other European 
countries continued to establish their own government backed oil companies to secure 
their energy independence. ENI in Italy, ELF as the second national French oil company 
were two examples. IFP
 (Acha, 2002).  
15
From the late 1940s, the relationship between international oil companies and producing 
countries began to change as a consequence of the Second World War. Under pressure 
for a greater share of national wealth, Iranian petroleum was nationalized in 1949. 
Intensive competition and over supply of crude oil pushed down oil prices in late fifties. 
This triggered the establishment of OPEC
 also was established in France in 1944 seeking long-term oil 
independent by training, R&D and production of knowledge, technology and 
equipment.  
16
                                                          
14 For more information about history of seven sisters see: 
 in 1960 by the main producing countries to 
restore declining oil prices.  In addition, other political and economic events such as oil 
nationalizations in other Arab countries, the Six Day War, increasing oil consumption, 
and widespread concerns about world limited reserves prepared the scene in the sixties 
and early seventies for the first oil shock in 1973. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was 
the main source of the second oil shock which was exacerbated and continued by the 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Sisters_%28oil_companies%29 
15 Institut français du pétrole 
16 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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Iran-Iraq war in 1980s pushing oil prices up to $38/bbl. The trend of oil prices after 
1970 and the main influential factors is shown in the figure 4.1.  
 
Source: http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm Access on 17th January 2012 
Continued high oil prices and political instability in the Middle East encouraged 
western and other countries to diversify their supply sources. Concerns of scarcity and 
high oil prices also increased R&D investments making extraction from high 
exploitation-cost fields in harsh environments and deep offshore economically feasible. 
A counter shock happened in 1986 as a result of unilateral decision of Saudi Arabia 
when so-called 'net back contracts' were introduced. Although this decision was 
abandoned soon by OPEC, it was not very effective due to the increasing share of non-
OPEC producing countries. This structural balance stabilized low oil prices for nearly 
two decades, in spite of short time fluctuations. Technological innovation in upstream 
petroleum industry became a key to bring challenging reservoirs into stream, 
particularly in deep offshore. 
After the turn of the century, oil prices began to increase again relatively rapidly, except 
for a short period driven by the financial crisis in 2008. There are good structural 
reasons to expect that this increase will last into the medium to long term. The main 
Figure  4-1 Crude oil prices (based on 2010 adjusted dollar for inflation) 
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driver is suggested as increasing demand in big industrializing countries such as China 
and India. While there are structural limits on the supply side, these countries have 
rapidly expanded demand due to high economic growth rates. This is not limited to 
petroleum but applies to most commodities and resources (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; 
Farooki and Kaplinsky; 2011). This short history of the industry shows the high level of 
volatility and great involvements of politics and government policy. This historical 
perspective is helpful to explain the dynamics of innovation in the sector, as will be 
shown in the section 4.6.   
4.3. Industry characteristics 
Upstream petroleum projects have three main characteristics which influence industry 
structure. (1) They are highly capital-intensive (2) They are very long lasting in terms of 
investments and revenues and (3) They involve various kinds of technical, economic 
and financial, political and environmental risks. Partnerships among operators are 
efficient means of allocating resources enabling trade-off between meeting scale 
economy and high risk (Isabelle, 2001) 
In addition, the industry has a strong geopolitical element, because reservoirs are not 
uniformly distributed in the globe (Acha, 2002). It also involves considerable politics 
with high degrees of government intervention in most countries. This is because the 
sector is intertwined with the rest of the economy and instabilities could distort the 
operation of the economy. Due to the volatility in oil and gas prices, the industry also 
experiences cyclical conditions, and booms and busts are major features of this industry.   
4.4. Industry value chain 
The petroleum industry has a relatively long and complicated value chain. This begins 
with exploration and production of crude oil, continues with transport, refining and 
finally ends with retail distribution of oil products. Each segment itself could be 
disaggregated into more detailed activities which involve different ranges of players. 
Although the term petroleum industry is popular, this business covers production of 
both oil and gas, as they are usually discovered together with the same producing 
companies. The upstream petroleum industry, the focus of this research, comprises a set 
of related activities. It covers activities related to oil and gas exploration (and other 
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similar materials such as heavy oil, condensates and tar sands), developing the reserves 
for extraction, production over their lifetime and finally decommissioning after 
depletion. It also includes the business activities supporting and supplying these main 
activities.        
To understand this complex web of activities, there are different ways to categorize. 
Figure 4.2 explores the range of different specializations and activities. At the top, there 
are different ranges of operators directly involved in exploration, development and 
production activities (red box). They are tier 1 players involved in licensing, financing 
and organizing an upstream project. They outsource some value chain activities to 
supply and service companies. The services and products provided to first tier operators 
could be divided into five main categories (Oil and Gas UK Economic Report, 2011):  
• reservoirs, covering mostly geological activities such as seismic, data acquisition 
and processing, reservoir engineering and management; 
• wells, covering drilling, well completions and other related services such as 
cementing; 
• facilities covering design, procurement, engineering and fabrication, operation, 
maintenance, decommissioning and related consultancies; 
• marine and sub-sea encompassing marine/sub-sea engineering, construction and 
operations, pipe laying, diving and marine logistics; 
• general support and services to both operators and main contractors, ranging from 
direct support such as asset management, catering and logistics to health, safety and 
environmental services, IT, venture capital, corporate finance, accounting, banking, 
legal and insurance services. 
Tier 3 supply and service companies are sub-contractors of second tier contractors 
which usually manufacture equipment and provide specialized services. These 
categories do not necessarily define the firms’ boundaries. Upstream business is formed 
of systems of companies each occupying certain parts of the value chain. They 
cooperate and compete to bring oil and gas to the marketplace. However, their ‘roles’ 
may change and evolve, and the ‘rules’ governing them also vary from time to time. 
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Technological innovation can play a major role in shifting the boundaries and bring new 
players to the value chain. These dynamics are discussed in the next section.   
 
Source: Oil and Gas UK Economic report (2011)  
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/economic_report.cfm  accessed on 18th Jan 2012 
4.5. Dynamics of  Industry Architecture 
The historical division of labour encompassed oil entrepreneurs, prospectors 
(experienced geologists), drillers, roughnecks (skilled labour) and roustabout (semi-
skilled labour). The main defining lines of the industry have remained similar, 
distinguishing two main types of companies, i.e. oil operators and service and supply 
companies. While operators compete in markets for crude oil and gas, service and 
                                                          
17 The oil and gas UK economic report prefers the term ‘supply chain’ to illustrate the chain of activities 
from the perspective operators. Some authors also use the term ‘value chain’ to refer to the activities 
within firms while the term ‘value system’ is suggested for the network of activities connecting different 
firms (for example Porter, 1991). Since there is no standardized way of using these terms, I chose the 
term value chain to refer to the whole range of activities (functional approach) in upstream industry, 
simply because it seems more popular and sensible. 
Figure  4-2 Upstream petroleum industry value chain17 
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supply companies compete in the market for equipment and services required in 
upstream projects (Acha, 2002).  
To understand the industry, it is necessary to recognize the varieties of both operator 
and service companies. National Oil Companies (NICs) and private International Oil 
Companies (IOCs also known as majors) are the two types of operators, most of them 
also cover18
While IOCs mostly emphasise business and financial objectives, NOCs usually follow 
wider goals combining national, social, political and economic interests. In addition, 
independent companies are also becoming important players, focusing only on upstream 
operations. These operators are usually active in small or mature oil deposits, which are 
not attractive enough for big companies and do not need advanced technology.  
 midstream, downstream and even petrochemicals. Table 4.1 lists Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly (PIW) rank of world's top 50 Oil Companies in 2008, comparing 
NOCs and IOCs based on six operational criteria such as reserves, production, and 
market capital.  
There are a diverse range of supply and service companies in the upstream sector, 
competing in different segments. Table 4.2 lists the top 50 supply and service 
companies differentiated by their segments and ranked according to their market 
capitalization. In one perceptive, two main types of supply and service companies are 
observable. Integrated service companies provide a different range of services. They 
tend to provide integrated and total solutions. Drilling rig operations, EPC (Engineering, 
Procurement, and Construction) projects and full packages of logging and data services 
are examples of their activities (Acha, 2002). In contrast, there are specialized 
companies with a narrower range of activities in particular segments. Onshore or 
offshore drillers, equipment producers, seismic services and transportation companies 




                                                          
18 In this case they are known as vertically integrated oil companies 
 82 
PIW's Top 50: How The Firms Stack Up 
2008 
 
Company Country State Ownership 
 
1 Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100 
2 NIOC Iran 100 
3 Exxon Mobil US   
4 PDV Venezuela 100 
5 CNPC China 100 
6 BP UK   
7 Royal Dutch Shell UK/Netherlands   
8 ConocoPhillips US   
9 Chevron US   
9 Total France   
11 Pemex Mexico 100 
12 KPC Kuwait 100 
13 Sonatrach Algeria 100 
14 Gazprom Russia 50.0023 
15 Petrobras Brazil 32.2 
16 Rosneft Russia 75.16 
17 Lukoil Russia   
18 Petronas Malaysia 100 
19 Adnoc UAE 100 
20 Eni Italy 30 
21 NNPC Nigeria 100 
22 QP Qatar 100 
23 INOC† Iraq 100 
24 Libya NOC Libya 100 
25 Sinopec China 75.84 
26 EGPC Egypt 100 
27 StatoilHydro Norway 65 
28 Repsol YPF Spain   
29 Surgutneftegas Russia   
30 Pertamina Indonesia 100 
31 ONGC India 74.14 
32 Marathon US   
33 PDO Oman 60 
34 EnCana Canada   
35 Uzbekneftegas Uzbekistan 100 
36 Socar Azerbaijan 100 
37 TNK-BP‡ Russia   
38 Apache US   
38 CNR Canada   
40 SPC Syria 100 
41 Kazmunaigas Kazakhstan 100 
42 Devon Energy US   
42 Hess US   
44 Anadarko US   
44 Occidental US   
44 OMV Austria 31.5 
47 BG UK   
48 CNOOC China 66.41 
49 Novatek Russia   
50 Ecopetrol Colombia 89.9 
   
Source: http://www.energyintel.com/documentdetail.asp?document_id=648479 
 



























Source: http://www.petrostrategies.org/Links/service_companies.htm  
Operators have continuously shown some kind of cartelistic behavior. The ‘seven 
sisters’ were dominant by 1980s controlling about eighty five percent of world 
Rank Market 
Capitalization 
Company Industry Segment Market Capitalization,      
$ Million 
1 Schlumberger Ltd. International Integrated 39,775 
2 Halliburton Company International Integrated 17,244 
3 Baker Hughes Inc. International Integrated 9,367 
4 Transocean Sedco Forex  Offshore Drillers 9,330 
5 Weatherford International Oilfield Equipment 6,065 
6 Nabors Industries  Onshore Drilling 5,271 
7 Diamond Offshore Drilling Company  Offshore Drillers 4,963 
8 Noble Drilling Corporation Offshore Drillers 4,823 
9 ENSCO International  Offshore Drillers 4,119 
10 BJ Services Company Oilfield Equipment 4,534 
11 Global Marine, Inc. Offshore Drillers 3,730 
12 Smith International Oilfield Equipment 3,625 
13 R&B Falcon Corp.  Offshore Drillers 3,582 
14 Santa Fe International  Offshore Drillers 3,443 
15 Cooper Cameron Corporation Oilfield Equipment 3,419 
16 Rowan Companies Offshore Drillers 2,466 
17 National Oilwell Oilfield Equipment 1,810 
18 Helmerich & Payne  Onshore Drilling 1,643 
19 Tidewater Inc.  Transportation 1,579 
20 Colflexip Stena Offshore Diving/Construction 1,521 
21 Hanover Company  Oilfield Equipment 1,481 
22 Petroleum Geo-Services  Seismic Services 1,354 
23 Marine Drilling Company  Offshore Drillers 1,300 
24 Pride International Offshore Drillers 1,293 
25 Lone Star Technologies  Oilfield Equipment 1,156 
26 Global Industries  Diving/Construction 1,080 
27 Atwood Oceanics, Inc. Offshore Drillers 828 
28 Key Energy Services Onshore Drilling 791 
29 Patterson Energy Inc. . Onshore Drilling 787 
30 Cal Dive International  Diving/Construction 715 
31 Varco International  Oilfield Equipment 711 
32 Seacor SMIT  Transportation 665 
33 Tuboscope Inc. Oilfield Equipment 650 
34 UTI Energy  Onshore Drilling 572 
35 Grey Wolf  Onshore Drilling 558 
36 Veritas DSG  Seismic Services 554 
37 Carbo Ceramics  Oilfield Equipment 471 
38 Maverick Tube Corp.  Oilfield Equipment 469 
39 McDermott International  Diving/Construction 460 
40 Oceaneering International Diving/Construction 375 
41 Unit Corporation Onshore Drilling   356 
42 Input/Output Inc. Seismic Services 311 
43 Parker Drilling Company  Onshore Drilling 310 
44 Stolt Comex Seaway Diving/Construction 285 
45 Offshore Logistics  Transportation 269 
46 Friede & Goldman Oilfield Equipment 269 
47 Trico Marine  Transportation 198 
48 TETRA Technologies  Oilfield Equipment 169 
49 Seitel Inc. Seismic Services 158 
 50 Gulfmark Offshore Transportation   151 
 
51 Gulf Island Fabrication  Diving/Construction 148 
Table  4-2 Top 50 Oil and Gas Service Companies 
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petroleum deposits. The wave of nationalization in producing countries led to the 
emergence of a new ‘seven sisters19
The new ‘seven sisters’ are not however homogenous, with a high level of coordination. 
In addition, their managerial, organizational and technological capabilities are still far 
behind what the IOCs accumulated over time. They follow different motives, interests 
and strategies. Figure 4.3 is a heuristic illustration of the variety of NOCs, positioning 
them alongside two dimensions - technological competence and production status. 
Some of them are national asset holders, others market, technology, finance or strategic 
resource seekers. While some of them are losing production levels and their technical 
capacities have been challenged, some of them like Petrobras and Petronas have caught 
up technologically with many IOCs. It might not even be accurate to call some of them 
NOCs anymore; as they are listed in international financial markets and their operations 
are dispersed globally.  
’. They are predominantly state-owned companies. 
They controlled about one third of oil and gas production and more than one third of 
world reserves in 2005. In contrast, the share of old ‘sevens sisters’ group – are now 
merged into four companies- reduced to about 10 percent of oil and gas production and 
3 percent of world reserves (Hoyos, 2007). 
Historically, IOCs became vertically integrated - upstream, midstream and downstream 
-  to be able to manage the impacts of oil price volatility and avoid supply interruption 
for downstream activities (Penrose, 1971; cited in Acha, 2002). Therefore, there was no 
technical reason to integrate upstream to downstream, but economic and political factors 
forced backward vertical integration (Weston et al., 1999). Chandler (1990) provides 
examples of American oil companies to support his theory of vertical integration and 
formation of multidivisional firms. In his view the ‘visible hand’ of big companies 
seemed more efficient to cope with market expansion and cost reductions after World 
War II (Acha, 2002).  
In addition, horizontal integration in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has 
been one important feature of the upstream industry. One important wave of M&As 
                                                          
19 They include Saudi Aramco, Russia’s Gazprom, CNPC of China, NIOC of Iran, 
Venezuela’s PDVSA, Brazil’s Petrobras and Petronas of Malaysia 
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among majors occurred in the early and mid-1980s to regain their position after 
nationalization of their assets in producing countries. Weston et al., (1999) adds that 
M&A in that period was not particular to oil industry. Global forces such as technical 
change, globalization, privatization and instability pushed many other industries to 
consolidate.  
 
  Source: Hoyos (2007). 
Collapse of oil prices in mid 1980s was a major driver for industry restructuring and 
emergence of a new industry architecture. As a result of sustained low oil prices, oil 
majors implemented cost reduction programs to increase their efficiency. Fluctuations 
around the average low prices drove them to change their cost structure from fixed to 
variable. They chose to lease many types of equipment from service companies 
previously owned by them. The aim was to increase flexibility and responsiveness to 
change (Weston et al., 1999). This created a massive opportunity for supply and service 
companies to takeover some parts of the activities previously done by operators. 
Technological progress in the industry and the need for specialization was probably 
another driver.  
These forces altered the division of labour between operators and supply and service 
companies. Oil operators reevaluated their activities to explore their real competitive 
domain and redefine their core and non-core areas. Their new strategy was to focus on 
Figure  4-3 The relative position of the new ‘seven sisters’ 
 86 
their competitive advantage. Exploration of productive reserves and efficient 
management of these assets over their long life cycle became the major competitive 
domain of operators. The provision of equipment and services in different phases of 
exploration, development and production of reserves became the responsibility of 
supply and service companies (Acha, 2002).  
The 1986 counter shock was a key turning point for oil service companies, pushing 
them towards horizontal and vertical integration strategies (Babusiaux et al., 2004). 
Similar to operators, service companies also restructured themselves in order to increase 
efficiency, faced with a declining market in the second half of 1980s. They redefined 
their portfolios, focusing on what they considered their main expertise, selling less 
relevant units. An external growth strategy was also undertaken by smaller specialized 
service companies in drilling and geophysical services (Barreau, 2002). The result was 
the relative expansion of specialized supply and service companies in the sector. 
Some major supply and service companies gradually began to provide a broad range of 
services to their clients to meet their expanding needs for bigger and more complex 
exploration and development projects. ‘Total solution’ or ‘integrated solution’ gained 
momentum as a customer relationship strategy when operators requested more packaged 
services instead of discrete activities. This increasing demand for integrated services 
pushed big supply and service companies to build project management and integration 
capabilities, which was previously the territory of operators.  
Alteration of industry architecture and technological advancement resulted in 
productivity improvement and cost reduction in the industry. From the mid-1980s to 
mid-1990s, the average cost of finding and lifting oil fell considerably. This happened 
in spite of the upward trend expected, stemming from the aging of existing fields and 
decline in easy access deposits (Fagan, 1997). Nonetheless, there was a ceiling for this 
downward trend and began to rise in the mid-1990s. Continued declining oil prices 
concurrent with natural rise of exploration and development costs got oil majors into 
trouble. Stock markets responded to low rate of returns. Funding new projects became 
difficult in the environment of volatile and declining income trends. The result was the 
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rise of mega mergers in late 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the costs and risks of the 
industry and mobilize resources.20
In spite of these consolidations, IOCs underperformed financially in most of the last 
decade compared to NOCs and service companies (Benayoun, and Whittaker, 2009). 
This reflects the limited growth opportunities for IOCs under their current business 
model, as they are not able to replace depleted reserves while most NOCs control their 
national reserves. In addition, the IOCs’ historical differentiating expertise – such as 
technological capabilities, financing capabilities, and system integration and project 
management capabilities - has been challenged. Less investment in technology and 
outsourcing of many technical and engineering parts to service companies transformed 
the role of IOCs. They changed from project executor with in-house capabilities to 
become a project orchestrator and system integrator relying on a network supply and 
service companies (Benayoun, and Whittaker, 2009). 
.  
In fact, this third stage of evolution evolved from the second phase, triggered by a 
search for a fuller degree of integration and exploitation of interactions and synergies 
between different activities. Near the turn of the century from 1998 to 2001, service and 
supply industry experienced mega mergers in which very big companies expanded their 
size while at the same time refocused their activities. These changes under continuous 
low oil prices had distinguishing features. First, the scale of acquired assets was much 
larger. Second, the scope of integration encompassed several service segments for major 
service companies. The overall result was an unprecedented record of industry 
consolidation, similar to what happened to major operators in the same period (Barreau, 
2002).        
These architectural adjustments created a very concentrated service sector. According to 
Babusiaux et al. (2004), three service majors accounted for more than 70% of total oil 
and gas service market at the end of the century. The share of these giant companies 
reached over 90% in directional drilling and logging, the segments which are highly 
knowledge intensive. In 2009, the top four companies in the exploration and evaluation 
                                                          
20 The list of merges is as follows: BP/Amoco/Arco; Total/Elf/Petrofina; Exxon/Mobile; Chevron/Texaco 
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services market accounted for about 80% percent of market share (GBI Research, 
2010).  
The behavior of the sector over the last decade seems puzzling at first glance, compared 
with the 1980s period. Prolonged low oil prices after 1986 began to reverse in 2002, 
expressing a sharp rising trend. Nonetheless, M&A activities have continued with an 
even stronger pace particularly since 2006 (Davies, 2007). While low oil prices in late 
1980s triggered waves of M&A to enable service companies to survive, M&A activities 
continued in the high oil price environment of 2000s when the service sector is 
performing well. This M&A trend is still ongoing and industry analysts expect much 
more to come (Pfeifer, 2011; Lazarov, 2011). This suggests that consolidations in both 
periods do not necessarily follow the same logic and must be explained according to 
different mechanisms.    
Directly related to oil prices, demand for petroleum supply and services has been 
different among these two periods. A shrinking market and low demand triggered 
consolidations in the late 1980s and 1990s. In the post 2002 period “increasing demand 
and high crude prices are underpinning merger and acquisition activity” (Pfeifer, 2011). 
It is clear that downturn in the service market pushes consolidation, because it creates 
economy of scale and scope and higher returns for shareholders. We may call it ‘market 
led’ mechanism for consolidation operating under declining and low profit markets.  
Clearly, the same argument cannot be applied to post 2002 period as prices are high and 
the service market is growing fast. Experts’ opinion on drivers of recent consolidations 
in service sector could be informative. The Director of Energy at McGladrey Capital 
Markets and an expert in M&A activities, explained recent  M&A activities as follows:  
“Due to the service-intensive nature of unconventional wells, large integrated service providers are best 
suited for this type [ i.e.unconventional] of drilling. These service-intensive development and exploration 
areas require the broad-based product and service offerings and global footprint that the large integrated 
vendors can provide. ... Another catalyst for OFS acquisitions is technology as major players continue to 
look for companies that can deliver the innovative drilling technology required in areas such as shale 
extraction. The industry's shift toward horizontal drilling and advanced completion/stimulation techniques 
has been a seminal event for OFS vendors, transforming what had been a relatively sleepy, mature sector 
into a hotbed of activity and technological innovation.” (Lazarov, 2011)[Emphasis added] 
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Another example is the view of Chad Deaton; Bake Hughes' CEO on acquisition of BJ 
services: 
 “will better position us to drive international growth and to compete for the growing large integrated 
projects by incorporating pressure pumping into our product offering,” (Baker Hughes, 2009).  
He also emphasises that companies should be large enough to afford the high R&D 
costs required for increasingly large complex projects.  
It is clear from these quotes that change in the nature and ‘quality’ of demand (e.g. 
service-intensive nature of unconventional wells or size and complexity of the projects) 
and its technological imperatives play a key role in the recent M&A activities. We may 
call this post 2002 consolidation more ‘technology led’, because it is a route for access 
to, and integration of different advanced technologies enabling companies to operate in 
complex upstream projects. 
Compared with ‘market led’ consolidations in 1980s and 1990s, ‘technology led’ 
drivers seem dominant in post 2000 M&A discourse. Meeting these technological 
requirements involves high R&D costs which are not affordable by small companies. 
This new environment in upstream petroleum industry is more favourable to big 
vertically integrated companies with patterns of innovation which is closer to 
Schumpeter Mark II.  We examine this hypothesis regarding the change in sectoral 
pattern of innovation in the chapter 6.  
In sum, dynamics of industry architecture express three different phases since 1970. The 
first phase is the period of oil shocks when operators have a dominant role. The second 
phase is the period of collapse of oil prices. This triggered M&A activities among 
majors and service companies, and at the same time accelerated outsourcing strategies. 
The result was the relative expansion of specialized supply and service companies. The 
third phase is the period of gradual vertical integration of major service companies. This 
enabled them to cope with the increasing demand for total and integrated solutions that 
operators called for. We addressed the dynamics of industry architecture or sectoral 
production system of upstream petroleum industry in this section. The next section 
discusses the nature and dynamics of sectoral innovation system.  
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4.6. Sectoral innovation system 
The aim of this section is to explore the role of technological innovation in the evolution 
and dynamics of this industry using the SIS framework and identify the main actors 
involved. As explained in chapter 3, the advantage of this framework is its systemic, 
integrated and dynamic approach and its focus on the knowledge base of the specific 
sectors. First, I review critically (in section 4.6.1) the theoretical frameworks concerning 
drivers of innovation in the upstream sector. It is shown that a simple linear 
supply/demand analysis provides a partial picture of the industrial dynamics of the 
sector. Next, in section 4.6.2, I provide an updated trend of innovative activities in 
upstream petroleum industry to examine and refine the suggested theoretical 
frameworks. It is shown that dynamics and transformations of the sector could be 
understood more comprehensively within SIS/IA frameworks. In addition I provide a 
description of the nature of the knowledge base in section 4.6.3 and of the main 
innovators in the sector in the section 4.6.4. This section provides a background for 
further analysis of the dynamics of knowledge base complexity in the next chapter.   
4.6.1. Drivers of innovation  
According to Isabelle (2001), incentives for innovation in the upstream petroleum 
industry remained very weak for about fifty years from the 1920s when it was 
internationalized. However from 1970s onward, technical challenges in the industry 
made innovation much harder. This was reinforced by the oil counter shock of the 
middle 1980s which induced fierce competition. She labels the first period as 
‘technological tranquillity’ and the second one as ‘technological revolution’. According 
to her view, international oil companies were largely relying on exogenously given 
technologies in the first period, while they subsequently became active creators of new 
technologies. 
Her theory of innovation recognizes two driving factors, technical demands operated 
from the 1970s, reinforced by competition pressures induced by low oil prices after 
1986. From the technical point of view, industry was experiencing long-term 
diminishing marginal cost from 1920-1970s, relying on easy access to increasingly 
giant reserves. Reserves were found largely in the Middle East and in other parts of the 
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world where international oil companies could operate. The formation of the seven 
sisters in 1928 created an oligopolistic structure where competitive forces for innovation 
remained weak. 
From the early 1970s the situation changed dramatically. Nationalization of the 
petroleum industry in many countries lowered easy access to cheap oil, and big 
reservoirs became unsecure and limited. There was no alternative but to seek oil in 
remote harsh areas like Alaska and the North Sea which required new sophisticated 
technologies. This technical demand was amplified by competitive pressures driven by 
low oil prices after 1986. From this perspective, oil prices have had a negative and 
indirect effect on innovation channelled through competitive pressures.       
Thurston and Stewart (2005) suggest a more comprehensive theory adding a supply-side 
technology push aspect to Isabelle’s (2001) demand-pull theory. The empirical analysis 
of Thurston and Stewart (2005) concludes that major shifts in supply of externally 
created technology and the expected demand for new techniques during high oil prices 
drove innovation in the petroleum industry. Their empirical evidence, however, has 
some inconsistencies with Isabelle’s (2001) framework.  
The first inconsistency is the ‘technological tranquillity’ period before the 1970s. The 
collected evidence shows that both demand and supply side forces have driven 
innovation in the sector, even before 1970s. Second, the historical data do not support 
the Isabelle idea that the competitive environment induced by low oil prices after 1986 
has driven innovation. The reason seems to be lack of enough financial resources for 
R&D investment, even if competitive pressures increased, as Isabelle (2001) claims. 
The typical behaviour of companies in weak market conditions is production at 
marginal costs where little profit is left to be spent in very risky activities like 
innovation. In addition, high exploitation cost reservoirs are not economically viable in 
low price conditions. Therefore demand for new advanced technology is weak. We 
already know that the first response of both operators and service companies to low oil 
prices was cost reduction and restructuring programs and less R&D expenditure, as 
discussed in section 4.5.  
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The theoretical framework of Thurston and Stewart (2005) predicts a proliferating 
landscape for the future of innovation in oil and gas. This is due to the coincidence of 
both strong demand forces stemming from increasing exploration and development 
(E&D) expenditures, and external technology diffusion into the upstream petroleum 
industry from other new industries. In the next section, we see how a systemic 
perspective completes this picture and sheds light on innovation dynamics. 
4.6.2. The dynamics of innovation in SIS perspective 
In this section, we take a systemic view to explain the dynamics of innovation. We 
found that simple correlation analysis of supply and demand factors is not sufficient to 
explain these dynamics. In contrast, the SIS approach equipped with a systemic and 
evolutionary perspective not only considers the supply and demand factors, but also 
how they interact with industry architecture in different phases. The combination of 
these factors shapes the rate of innovation in different periods. The trend of oil prices 
presented in figure 4.1 is considered as both supply and demand factor. It pushes 
innovation through higher R&D investments. It also pulls innovation through 
stimulation of demand for new techniques, because it makes more complex and 
expensive deposits economically viable.    
Figure 4.4 presents the innovation trend in the upstream petroleum industry according to 
the number of patent applications in the US patent office (solid line). The dash-line 
shows the trend of total patenting in USPTO at 1% scale to control for technology push 
factor. In other words, we could understand the extent to which observed dynamics of 
innovation in upstream sector is a reflection of technology push from other sectors, or 
the result of internal mechanisms within the sector.  
According to figure 4.4, the dynamics of innovation in upstream petroleum industry 
presents three distinct periods over the last four decades. From the early 1970s until the 
mid-1980s, we observe a growing trend where the number of US patent applications 
almost doubled from about 700 per year in 1970 to about 1450 in 1984. The second 
period runs from 1984 to 1994, with a negative trend in innovation. Third period begins 
after 1994 when industry grows and looks very innovative. 
 93 
The first period corresponds to the first and second oil shock periods when oil prices 
were very high and worries of oil scarcity dominant. These two factors provided both 
powerful motives for upstream R&D investment. The aim was to open up more 
challenging reservoirs in harsh locations and the key was technology. These 
technological efforts were enormously successful to bring down exploration and 
production (E&P) costs and increasing reserve replacement ratios. The stable trend of 
total patenting in this period suggests that the rise of innovation is not attributable to this 
trend and should be explained according to other factors.  
Combined with other geopolitical factors, explained in section 4.2, this technological 
progress consequently led to excessive supply, pushing down oil prices for more than 
one and half decades. This self-correcting mechanism brought the upstream industry 
into the second period when patenting took a negative trend from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s. This negative feedback loop could be seen as a long term and indirect 
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According to Hotelling’s law (Babusiaux et al.; 2004, pp.45) oil price is a function of its 
scarcity. Scarcity is also subject to change according to available technology. Therefore, 
oil prices seemed to have negative impacts on innovation in the long term, although it 
Figure  4-4 The number of US patent applications over time 
P1 P2 P3 
 
 94 
drove innovation in the short term.  This is because availability of better technology 
provided by R&D investments in the first period reduced the level of scarcity. In other 
words, technical progress enhanced access to more and cheaper resources which led to 
oversupply of crude oil and other fossil fuels. In the longer term, it decreased oil prices 
and weakened demand side forces for innovation.  
In addition to interacting supply and demand forces, it is argued that firm size and 
industry structure is an important determinant of innovation. In an empirical analysis of 
the US oil industry in the 1970s, Teece and Armour (1976) showed that industry 
divestiture has a harmful impact on innovation in the sector, particularly with regard to 
big high-risk and long-term R&D programs. The main explanation is that minimum 
scale economy will be lost in smaller companies. In addition, vertical disintegration 
prevents synergies between different parts of the value chain and may block interactions 
between research activities and applications. The argument favours more a concentrated 
and oligopolistic structure for technological leadership, contrary to Isabelle’s (2001) 
competition argument.        
The second period shows about a 15% decline in upstream innovation while total patent 
application moves in the opposite direction expressing more than 70% growth over that 
period. This suggests that low oil prices have been an important disincentive for 
innovation, although total patenting has been growing fast. In other words, availability 
of technological opportunities from other industries is not very effective when demand 
for innovation is week. As seen from the last section, organizational innovations such as 
rationalization, reorganization and M&A activities might be more appropriate and less 
risky strategies. This rejects Isabelle’s (2001) proposition that low oil prices stimulated 
innovation, because of a more competitive environment. 
The third period is more complicated to analyze. While there is no large change in oil 
prices until 2002, nor technology-push trend (dash line in the figure 4.4) compared to 
second period, the innovation performance of the industry has dramatically increased. 
The number of patent applications for upstream petroleum industry grew from about 
1250 in 1994 to 3350 in 2005 experiencing about 170% growth. In fact, this period 
could be labelled as a real ‘technological revolution’ or even ‘technological explosion’. 
The key question is what factors are responsible for this radical shift? What is striking is 
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that oil prices stayed low for most of this period. In spite of low oil prices, the 
innovation trend in upstream petroleum took a sharp onward trend after 1994, at least 6 
year before rising oil prices.  
Several possible complementary explanations could be suggested for this innovation 
jump. At first glance technology push theory could help. As is evident from figure 4.4, 
total patent applications increased from about 19,000 in 1994 to more than 39,000 in 
2005 showing almost 105% growth, meaning 35% more than its growth rate in the 
second period. Although this seems acceptable as part of the answer, it is not sufficient 
for explaining the very radical shift in upstream innovation.  The minus 15% growth 
rate in second period increased to about 170% over the third period, a185% increase in 
growth rate. Ceteris paribus, we expect a 35% increase in innovation growth as the 
function of technology push mechanism. The rest of the gap between should be 
explained by other factors.  
According to the historical context, the explanation could be completed by the 
combination of demand side and industry architecture. There is supporting evidence, as 
explained in sections 4.5 and 4.6.1, that emergence of ‘qualitatively’ very different and 
powerful demand for innovation is partly responsible for the recent technological 
revolution of the industry. The cost of finding and lifting oil which had a downward 
trend for about 15 years began to rise since 1995 (U.S. EIA, 2011). This is a sign of 
approaching end of easy oil. The nature of services, equipment, design and engineering 
in upstream projects should be adapted to geological location and geophysical 
characteristics of the reservoir such as the shape, size, temperature, and type of rocks. 
As time goes by, easy oil both in terms of the location and other characteristics is 
depleted and companies look for more difficult less-accessible locations and more 
challenging types of material to extract. Advanced and complex technology became a 
matter of survival, not just a tool for higher profits.  
Nonetheless, available industry architecture, formed mostly of operators and specialized 
service companies, was not very efficient to cope with new technological imperatives of 
the sector. Given low oil prices and limited resources for innovation, more efficient 
industry architecture is required to increase the productivity of the innovation system.  
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The emergence of new large integrated service companies could be seen as a key factor 
in the rise of productivity in the innovation system. Larger scale M&A activities moved 
the sector to a more concentrated industry structure which for Teece and Armour (1976) 
is more favourable for innovation. This systemic analysis suggests that reconfiguration 
of industry architecture was an organizational industry-wide response to the new 
technological requirements. This industry restructuring enabled the sector to express a 
surge in innovation trend, in spite of continued low oil prices. This analysis suggests 
that a systemic and dynamic approach is helpful to explain the dynamics of innovation 
and sheds light on transformations of sectoral innovation systems. In addition to supply 
and demand related factors, SIS approach considers their dynamic interactions with 
industry architecture over time.   
Although petroleum industry is not usually recognized as an innovation and patent 
intensive sector, this traditional measure of innovative activity confirms that flow of 
innovation has experienced a ‘technological explosion’ since 1995. This picture is not 
compatible with the standard version of industry life cycle theory (Utterback and 
Abernathy, 1975) which assumes that mature industries usually become exhausted of 
innovation. Our patent database does not cover the period after 2005. Yet, we expect 
that such acceleration in innovation trends has continued as a result of marriage of high 
oil prices, depletion of easily accessible reserves, increasing share of unconventional 
reserves, and diffusion of general purpose technologies from other industries into the 
upstream sector. All in all, the service intensity of E&P activities and their knowledge 
content have been incredibly increased over time, such that Surya Rajan from IHS 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates says:  
“If all technological innovations produced by the oil and gas industry were added up, they would 
probably rival NASA’s space program or the Industrial Revolution.” (Rajan, 2011. p. 11) 
4.6.3. Knowledge and technologies  
One of the fundamental building blocks of SIS is the knowledge base which feeds the 
innovation process in the sector. Accordingly, the boundaries of each sector may change 
from time to time as the knowledge base of the sector evolves and working technologies 
change. Patent data is a very informative and detailed source to trace domains of 
knowledge contributing to different sectors. I present here some analysis of the main 
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knowledge domains in upstream petroleum based on both the International (IPC) and 
Derwent patent classification systems. According to the nature of these classifications, 
IPC could illustrate the knowledge domains mostly in terms of their scientific and 
technical discipline. Derwent on the other hand could shed light more on their industrial 
application (Acha and Brusoni, 2005). Nonetheless, they are not always clear cut and 
these classification schemes may overlap.  
Table 4.3 summarises the numbers and shares of patents in each IPC section at the 1-
digit IPC level. It shows that all 8 main IPC sections contribute to the knowledge base 
of the industry, though their shares greatly vary from about 40% at the top for fixed 
constructions (E) to about 0.4% at the bottom of table for textile and papers (D). Table 
4.4 provides similar information at more disaggregation levels, showing very unequal 
distribution in classes and sub classes. Sometimes, the main technological domains are 
identified easier by looking at disaggregated data, because aggregated groups refer to 
functions rather than technological disciplines. 
Rank One digit IPC class (Section) Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 E:FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS 26,000 39.21 39.2 
2 C:CHEMISTRY; METALLURGY 13,101 19.76 59 
3 B:PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING 8,988 13.55 72.5 
4 G: PHYSICS 8,245 12.43 85 
5 F:MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING 6,978 10.52 95.5 
6 H:ELECTRICITY 1,707 2.57 98.1 
7 A:HUMAN NECESSITIES 1,037 1.56 99.6 
8 D:TEXTILES; PAPER 253 0.38 100 
Total    66309 100 100 
 
As tables show, in the section fixed constructions (E), drilling technologies and a 
variety of related techniques to survey, test, or complete the oil wells are included. In 
addition, hydraulic engineering for subsea constructions is a major area. Chemistry is 
the second largest contributing section which covers near 20% of inventions. It includes 
a different range of chemical processes such as organic and inorganic compounds, and 
solutions to environmental challenges.  
 
Table  4-3 Knowledge domains of upstream petroleum: 1 digit IPC  
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Main 




E21B-043 Methods or apparatus for obtaining oil, gas, water, soluble or meltable materials or a slurry of minerals from wells  7.81 
E21B-033 Sealing or packing boreholes or wells 4.46 
E21B-047 Survey of boreholes or wells  3.35 
E21B-017 Drilling rods or pipes; Flexible drill strings; Kellies; Drill collars; Sucker rods; Casings; Tubings 2.75 
E21B-007 Special methods or apparatus for drilling 2.21 
E21B-023 Apparatus for displacing, setting, locking, releasing or removing tools, packers or the like in boreholes or wells 2.13 
E21B-021 Methods or apparatus for flushing boreholes, e.g. by use of exhaust air from motor 1.61 
E21B-019 Handling rods, casings, tubes or the like outside the borehole, e.g. in the derrick; Apparatus for feeding the rods or cables 1.59 
E21B-034 Valve arrangements for boreholes or wells 1.58 
E21B-010 Drill bits  1.51 
E21B-049 Testing the nature of borehole walls; Formation testing; Methods or apparatus for obtaining samples of soil or well fluids, specially adapted to earth drilling or wells  1.51 
E02 HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING; FOUNDATIONS; SOIL-SHIFTING 2.47 
C 
C09 DYES; PAINTS; POLISHES; NATURAL RESINS; ADHESIVES; 5.77 
C10 PETROLEUM, GAS OR COKE INDUSTRIES; TECHNICAL GASES CONTAINING CARBON MONOXIDE; FUELS; LUBRICANTS; PEAT 2.99 
C08 ORGANIC MACROMOLECULAR COMPOUNDS; THEIR PREPARATION OR CHEMICAL WORKING-UP; COMPOSITIONS BASED THEREON 2.85 
C07 ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 1.76 
C04 CEMENTS; CONCRETE; ARTIFICIAL STONE; CERAMICS; REFRACTORIES 1.29 
C02 TREATMENT OF WATER, WASTE WATER, SEWAGE, OR SLUDGE 1.24 
C01 INORGANIC CHEMISTRY 0.9 
B 
B63 SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VESSELS; RELATED EQUIPMENT 2.16 
B23 MACHINE TOOLS; METAL-WORKING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 1.04 
B65 CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL 0.59 
G 
G01V GEOPHYSICS; GRAVITATIONAL MEASUREMENTS; DETECTING MASSES OR OBJECTS 5.84 
G01N INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES  2.16 
G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING  1.08 
F 
F16 
ENGINEERING ELEMENTS OR UNITS; GENERAL MEASURES FOR PRODUCING 
AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MACHINES OR INSTALLATIONS; 
THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL 
5.58 
F04 POSITIVE-DISPLACEMENT MACHINES FOR LIQUIDS; PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS OR ELASTIC FLUIDS 1.49 
F25 
REFRIGERATION OR COOLING; COMBINED HEATING AND REFRIGERATION 
SYSTEMS; HEAT PUMP SYSTEMS; MANUFACTURE OR STORAGE OF ICE; 
LIQUEFACTION OR SOLIDIFICATION OF GASES 
0.6 
F17 STORING OR DISTRIBUTING GASES OR LIQUIDS 0.54 
H 
H01 BASIC ELECTRIC ELEMENTS 0.97 
H04 ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE 0.81 
A 
A61 MEDICAL OR VETERINARY SCIENCE; HYGIENE 0.6 
A01 AGRICULTURE; FORESTRY; ANIMAL HUSBANDRY; HUNTING; TRAPPING; FISHING 0.49 
D D21 PAPER-MAKING; PRODUCTION OF CELLULOSE 0.14 
Table  4-4 Knowledge domains of upstream petroleum: technological areas based 
on 3, 4, or 7 digit IPC classes 
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Derwent Section Percent Derwent class Percent 
Q Mechanical 92.89 
Q49 Mining 66.12 
Q67 Pipes, joints, fittings 5.62 
Q42 Hydraulic engineering, sewerage 4.71 
Q24 Ships 3.90 
Q56 Pumps 2.36 
Q66 Valves, taps cocks 1.90 
A Polymers and Plastics 28.14 
A97 Miscellaneous goods not specified elsewhere 10.83 
A14 Other substituted mono-olefins, PVC, PTFE 3.15 
A88 
Mechanical engineering, tools, valves, gears, 
conveyor belts 2.79 
A25 Polyurethanes, polyethers 1.67 
A93 Roads, building, construction flooring 1.54 
A11 







S03 Scientific Instrumentation, photometry, calorimetry 14.20 
S02 
Engineering Instrumentation, recording equipment, 
general testing methods 
3.72 
E General Chemicals 11.45 E19 
Other organic compounds general - unknown 
structure, mixtures 
2.65 
E36 Non-metallic elements, semi-metals (Se, Te, B, Si 1.76 
E17 Other aliphatics 1.61 
X Electric Power Engineering 10.81 X25 Industrial Electric Equipment 
9.27 
P General 10.26 P43 Sorting, cleaning, waste disposal 
1.37 
P41 Crushing: centrifuging, separating solids 1.20 
D 
Food, Detergents, 
Water Treatment and 
Biotechnology 
7.70 
D15 Treating water, industrial waste and sewage 2.32 
D21 Preparations for dental or toilet purposes 1.23 
J Chemical Engineering 5.77 
J01 
Separation including e.g. evaporation, crystallisation 
etc. 3.61 
J04 
Chemical/physical processes and apparatus 
including catalysis 
1.38 
T Computing and Control 4.91 T01 Digital Computers 3.75 
W Communications 4.29 W05 Alarms, Signalling, Telemetry and Telecontrol 2.27 







L02 Refractories, ceramics, cement 
3.01 
G Printing, Coating, Photographic 2.70 G02 Inks, paints, polishes 
1.60 
F Textiles and Paper-Making 2.38 F09 
Paper-making production of cellulose, chemical 







K08 Nucleonics, X-ray techniques 
1.22 
V Electronic Components 1.88       
C Agricultural Chemicals 1.32       
B Pharmaceuticals 1.08       
U Semiconductors and Electronic Circuitry 0.64       
 
Table  4-5 Knowledge domains of upstream petroleum: industrial applications 
based on 1, 3 digit Derwent classification codes 
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The main category in Section B (about 14%) is allocated to performing operations and 
transportation. This covers ship engineering and vessels used for offshore operations. 
Geophysical sciences and electric digital processing to visualize the collected 
information are main categories in the section G which stands for Physics covering 
more than 12% of the patents. 
Table 4.5 illustrates the main industries in which patents have been co-classified in 
addition to upstream petroleum (H01). These figures signal the degree of knowledge 
base overlap between upstream petroleum industry and other sectors. The data is 
provided in 1-digit and 3-digit levels of aggregation, because of very uneven 
distribution of patents. The table rank is based on section percentages and within each 
section according to class percentages.  
As may be expected, mining (Q49) is the most similar industry to upstream petroleum 
in terms of the knowledge base, because more than 66% per cent of patents of upstream 
have also applications in the mining industry. Within the same section, pipes, hydraulic 
engineering, shipping, pump and valves are also important.  Polymer and plastic 
industry is the next important industry accounting for about 28% of patents. Scientific 
and engineering instrumentation industry is in the next position with share of near 18%. 
The main lesson from this table is the diversity of industries which play a role in one or 
another segment of the upstream petroleum industry. One implication is that in order to 
have a strong and developed upstream petroleum industry, a region or country needs a 
diverse range of other industries. On the other hand, if a country is competitive in these 
overlapping industries, it can exploit this knowledge in some segments of upstream 
sector. 
4.6.4. Key actors and players  
Upstream petroleum is sometimes understood as a kind of passive innovation system in 
which the main source of innovation is outside the sector. This view is embedded in 
resource curse theories reviewed in the chapter 1 where resource based industries are 
not considered as technologically dynamic sectors. In other words, it is assumed that the 
sphere of innovation is mostly the responsibility of other industries which produce new 
tools and techniques for oil exploration and production operations. According to this 
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view, the role of oil companies is to guide innovation processes as ‘users’ by 
articulating their needs and requirements. At most, they may play the role of ‘lead users’ 
(Von Hippel, 1986) providing product concepts and design to facilitate the innovation 
process by external innovators, or fund R&D activities. In terms of Pavitt’s taxonomy 
(Pavitt, 1984), this would be an example of supplier-dominated sectors such as textile 
and services where new technologies are embodied in new equipment and capital goods. 
Learning by doing and using is the dominant form of learning process. Nonetheless, 
Pavitt and Von Hippel have not explicitly talked about the upstream petroleum industry. 
As we will be seen in this section, and also with more elaboration in chapter 6, this is a 
very simplistic view of the innovation process in this sector. This view might have been 
accurate in the early developments of the industry, but is no longer valid. Not only are a 
diverse range of actors within the upstream sector involved actively in the innovation 
processes, but their roles and patterns of interaction in networks of innovation have 
changed, along with market and technological dynamics. Analysis of the upstream 
sector does not support a static and technologically passive picture. In contrast, the 
systemic and dynamic perspective of SIS approach sheds new light on the active role of 
internal actors of the sector in innovation processes.  
Table 4.6 presents the list of top 50 innovators in upstream petroleum industry ranked 
based on the number of the patents registered in the Derwent Innovation Index between 
1965 and 2009. This table classifies the actors according to their role in the industry, 
distinguishing between integrated oil companies (IOCs), integrated service companies 
(ISCs), research and development institutes (R&D) and specialised service and supply 
companies (SSCs)21
                                                          
21 The six top service companies which provide services and systems in different segments of upstream 
sector have been put in the category of integrated service companies, although the first three are often 
known as integrated service companies. Weatherford, Smith International, Dresser Industries were also 
added to this category because of their diverse range of products and services and also the similarity of 
their patenting behaviour. The scope of company activity is largely drawn from their websites and related 
Wikipedia.  Apart from these 6 companies, other service and supply companies are classified as 
specialized supply and service companies, because they largely chose a particular scope of upstream 
activities.   
. The main business segments of the companies are also presented. 
In addition, the period over which their patenting activities are reflected in our database 
is specified. As is clear, not all of them are still active due to the large number of 
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mergers and acquisitions in upstream industry (grey in the table 4.6). The main M&A 
activities and their year of occurrence are also listed22
Some key insights from this table shed light on the characteristics of the innovation 
system of upstream petroleum. These top 50 patentees account for more than 50% of all 
patents in the sector. It is evident that six ISCs are ranked almost at the top of the list, 
holding nearly 43% of the share among Top 50s. The actual number of ISCs is currently 
4 as the result of M&A activities. 16 IOCs are the second group in the list accounting 
for more than a 27% share. Their current number is 9 because of M&A activities that 
occurred in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. 
. The patents of different 
affiliations of big companies are assigned to the parent company.        
The IOCs and ISCs together are responsible for a more than 70% share among the top 
50 patentees. Apart from two R&D institutes with a share of nearly 6.5%, the rest (23%) 
is registered by 26 SSCs companies whose number also reduced to 15 because of 
M&As. Altogether, 30 entities from these 50 were active by 2009. According to this 
information, upstream oil and gas players have been major contributors to the upstream 
SIS, whether as ISCs, IOCs, SSCs or R&D institutes. Among these top 50 patentees, 
there are only 10 companies where their main business is not oil and gas, accounting for 
about 8 % of the innovation share.  
                                                          
22 The sources of this information are mainly company websites and related Wikipedia. A fuller summary 
of this information and the patenting trend of individual companies is available on request. There, it is 
specified how the data set has treated the companies after M&A activities. The simple rule is that major 
companies continued after M&A and smaller ones abandoned. For example, Exxon Mobile is a name 
assigned to Exxon after M&A and continued for the merged entity while Mobile is abandoned after 1999 
when it was merged.       
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Table  4-6 Top 50 patentees in upstream petroleum industry over 1965- 2009 based on Derwent Innovation Index  




Main Business Main M&A** 
1 Schlumberger ISC 3073 1966-2008 Integrated service company 1965 Forex(A); 1984 Sedco(A); 1985 Geco(%50A); 
2000 Western Geophysical(%70A);  2006 Western 
Geophysical(%30A) 
2 Halliburton ISC 2560 1965-2008 Integrated service company 1998 Dresser(M) 
3 Baker Hughes ISC 1682 1968-2008 Integrated service company 1987 Hughes Tool Company(M) 
4 Shell IOC 1190 1966-2008 Integrated oil company - 
5 Weatherford ISC 814 1973-2008 Integrated service company 1973 (F) 
6 Exxon Mobil Co. IOC 808 1965-2008 Integrated oil company 1999 Mobil(M) 
7 IFP R&D 749 1965-2008 Research institute in petroleum - 
8 PRAD R&D R&D 638 1979-2008 R&D in particulate/multiphase processes 1979 (F) 
9 Texaco IOC 618 1966-2000 Integrated oil company 2001  Chevron(M) 
10 Smith International ISC 555 1969-2008 Supplies products to gas and oil production and 
exploration companies 
2010  Schlumberger(M) 
11 Mobil oil corporation IOC 545 1967-2000 Integrated oil company 1999 Exxon(M) 
12 Dresser Industries ISC 456 1967-2004 Technology, products, and services used for 
developing energy and natural resources 
1998 Halliburton(M); 2001 separation again 
13 Camco International SSC 409 1968-2002 Drill bits - Completion equipment 1998 Schlumberger(M) 
14 Vetco SSC 351 1968-2008 Oil and gas equipment, services 1991 ABB (Owned); 2007 GE(Ac. By) 
15 ConocoPhillips IOC 314 1966-2007 Integrated oil company 2002 Phillips(M); 
16 Chevron IOC 311 1966-2007 Integrated oil company 2000 Texaco(A) 
17 BJ Services Co. SSC 298 1965-2008 Pressure pumping and oilfield services  1974 Hughes Tool Company(Ac. By); 1989 dissolved to 
be part of Baker-Hughes; 
18 Sofitech SSC 273 1988-2006 - 1988 (F) 
19 Amoco IOC 271 1967-1998 Integrated oil company 2001 BP(M) 
20 Otis Engineering Co. SSC 257 1971-1992 Elevators, escalators and moving walkways - 
21 Elf Aquitaine IOC 254 1968-2000 Integrated oil company 2000 Total(M) 
22 BP IOC 243 1978-2008 Integrated oil company 1998 Amoco (M), 2000 Arco(M) 
23 Cooper Cameron SSC 227 1984-2008 Pressure control, processing, flow control and 
compression systems 
1989 Cooper(M) 
24 Statoil IOC 226 1983-2008 Integrated oil company 1972(F) 
25 Hughes Tool Co. SSC 224 1966-1992 Oil drilling rigs 1987 Baker(M) 
26 Dowell Schlumberger SSC 223 1980-2001 Pumping services for the oil industry - 
27 FMC Corporation SSC 221 1968-2007 Pumps and subsea systems  - 
 104 
28 Marathon Oil Co. IOC 220 1965-2006 Integrated oil company  
29 Arco IOC 217 1965-1999 Integrated oil company 2000 BP(M) 
30 M-I SWACO SSC 216 1989-2008 Drilling fluids (mud) 1999 (F) 
31 Western Atlas SSC 197 1977-2000 Geophysical services 1998 Baker Hughes (Ac. by) 
32 The Dow Chemical Co. SSC 194 1966-2007 Plastics, chemicals, and agricultural products - 
33 Varco SSC 179 1978-2006 Oil drilling rigs 2005 National Oilwell Varco(M) 
34 Phillips Petroleum Co. IOC 177 1965-2002 Integrated oil company 2002 Conoco(M) 
35 BASF SSC 159 1969-2008 Chemical company   
36 Total IOC 147 1968-2008 Integrated oil company 1999 Petrofina(M); 2000 Elf(A) 
37 National Oilwell Varco SSC 141 1986-2008 Oil drilling rigs 1987 (F) 
38 Hydril SSC 133 1967-2007 Pressure Control technologies - 
39 NL Industries SSC 133 1968-1988 Component and chemical products  - 
40 Sandvik SSC 128 1977-2008 Tooling, stainless steel alloys and materials 
technology, mining and construction 
- 
41 Kvaerner SSC 127 1982-2007 All facets of engineering and construction, 
including shipbuilding, process technology, 
engineering and construction 
2005 Aker(M) 
42 ABB Offshore Systems SSC 125 1983-2007 Oil and Gas Equipment, Services 2004 Vetco(Ac. By) 
43 Union Oil Co. of 
California 
IOC 125 1965-2002 Oil operator 2005 Chevron(M) 
44 Rhodia SSC 119 1990-2008 Chemicals and new technologies - 
45 Petrobras IOC 119 1983-2008 Oil operator - 
46 Sumitomo Metal 
Industries 
SSC 118 1970-2007 Manufacturing Seamless Pipes and Tubes - 
47 Christensen SSC 115 1969-1990 Directional drilling company 1987 Baker Hughes(Ac. by) 
48 Nalco Chemical Co. SSC 106 1967-2006 Chemicals and water treatment - 
49 Baroid Indust. Dril. 
Products 
SSC 105 1975-1997 Drilling products and services 1991 Haliburton (Ac. by) 
50 Cooper SSC 100 1985-1993 Pressure control, processing, flow control and 
compression systems 
1989 Cameron(M) 
* ISC: Integrated Service Companies; IOC: Integrated Oil Company; R&D: Research and Development Institute; SSC: Specialized Service and Supply Company 
** These M&A information come from Wikipedia and companies’ websites and only cover the main ones. Therefore, they should not be accounted as exhaustive list 
(A): Acquisition; (M): Merge; (Ac. By): Acquired by; (F) Founded in 
*** Merged entities are in grey 
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These figures clearly show that a range of companies both from within upstream sector 
and outside are contributing to the knowledge base of the sector, but the role of oil 
business companies is dominant. In addition, public R&D institutes such as IFPs have 
been important players in the technological dynamics of the industry. The diversity of 
actors would be higher if we go down the list where other players such as universities 
and research laboratories are evident. Undoubtedly, petroleum industry is not a passive 
recipient of innovation offered by other industries. Companies from within the industry 
search for problems actively, carry out research and development programs, and shape 
the technological environment of the industry. Nonetheless, the sector also benefits 
from innovations offered by other relevant industries such as chemical, metallurgy and 
electronics.  
Patterns of M&A activities also provide some interesting insights. One visible point is 
that they have been usually organized within either operators or service companies. In 
other words, operators have been targets for operators and specialized service 
companies usually targets for integrated service companies. With regard to the scale of 
oil operators, they could have targeted both integrated and specialized service 
companies, but our data does not show that this strategy has been attempted. This is 
particularly interesting for the post 2000 period because ISCs outperformed operators in 
financial terms, but operators did not consider their acquisition as a value adding 
activity. This signals that the domain of services is still conceived as a separate area 
outside of operators’ business, although it is technologically very advanced. Another 
related issue is that M&A activities within operators are usually clustered in time 
around the peaks in market dynamics characterized by oil prices. This is less so for 
service companies where their M&A activities are distributed more evenly over time. 
This pattern may suggest that M&As are more ‘market led’ for operators induced 
largely by low oil prices, while within the service sector, ‘technology led’ M&As are 
perused for innovation leadership.         
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter had two main aims. First, to describe how upstream petroleum industry 
architecture has changed over time and to explain the major transformations in the 
industry. The purpose was to show historically how the companies’ division of labour in 
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complementary markets formed and evolved over time. In addition, the possible driving 
forces behind the evolution of the industry architecture are discussed. It clarifies why 
certain division of labour emerged in one period and was replaced by a new pattern in 
subsequent periods. The second aim was to describe the sectoral innovation system in 
upstream petroleum. Within SIS approach dynamics, drivers and consequences of 
innovation are analyzed, and the knowledge base and the configuration of main agents 
involved in the innovation processes are addressed.  
The analysis of transformations of the sector presented in this chapter clearly supports 
the advantage of the SIS approach to explain the innovation dynamics.  It shows that 
there is no simple linear relationship between supply/demand factors and rate of 
innovation. The nature of supply/demand relationship with innovation may change over 
time through interactive and co-evolutionary processes creating new industry 
architectures. The dynamics of industry architecture is both shaped by and also affects 
the dynamics of innovation. As the case of upstream petroleum industry suggests, 
supply/demand factors could shape the industry architecture which affects innovation. 
Innovation also may affect supply/demand factors which could lead to alteration of 
industry architecture in the long term. SIS approach is relevant, because it takes an 
integrated, systemic view and considers complex interactive dynamics of different 
factors. The simple linear approach is not sufficient to explain the dynamics of 
innovation. The SIS approach which considers these interactive co-evolutionary 
processes is therefore very relevant to explain the transformations of upstream 
petroleum industry.  
The main finding of this chapter is that upstream petroleum industry has experienced 
three distinctive phases since the early 1970s over which both upstream industry 
architecture and innovation systems changed. In fact the dynamics of industry 
architecture and systems of innovation are closely related and interconnected. The first 
period covers the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, the second period the mid-1980s to 
mid-1990s and the third period begins from the mid-1990s. Historical evidence suggests 
that the major driver behind the transition from the first to second period was collapse 
of oil prices and perhaps vertical industry divestures. The emergence of ‘qualitatively’ 
different demand for complex upstream projects in harsh and less accessible 
 107 
environments, combined with more-integrated industry architecture, were the major 
factors behind the transition from the second to third period.  
The industry architecture of the first period was characterised by the historical 
dominance of integrated operators supplied by a different group of specialized supply 
and service companies. Geopolitical changes in producing countries and concerns of 
scarcity had pushed oil prices high, leading to the oil shocks of this period. While fears 
of scarcity motivated oil companies to look for oil reserves in geologically harsher and 
less accessible locations, high oil prices also provided resources to be invested in R&D. 
At the same time high oil prices channelled innovation demand by making 
economically feasible more technologically demanding reserves. Availability of 
financial resources for technological innovation and strong demand created a dynamic 
SIS characterized by high innovation growth and declining exploration and production 
costs. The relatively vertically integrated structure of the industry was supportive for 
large, high risk and long term R&D programs. These dynamics were successful in 
increasing supply and bringing down oil prices, thanks to innovation driven 
productivity, the trend that launched transition of upstream sector to the second period. 
The industry architecture of the second period is characterized by consolidation among 
operators and also among service companies through M&A activities. Yet, a wave of 
vertical divesture and outsourcing by operators to specialized service companies 
happened. The main motivations were rationalization and refocusing for higher 
operational productivity. As a result, M&A activities of this period seems more of a 
‘market let’ type and a response of financial markets to shrinking profits. The upstream 
SIS seems to stagnate in this period, when innovation took a negative trend. This low 
innovation performance is explained by low oil prices which not only reduced 
innovation investment, but also innovation demand. In addition, vertical disintegration 
of the value chain, or what Teece and Armour (1976) call divestiture, could have had a 
deleterious impact on R&D and innovation activities. Although low oil prices 
continued, innovation began a new take-off in the middle of the 1990s, expressing a 
new phase for upstream sector which could be called a 'technological revolution'.         
The industry architecture of the third period is characterized by vertical integration and 
expansion of boundaries in major service companies. They also extended their project 
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management and orchestration capabilities. This was driven by requests from their 
customers (i.e. operators) for more integrated and ‘total solutions’ to cope with 
increasingly complex upstream projects. The technological imperatives of these 
complex projects as a ‘qualitatively’ different demand triggered a ‘technological 
revolution' of the sector in this period, in spite of low oil prices. Although ‘market led’ 
M&A activities among operators continued in this low oil price environment,  M&A 
among service companies seems to be more ‘technology led’, enabling them to cope 
with technologically complex projects. The surge in the innovation trend and the nature 
of ‘technology led’ M&A activities among major integrated services companies over 
this period are interpreted as the signs of fundamental transformation of upstream sector 
towards higher technological complexity. Deeper examination of this proposition based 
on the patent data, however is the main aim of the next chapter.  
A related theoretical conclusion is that standard application of the conventional industry 
life cycle (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) is unable to explain innovation dynamics in 
an industry as mature as upstream petroleum. Industrial dynamics does not necessarily 
progress according to the standard s-shape models. Industry architecture may change in 
response to both external environment and firms endogenous strategies. New innovative 
agents may emerge within the sector and old players may replace their organizational 
boundaries or disappear from the sector. This process could be related to the emergence 
of new technologies, their integration with existing technologies and/or obsolesce of old 
technologies. This architectural dynamic and its relationship with technical changes are 
often overlooked in conventional perspectives. Given the simplistic and somewhat 
misleading view of this standard model, more systemic approaches such as sectoral 
innovation systems and industry architecture can provide deeper insights about 
innovation drivers and industrial dynamics.  
Analysis of upstream sectoral innovation system in this chapter illustrates that it is a 
highly dynamic and innovative sector particularly in the most recent period. It shows 
that major disciplines such as mechanics, chemistry, physics and geophysics, electronics 
and even biology and biotechnology all contributed to the knowledge base of the sector. 
New technologies and products developed based on these knowledge sources are highly 
influential in shaping the industrial dynamics of the sector. In addition, the upstream 
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petroleum knowledge base has considerable overlaps with other industries such as 
mining, polymer and plastics, instrumentation, electrical and communication, and 
chemical industry. My analysis of the main patentees confirms that the upstream 
industry is an active innovator. As a result viewing it as an only passive receiver of 
innovation from other sectors is wrong. A different range of operators, integrated 
service companies and specialized firms within the sector, in addition to non-firm 
organizations like public R&D institutes and universities are involved in innovation 
processes. Integrated service companies are positioned at top of the list signalling their 
critical role in innovation processes. The dynamics of innovation explored in this 
chapter suggests that industry architecture and technical change are interacting 
phenomena mutually shaping industrial dynamics.  
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5. Chapter 5: Dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a meaningful representation of the knowledge base 
of the upstream petroleum industry in order to explore the dynamic of complexity in 
this sector. It was mentioned in chapters 1 and 3 that inadequate attention to the nature 
of knowledge underlying upstream petroleum industry is one reason why the innovative 
capacity of this sector is underestimated. I also suggested in the previous chapter that 
analysis of the industrial dynamics of upstream petroleum provides some evidence 
supporting the idea that the sector moves toward technological complexity to cope with 
a new ‘qualitatively’ different demand. We articulate and examine this proposition in 
this chapter using patent data.  
Employing some of the latest developments in theoretical representation of knowledge 
and empirical methodologies suggested in the literature, I propose a three-dimensional 
perspective to characterise different aspects of knowledge base complexity. I argue that 
distinction and conceptual clarification of these three dimensions are important. Some 
of the conceptual ambiguities in the literature and inconsistent theoretical implications 
of each dimension can be resolved with regard to these three different aspects of 
complexity. Application of this three-dimensional perspective in the case of upstream 
petroleum industry confirms its usefulness in recognizing different phases of industry 
life cycle according to trends of complexity. It also shows that these three aspects do not 
necessarily follow similar dynamics, although they might be related to each other.  
Combination of the dynamics of the knowledge base complexity presented in this 
chapter and technological opportunities presented in chapter 4 provide a more complete 
picture of the dynamics of technological regimes of the industry. The discussion about 
the implications of complexity for knowledge cumulativeness at the end of the chapter 
extends the picture of the dynamics of technological regimes. Understanding the 
combination of opportunities, complexity, and cumulativeness as three important 
elements of technological regimes paves the way for the analysis of associated 
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dynamics of patterns of innovation at sectoral, organizational and geographical levels in 
subsequent chapters.   
The analysis provided in this chapter involves three novel aspects. At the conceptual 
level, I expand and articulate the concept of knowledge base complexity in three 
dimensions. This is a neglected area in the SIS and technological regimes literature 
which requires more work, as explained in the chapter 3. In acknowledgement of this 
requirement I integrate insights from the endogenous complexity approach with the SIS 
approach and the technological regime idea. Accordingly, I develop a method to 
measure the dynamics of complexity which captures the three dimensions. The second 
novel aspect of this chapter is therefore of a methodological type.   
The third novel aspect is the empirical application of the suggested method in an 
established industry. This is in contrast with all previous studies which are constrained 
to modern new sectors and general purpose technologies. Although theoretical 
discussions about knowledge based economy acknowledge that the increasing role of 
knowledge is not limited to the ‘new’ parts of the economy and cover the ‘old’ parts as 
well, empirical work on the knowledge base have given implicit priority to so called 
‘knowledge intensive’ industries. This chapter is an attempt to create a more balanced 
approach. This is important because knowledge is the source of competitiveness, not 
just in particular industries but across the board in all economic activities (Antonelli, 
2011).  
Section 5.2 is a brief review of the development of theoretical approaches in the 
literature about how to represent and model knowledge. Section 5.3 summarizes the 
state of the art in empirical analysis of the sectoral knowledge bases. It explains the 
previous empirical attempts to provide a meaningful representation of the knowledge 
base in different sectors. Section 5.4 provides a dynamic and three-dimensional 
perspective to knowledge base complexity, distinguishing between three dimensions of 
depth, breadth and systemic complexity. It also proposes a methodology to measure 
each dimension of complexity. I briefly introduce the hypothesis and the data used to 
capture the dynamics of knowledge base complexity in upstream petroleum industry in 
the section 5.5. The results of the analysis are provided in the section 5.6. Section 5.7 
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discusses the knowledge based perspective to industry life cycle according the results 
presented in section 5.6. The last section summarises the findings and concludes. 
5.2. Theoretical approach to the knowledge base  
As the importance of technological knowledge and innovation in economic activities is 
increasingly understood, scholarly efforts towards more meaningful and sensible 
representation of knowledge have increased. The result has been the development of 
different approaches which have progressively improved our understanding of 
knowledge production and utilization processes and their economic consequences. In an 
original literature survey, Krafft and Quatraro (2011) proposed a taxonomy 
differentiating four theoretical approaches to knowledge. They showed how these 
approaches have developed over time from linearity to endogenous complexity. They 
concluded that endogenous complexity is the last and most promising approach, 
although it is still in its early stages. Among other important features, what makes it 
attractive and relevant to this research is its representation of knowledge as an emergent 
dynamic property of the system which can change and evolve over time. This approach 
is consistent with the dynamic perspective to technological regimes and the properties 
of the knowledge base presented in chapter 3.  
The weakness of previous approaches is that they either look at knowledge as 
homogenous capital stock or they assume the architecture of knowledge structure as 
given, exogenous and stable over time. The first approach to model knowledge and 
analyse the economic impact of knowledge production was the extended version of 
production function (Solow, 1956 & 1967; Griliches, 1979; Mansfield, 1980). 
Knowledge is seen as a new input to production function, in addition to labour and fixed 
capital. Similar to capital, knowledge is also viewed as homogenous stock accumulated 
as the linear outcome of R&D investments. The most recent developments in this strand 
of research extents the definition of capital to include knowledge accumulation and 
capture its role in productivity growth (Corrado et al., 2005, 2009).  
The next approach was knowledge production function which was proposed in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Nelson, 1980 & 1982). The aim was to open the black box and 
capture interactive dynamics leading to production of technological knowledge. 
 113 
Although it keeps the homogenous capital stock conception of knowledge, it takes into 
account the role of increasing returns stemming from learning processes and knowledge 
externalities in knowledge production processes. Nonetheless, little seems to be said 
about the cognitive micro processes involved in the production of knowledge. 
Recombinant knowledge is the third approach, developed to explain micro mechanisms 
underlying knowledge production activities by integrating complexity sciences and 
economic theories. New knowledge is seen as the outcome of a search process over a 
rugged landscape with the aim of finding a local optimal combination among a set of 
alternative components. Complexity and heterogeneity of knowledge are both 
acknowledged, because knowledge is comprised of many interacting different elements. 
Although this recombinant approach provided very interesting insights, complexity of 
the system is still given and exogenous. This feature is not appropriate for analysis of 
evolutionary processes and dynamics of technological changes and complexity is an 
emergent and endogenous property of the system (Frenken, 2006). 
The latest approach to technological knowledge is endogenous complexity assuming 
that architecture of a complex system may change over time, as a result of internal 
dynamics of the system. In this view, knowledge is represented as an emergent property 
stemming from complex dynamics and interactions between elements of the system. 
They could be the bits or elements of existing knowledge (Saviotti, 2007; Antonelli, 
2008; Arthur, 2009).   
A general representation of knowledge has been suggested (Saviotti, 2004, 2007, 2011) 
as the theoretical base for recent empirical studies of the knowledge base within 
endogenous complexity framework (e.g. Quatraro, 2009; Krafft et al., 2011). The 
general characteristic of this representation allows its application for different types of 
knowledge produced by different institutions. The main advantage of this representation 
is the powerful basis that it provides for empirical analysis of properties of knowledge 
creation and utilization processes using information in patent documents or 
publications.  
Two properties of knowledge are at the centre of this representation (Saviotti, 2004 & 
2007): 
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1- Knowledge is a co-relational structure: 
2- Knowledge is a retrieval or interpretative structure.  
The first property implies that knowledge establishes co-relations, or linkages between 
different concepts and variables in order to offer an understanding (scientific 
knowledge) or create a utility or functionality (technological knowledge). The second 
property implies the possibility of recovery of the types of knowledge which are close 
and similar to what an agent already knows. This feature refers to the involvement of 
actors’ absorptive capacity in knowledge development processes (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). In other words, agents in a dynamic economic system need to absorb new 
knowledge. However their existing internal knowledge determines their capacity to 
learn external knowledge and to use available information (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011). 
It can be deduced from these properties that knowledge has a collective character and 
could be represented as a network, nodes of which are concepts or variables, connected 
together when they are jointly used in the knowledge space. This general representation 
is consistent with the endogenous complexity approach, because new knowledge could 
be the outcome of creative recombination of heterogeneous bits of knowledge which are 
fragmented and belong to different economic agents. In this network view, the 
knowledge base at each point of time is characterized by a structure or system formed of 
a set of elements (or nodes) and their relations and interactions (links).  
This particular structure should be seen as both effect and determinant of the interaction 
among agents implying the collective character of knowledge. In this representation, the 
structure of knowledge, as a complex system, is shaped by and also shapes agents 
behaviour.  This structure may change over time as a result of introduction of new bits 
of knowledge or emergence of new links and combinations. It also may change when 
the importance of some nodes or links change in the architecture of the network. 
Agents’ behaviour, which depends on their absorptive capacities and learning dynamics, 
could change when they activate their search processes in this knowledge landscape. 
They often move in the spaces very close to their learning capacities. On the other hand, 
agents’ behaviour could change the structure of the knowledge base, as they may 
introduce new bits or linkages and drop old ones. Therefore, technological change is an 
outcome of interactions between knowledge structure level and agents’ level.  
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The collective character of knowledge can be mapped at different analytical levels, from 
firms, to sectors, regions etc., depending on the analytical purpose of the study. At the 
firm level, the collective character is the outcome of interactions among individuals and 
different departments within the same firm. The knowledge base of the firm could be 
defined as the collective knowledge (all bits of knowledge dispersed within the firm) 
used to achieve productive goals. When we aim to study of the knowledge base of a 
sector or an industry, this collective character also includes the interactions among 
different agents involved in knowledge generation processes in that sector. Accordingly, 
the knowledge base of the sector is defined as the collective knowledge according to 
which the sector operates in order to deliver particular goods or services.             
5.3. Empirical studies of sectoral knowledge bases 
The network representation of knowledge has offered a suitable conceptual foundation 
for the study of dynamics of the knowledge base of the firms and industries (there are 
several examples in Saviotti, 2011). However, it is practically difficult to identify all the 
nodes (variables) and links (relationships) of the knowledge base of a firm or a sector. 
As a result, the empirical emerging research tradition often suggests identifying small 
units within traces of knowledge, as an approximate and alterative strategy (Saviotti, 
2004, 2007, 2011, Krafft et al., 2011). Patents and publications are regarded as the most 
available and accessible traces of knowledge within which these small bits of 
knowledge appear systematically. They have become the main basis for recent empirical 
quantitative studies of the knowledge base.  
Technological classifications or themes appear in patents and publications are employed 
for representation of knowledge network. Technological classes or themes represent the 
nodes, because they are indicators of the main units of knowledge. Joint utilization of 
the units in the same text such as patents or publications is also interpreted as the 
indication of links between bits of knowledge. This implies that both units are 
complementary parts of a piece of knowledge, neither of which alone could do the job 
of the collective entity. Therefore, co-occurrence of technological classes in the same 
patent document shows the link, while the frequency of co-occurrence of different 
classes is a measure of strength of the link. The matrix of co-occurrence of 
technological classes could define the knowledge network where the generic cell is the 
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observed frequency of co-occurrence of technological classes at a particular point of 
time. This matrix provides the raw material for calculation of different characteristics of 
the knowledge base (Krafft et al., 2009; Antonelli et al., 2010).  
A similar approach is followed in this study in order to identify the dynamics of 
knowledge base of the upstream sector. This approach offers a number of valuable and 
promising contributions, although it is relatively very young and so far applied only in a 
few studies. At a general level, we can identify firm and sectoral studies of the 
knowledge base. The former group has been developed more, while the second is still at 
exploratory stages.  
In firm level studies, different measures of the knowledge base are often suggested as 
independent variables where their capacity to explain knowledge, innovative or 
economic performance of firms is examined. Knowledge coherence, knowledge 
relatedness or knowledge integration (Breschi et al., 2003; Nesta and Saviotti, 2006 & 
2006; Nesta, 2008, Dibiaggio and Nasiriyar, 2009) and knowledge decomposability 
(Yayavaram and Gautam, 2008) are some of the suggested features of the knowledge 
base. They are all computed using matrices of co-occurrence of technological classes.  
The second group has mostly focused on exploration of the dynamics of the knowledge 
base in industries and their possible associations with industry life cycles (Grebel et al., 
2006; Krafft et al., 2009 & 2011).  Antonelli et al. (2010) is one different study which 
takes a cross-country approach to study the properties of the knowledge base of the ICT 
sector in different countries and examine its relationship with countries’ productivity 
growth.  
From the perspective of the present PhD thesis, the first noticeable point is the exclusive 
focus of all previous studies of sectoral knowledge bases on so-called knowledge 
intensive sectors such as biotechnology, telecommunication, electronics (Grebel et al., 
2006, Krafft et al., 2009; 2011) and ICT (Antonielli, 2010). In this line of research, 
Grebel et al. (2006) is perhaps one of the earliest attempts which aimed to explore the 
life cycle of knowledge intensive industries. The broad claim is that changes of 
industrial organization in biotechnology and telecommunications sectors during the 
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1980s from vertically integrated firms to innovation networks can be explained, at least 
partly, by changes in the sectoral knowledge bases.  
Knowledge dynamics were the result of technological paradigm shifts and a growing 
rate of creation of new knowledge which stimulated specialization among different 
firms and institutions. It is argued that most industry life cycle models are proposed 
based on industries of the first half of the twentieth century, when the visible hand of 
Chandlerian vertically integrated firms was the appropriate form of organization. 
However after the 1970s, emergence of radically new types of knowledge created a 
large discontinuity in the knowledge base of the sectors. It altered the industrial 
organization of these sectors toward a more disintegrated and network based 
configuration (Grebel et al., 2006).  
Employing a co-occurrence matrix of technologies, it is shown that firms’ search 
strategies evolve from random search immediately after the discontinuity, to a more 
organized search later on (Grebel et al., 2006). In the former condition, firms perceive 
new technological opportunities involved in the new paradigm, but they have not still 
identified promising trajectories of future developments. Uncertainty is high and firms 
try all possible directions and combinations. As a result we expect that agents focus 
more on exploration search strategies where innovations tend to be of a more radical 
kind. This implies investment in various ranges of combinations reflected in more equal 
distribution of co-occurrence frequencies in the matrix. 
After some period of learning, firms begin to identify the most promising trajectories 
and the most productive combinations. Uncertainty reduces and search becomes 
organized around a more limited number of options and their recombinations on well 
defined trajectories. The agents employ more exploitation search strategies in order to 
enhance their benefits from the new knowledge discovered in exploration phase. This 
situation implies more concentration on some promising combinations. It is reflected in 
a few high-frequency cells in co-occurrence matrix. This dichotomy clarifies March’s 
(1991) well known distinction between exploration vs. exploitation strategies (Krafft et 
al. 2011). 
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Subsequent work (Krafft et al., 2009, 2011) suggested viewing these dichotomies as 
corresponding to a lifecycle, providing further analytical refinements using more 
sophisticated measures. The lifecycle is supposed to begin with the birth of new types of 
knowledge and continues until it gradually matures and becomes routine. The 
implication of this perspective is that exploration vs. exploitation should not be viewed 
as two discrete states, but rather the extremes of a range of possible combinations. 
Several measures such as variety (in two types related and unrelated); coherence and 
cognitive distance are suggested to improve the analytical capacity of the previous 
dichotomies and to capture the dynamic of the knowledge base.  
The empirical results broadly support the previous hypothesis of transition from random 
to organized search, but provide greater articulation with reference to trends of the 
measures of the knowledge base. Multiple patterns could emerge out of the combination 
of these measures, corresponding to each phase of industry life cycle. For example, a 
high ratio of related variety to unrelated variety, which is expected in the exploitation 
phase, is compatible with high, constant and growing coherence. This implies that there 
is no one-to-one correspondence between values or trends of knowledge base properties 
and phases of industry lifecycle. Different sectors present different patterns of transition 
in terms of timing, levels and trends of different properties of the knowledge base 
(Krafft et al., 2009, 2011).  
While providing fascinating results, this very new strand of research is still at 
explorative stages and most results are very descriptive. We need further   extensions in 
several aspects. The authors (Krafft et al., 2009) proposed more explanatory work as the 
future avenue of research. First, examination of the impact of change of knowledge base 
structure on the patterns of industrial organization, especially entry to and exit from the 
sector. Second, analysis of geographical concerns and challenges of companies in 
knowledge generation processes over long distances. In other words, how the nature of 
knowledge may affect patterns of geographical organization of innovation. In addition, 
the comparison of the results with other industries has been recommended to broaden 
the empirical base of this new strand of research. (Krafft et al., 2009; Krafft and 
Quatraro, 2011). 
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This PhD thesis is a step forward which meets all three suggestions. The previous 
studies have all focused on new and so-called knowledge intensive sectors. Therefore, 
other industries are implicitly considered less important or as downgraded sectors in 
today’s knowledge based economies. Focusing on a currently established and old sector  
- upstream petroleum industry - is empirically one of the novel dimensions of this PhD 
research. In addition, I follow theoretically both the sectoral and geographical 
implications of the dynamics of complexity of knowledge base structure and examine 
them empirically using patent data.  
5.4.  knowledge base complexity: A three-dimensional perspective  
I began this research on knowledge base complexity with a relatively simple view on 
the concept. I got the first definition from the SIS literature defining complex 
knowledge as what involves combination of large number of technological disciplines 
and organizational competences (see chapter 3, section 3.4). However, more digging in 
relevant literatures showed that it is neither a straightforward concept to define nor an 
easy concept to measure. In fact the term complexity is itself a ‘complex’ concept with 
several definitions and dimensions according to different authors.   
The term complexity is an increasingly popular concept, partly because of the rapid 
diffusion of complexity theory as a general approach into many disciplines in both 
natural and social sciences. This concept could be ambiguous and confusing, because 
different authors point out different types (for example, static vs. dynamic), dimensions 
(for example breadth vs. depth or both), levels or functions (component vs. system; 
product vs. process; firms vs. industries) of complexity. They also take different 
perspectives to complexity (for example ontological vs. epistemological), while 
sometimes not explicitly clarifying what kind of complexity they are talking about.  
Even within the economics of innovation and knowledge as a new discipline, there is no 
unified definition of complexity and its measurement approach. For the purpose of this 
study, I identified three dimensions of complexity relevant and interesting for the 
analysis of knowledge base as a system: breadth, depth and systemic. Conceptually, 
they refer to three different dimensions of the structure of the knowledge base.  Breadth 
and depth describe the characteristics which are related to the elements of the 
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knowledge system, but do not take into account the interdependencies and relationships 
between elements. In contrast, systemic complexity characterises how different 
elements of the system are connected. In what follows I provide a definition of each 
dimension and a relevant proxy to measure them in this research. These definitions are 
drawn from available literature and refined for further clarification and distinction. 
Although the three dimensions are different conceptually, they are not necessary totally 
independent. It means that change of one dimension could have particular implications 
for other dimensions.   
5.4.1. Breadth complexity  
According to Wang and Tunzelman (2000) breadth complexity refers to the range or 
scope of different subjects, fields or elements in a system. At first glance, breadth 
complexity appears simple, referring to the diversity of elements of a system such as 
knowledge base of a sector.  However Stirling (2007) explains that this concept could 
refer to three different properties: variety, balance and disparity23
According to Stirling (2007), the first property is variety or the number of categories. 
When we ask about this property, we normally need to answer the question “how many 
types of things do we have” (Stirling, 2007, p. 709). The concept of balance answers the 
question “How much of each type of things do we have” (Stirling, 2007, p. 709). This 
property refers to balance or distribution of things or elements within categories. In 
some categories or technological classes, we might have a few, but in others we might 
have many. Disparity is the other property which is different from the previous two. It 
aims to respond the question “How different from each other are the types of things that 
we have” (Stirling, 2007, p. 709).  
.  
Unfortunately there is no consistency in using the terms for different properties. 
Balance for Stirling (2007) which describes the distribution within categories, is also 
referred to as variety by others (Frenken et al., 2007; Krafft and Quatraro, 2011). In this 
research, I reserve the term variety for this distributional property, because it is a more 
important aspect. This application of the term has recently become popular in both 
                                                          
23 Stirling (2007) and Rafols and Meyer (2010) use ‘diversity’ as the umbrella term covering the three 
properties of breadth complexity 
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economic and innovation studies (for example Krafft et al., 2009; Saviotti and Frenken, 
2008, Boschma and Iammarino, 2009; Neffke et al., 2011). Variety is very important in 
the study of sectoral knowledge bases, because technical knowledge usually has highly 
skewed distributions (Saviotti, 2009). In each sector, certain core technological areas are 
very important, while many others have a very marginal role in the knowledge structure.  
Most breadth studies have been performed at firm level in order to understand how and 
why companies are technologically diversified and how their pattern of specialization 
may change. For example, breadth of knowledge base has been analyzed in 
pharmaceutical companies (Brusoni et al., 2005; Brusoni and Geuna, 2005; Nesta and 
Saviotti 2005) and tyre companies (Acha and Brusoni, 2005). The number of fields or 
classes in which a firm is active or relatively ‘specialized24
In this research, my focus is on the dynamics of variety to describe the evolution of 
breadth complexity. Therefore, I do not analyze other diversity or breadth properties. 
This is because variety has been considered an important aspect of sectoral knowledge 
base in previous studies (Krafft et al., 2009 and 2011), providing a basis for inter-
sectoral comparisons. From time to time, not only are new technologies added to the 
knowledge base, but also the share of different technological fields might change. Some 
technological areas might involve rich opportunities and expand. Others might be tried 
and later relinquished. More importantly, the size and scope of search strategies could 
change over the industry life cycle, shaping the technological trajectories of the sector, 
as explained in section 5.3.  
’ is considered as the breadth 
of firms’ knowledge bases. 
A number of indicators have been suggested to capture the variety or dispersion of 
technologies within categories. The common principle in all of them is that ceteris 
paribus, the more equal the distribution, the higher the variety. For example, the 
Herfindahl index is very popular in studying technological variety (for example 
Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2008; Corrocher et al., 2007; Garcia-Vega, 
2006; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994 among many 
                                                          
24 The indicator of relative specialization is often ‘Revealed Technology Advantage (RTA) and its 
variations which will be explained in the next chapter.   
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others). Nonetheless, I employ the Entropy index to measure variety as a proxy for 
breadth complexity, because of some advantages. 
Entropy is an old index borrowed from information theory in thermodynamics 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) and used in diversification studies (for example 
Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Kodama, 1986). This index measures the degree of 
disorder or randomness in a distribution where more balanced distributions get higher 
values. More recently, it has been used in research on the dynamics of sectoral 
knowledge bases (Krafft et al., 2009 and 2011). The main advantage of this index is its 
decomposability to ‘within’ and ‘between’ parts enabling us to study both related 
variety (RV) and unrelated variety (UV), at the same time. Unrelated variety refers to 
the degree of disorder or variety ‘across’ the main categories (aggregated level), while 
related variety captures the sum of the weighted entropy or the average degree of 
disorder ‘within’ categories (at disaggregated level) (Frenken et al., 2007).  
This feature allows us to explore the sources of dynamics in breadth complexity 
measured by the total variety (TV) index. The variety of sectors could change as a result 
of change in both local and global search boundaries. In the case of a more local 
‘organized’ search, companies diversify in the vicinity of available technological fields, 
leading to higher disorder ‘within’ technological classes or higher related variety. 
Conversely, when search processes are more ‘random’ and global, unrelated variety 
increases. As the total level of the sectoral variety is the sum of the two components, we 
could trace the changing trend in organized vs. random search strategies and how the 
mix of the two changes over time.  
For formal notification, let gC refer to technological classes at the 4-digit level where 
g = (1, …, G). All sub-classes i at disaggregated level (7-digit here) fall under one 4-
digit classes, because of the nature of hierarchical classification system.  Therefore the 
share of 4-digit classes gP is given by the sum of ip shares: 
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Given the decomposability feature of the entropy index (Frenken et al., 2007), the total 
variety (TV) entropy is given by the sum of unrelated variety (UV:4-digit entropy) and 
related variety ( RV: weighted sum of 7-digit entropy within each 4-digit classes).  
TV = UV + RV  
To sum up, among the three aspects suggested for breadth complexity, I chose to focus 
on variety referring to the degree of randomness or balance of innovative activities 
among different technological categories. The total variety (TV) is measured by the 
entropy index. This index is decomposable into two components of related (RV) and 
unrelated variety (UV) which distinguish different sources of total variety (TV). Related 
variety captures the degree of local variation and differentiation within technological 
categories. Unrelated variety looks at global differentiation across technological 
categories. Since the total variety is the sum of these two components, its trend may 
change as a result of either of the two components. The relative share of the two 
components in the overall trend of total variety could show the dominant search 
strategies in each period (Krafft et al., 2009 and 2011).   
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5.4.2. Depth complexity  
The issue of depth complexity is more controversial and less straightforward, because of 
the lack of agreement on the definition of the concept and also limited studies referring 
to depth and its measurement methodology. For example Brusoni et al., (2005) defines 
the depth of knowledge for a firm in a particular field as the integration of both basic 
and applied research in that field. The total depth of knowledge for a firm is considered 
as a proportion of all the fields in which the firm is specialized, both in terms of basic 
and applied research. Another study suggests the count of secondary technological 
fields of each patent as the measure of depth of patent or invention, when they are the 
same as the main technology field of the patent itself (Özman, 2007). In fact this 
method first measures the depth of each patent according to its secondary 
classifications, the average of which defines the depth of knowledge base at higher 
aggregated levels for such firms or industries.  
In order to choose an appropriate index for the depth complexity of knowledge at 
industry level, we first need a relevant conceptual definition with regard to the purpose 
of the study. While breadth of sectoral knowledge refers to the range of different 
technical fields, depth is more about accumulation of knowledge within ‘existing’ fields 
vs. technological discontinuities which may invalidate (or destroy) the value of existing 
knowledge. In short, breadth is concerned with heterogeneity while depth addresses the 
level of sophistication and accumulation within a particular area. This approach is in 
line with the Wang and Tunzelman (2000) definition, referring to “analytical 
sophistication of a subject, which becomes complex because of the cognitive difficulty 
of pushing the particular matter to its logical extremes” (p. 806).  
Although in practice it might be difficult to distinguish between two types of knowledge 
development through breadth (broadening) vs. depth (deepening), conceptually it is 
informative to address them differently. Particularly, it can be meaningful in 
comparative terms where the knowledge base of some industries is being developed 
with new technologies (broadening), while others mostly focus on certain core 
technological fields digging more within existing technological fields. While these two 
 125 
processes of knowledge expansion are often active side by side, their importance and 
weight could change over time in a particular industry.  
According to these conceptual concerns, we need to know the degree to which new 
knowledge in the upstream petroleum industry is generated within existing old 
technological areas vs. totally new technological fields. As a result, the measure of 
depth complexity is simply defined as the percentage of knowledge added to the 
industry knowledge stock from existing technological classes. Formally, we assume that 
K∆  is the extent of knowledge generation in the knowledge base of the sector. oldK∆ is 
the extent of knowledge generation from existing technological classes in a previous 
period.  newK∆  also is the amount of knowledge added from new technological classes 
which were not present in the previous year. Therefore, the sum of the two forms the 
total knowledge added to the knowledge stock of the sector between two subsequent 
years.      
K∆ = oldK∆ + newK∆  
Accordingly, depth complexity is given by the Knowledge Accumulation Percentage 
from old technological classes: 
Knowledge Accumulation Percentage (KAP) =( oldK∆ / K∆ )*100 
This index could be interpreted as a proxy of sectoral cumulativeness and its changing 
pattern over time. In one hypothetical extreme, if all additional pieces of knowledge are 
from existing fields, depth would be at its highest level of one. On the other hand, if all 
increased knowledge comes from new sources, the depth would be zero, meaning a lack 
of contribution of existing fields in the knowledge expansion process of the industry. 
Given the incremental cumulative nature of knowledge generation processes, we 
normally expect a high and increasing trend when industry moves toward maturity. 
However, rapid technological revolutions may invalidate the old knowledge reducing 
cumulativeness. But this mostly happens at the level of individual technologies. At the 
level of a sector, it is hardly possible that a large proportion of knowledge comes from 
totally new fields.         
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5.4.3. Systemic Complexity 
Most of the time when scholars talk about complexity, the main concern is volume of 
interdependencies and degree of interaction between elements of a system. For example 
Patel and Pavitt (1997) implicitly take this view and Sorenson and Rivkin (2006) 
directly refer to this dimension of complexity. This specific notion of knowledge 
complexity is present when “the opportunities to generate new knowledge are 
conditional on the identification and integration of the diverse bits of complementary 
knowledge that are inputs into the knowledge production process” (Antonelli, 2003, 
p.507). When this kind of complexity matters, recombination of both pre-existing and 
new bits of knowledge is key for the generation of new knowledge and introduction of 
systemic innovations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996).  
The complementarity between bits of knowledge is the source of recombination and 
creation of this type of complexity. Knowledge indivisibility is the outcome of this 
process where systemic knowledge serves new functions which are not achievable by 
individual bits of knowledge. In sectors with high levels of this type of complexity, 
effective production and competitiveness requires access and control of a diverse range 
of knowledge on the one hand, and integrative coordination capability on the other. 
Successful innovation is not possible without full understanding of the compatibilities 
and complementarities of diverse ranges of technologies (Antonelli, 2003). Because the 
source of this complexity is often systemic innovation (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), I 
label this type of complexity as systemic complexity. This dimension of complexity is 
more in line with the perspectives developed in complexity sciences such as Simon 
(1962) and its integration in the economics of innovation (Antonelli, 2011). This is 
because in the complex systems perspective, the interactions between different elements 
of the system which could create endogenous non-linear dynamics are at the centre of 
the analysis.  
The proxies discussed so far do not consider the links and interactions between different 
elements of the knowledge base; therefore they do not capture the dynamics of systemic 
complexity. They do not consider the recombinant nature of the knowledge and its 
endogenous systemic complexity. In order to measure this type of complexity, network 
representation of the knowledge base is very relevant. As explained in section 5.2 
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(Saviotti, 2009, 2011; Krafft, 2011), the knowledge base has a co-relational structure 
comprised of nodes and links between these nodes. In this approach knowledge could 
be represented as a network.   
If the knowledge base of the industry is conceptualised as a network, nodes are 
technology classes and links represent relationships between technologies connecting 
nodes together. The measures of breadth and depth complexity introduced so far do not 
consider the connectivity and the relationships between technologies. In other words, 
they just represent the variety and size of the nodes of the knowledge network, but they 
ignore the structure of relationships between different knowledge domains. Even related 
variety captures the level of diversity or disorder around key technologies, but does not 
consider how different technologies are connected and related in the knowledge 
network. In order to provide a fuller representation of knowledge base from a systemic 
complexity perspective, we need to know how the structure of the network is formed by 
linkages. Dynamics of complexity could be understood, not only through changes in the 
number and size of the nodes (which refer to breadth and depth complexity), but also 
from the pattern of linkages and interactions between the nodes (which refer to systemic 
complexity).  
Systemic complexity or network connectivity may change as result of formation of new 
ties between un-connected nodes or a stronger relationship between connected nodes. It 
also may change when isolated nodes appear or connected nodes are disconnected. The 
main advantage of network analysis indicators is that they consider knowledge as an 
integrated system in which both the building blocks of the system (nodes) and their 
interactions (ties) are investigated at the same time. This enables us to monitor how 
knowledge structure changes over time when new technologies emerge, diffuse and 
integrate in the system or the old ones expire, are abandoned or disconnected from the 
knowledge base (Krafft et al., 2011).   
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has a powerful toolbox to characterize the connectivity 
of the network. As mentioned in section 5.3, a matrix of co-occurrence of technological 
classes has been suggested as a raw material on which different features of the 
knowledge network could be measured. Among various measures available to describe 
the connectivity and structure of the knowledge base, network density is one of the 
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popular indexes. It describes the general level of linkages to nodes of a graph, defined 
as the total number of links as a proportion of the possible number of links between 
nodes. However the weakness of this measure is that it does not consider the strength of 
the nodes and links, and treats weak and strong links equally (Krafft, 2011). From 
previous research, we know that distribution of the links is highly unequal. A few nodes 
are very central and highly connected, while many others have very weak linkages or 
are isolated (Saviotti, 2009, 2011). 
The degree of a node is used as one of the centrality measures, describing how strong is 
the level of connectivity of a node. Formally, the following equation expresses the 
measure of degree centrality (DC): 





Where n represents the nodes and l represent the links.  
The degree centrality is defined as the number of links of one node with other nodes of 
the network. Because this measure is affected by the network size, it is often divided by 
its maximum value to provide a normalized proxy (Krafft, 2011), as the following 
equation shows:  
nNDC  = nDC / )1( −N  
This normalization allows for comparability of the degree centrality over time and 
analysis of dynamics of systemic complexity, because the size of the knowledge 
network changes over time. Degree centrality characterises a single node, not the 
network.  In order to create a measure of connectivity at the level of a network, we rely 
on the average of the degree centrality of all nodes of the network.  However, following  
(Krafft, 2011), I used the average measure of degree centrality, weighted by relative 
frequency. This takes into account the highly unequal strength of the nodes, giving 
higher weights to important technological classes. Accordingly, the measure of systemic 
complexity of the knowledge base is weighted average degree centrality (WADC), as 
follows:          
 129 





When the speed of formation new nodes outweighs the formation of links, the network 
becomes less connected and systemic complexity decreases. In contrast, when the 
formation of new links is stronger than appearance of new nodes in the knowledge 
network, network connectively increases, signalling the rise of systemic complexity.      
5.5. Hypothesis and Data  
We expect that these three measures of different dimensions of complexity provide a 
meaningful base to answer the first question of this PhD thesis:  
Q1: How has the technological complexity evolved over time in the upstream petroleum 
industry? 
Accordingly, our first basic hypothesis is that: 
Hypotheses 1: Upstream petroleum industry has gradually moved towards higher 
degrees of technological complexity.  
We aim to evaluate this hypothesis in upstream petroleum industry with reference to the 
three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity. The discussion of 
complexity in the previous section showed that complexity could have several 
dimensions. As a result, a precise answer to the question requires defining which 
dimensions of complexity are relevant. We suggest that the distinction between breadth, 
depth and systemic complexity offers analytical value and removes some of the 
conceptual ambiguities in the literature. We also discuss the different theoretical 
implications of the different dimensions of complexity in the next chapters.  
In theory, it is perceivable how the knowledge base of an industry could move towards 
higher degrees of complexity via any of these three mechanisms. When a new piece of 
knowledge is generated within incumbent technical domains, depth complexity 
increases. If a new piece of knowledge is generated in a new technical domain, breadth 
complexity increases. If a new piece of knowledge is the outcome of linkages and 
relationships between several knowledge domains, systemic complexity of the sectors 
increases. Nonetheless, these mechanisms are often combined in practice. Using the 
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suggested measures of three dimensions of complexity, we explore dominant trends in 
upstream petroleum industry and investigate their connections with the industry life 
cycle. 
The three suggested proxies are measured based on the international patent 
classification system (IPC) and the matrix of co-occurrence of technological classes. 
Table 5.1 displays some basic descriptive statistics at 4-digit and 7-digit levels of 
aggregation. Given the decomposability nature of entropy index for breadth complexity, 
these two levels of aggregation are used to measure the dynamics of total variety (TV) 
at 7-digit level and related and unrelated variety (RV & UV) at 4-digit level. The table 
shows that on average every 4-digit class is formed of more than seven sub-classes at 7-
digit level. In line with previous research (Krafft et al., 2009, 2011), we assume each 
pairs of entities (in this case patents) in one class are on average more similar in terms 
of knowledge domain, than those which are classified in different classes. Although 
some exceptions might exist, this seems a reasonable assumption without which the 




Since the focus is on dynamics of the knowledge base complexity, periodical analysis of 
the trends is important. The main three periods of the industry are labelled as p1, p2, p3 
for simplicity, as explored in the previous chapter. Following other trend analysis 
research in the field (e.g. Krafft et al., 2009), 5-year cumulated data are used to smooth 
the random changes and introduce some rigidity to the trends.  
5.6. Dynamics of knowledge base complexity in upstream petroleum  
The dynamics of three dimensions of knowledge base complexity in the upstream 
petroleum industry are presented in figure 5.1. The trends clearly show that the three 
dimensions follow different patterns reflecting three different aspects of complexity 
phenomena. Some broad trends are observable in all three dimensions which could be 
Level 
Class 
count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
4 dig IPC 600 125.93 1019.50 1 23921 
7 dig IPC 4301 27.69 217.59 1 9304 
 Table  5-1 Descriptive statistics at different digit of IPC classes 
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understood with reverence to major transformations of the industry. Figure 5.1 (a) 
shows the dynamics of depth complexity capturing the degree of cumulativeness of the 
upstream sector. It presents the Knowledge Accumulation Percentage (KAP) in existing 
technological classes, compared to new classes.  
The trend of depth complexity indicates the very high and growing level of 
cumulativeness. It suggests existing knowledge in the current technological classes is a  
major contributor to the expansion of knowledge stock in the industry. In contrast, new 
technological fields are playing a tiny role in the growth of the knowledge base and this 
marginal role is decreasing.  
While depth complexity has an overall increasing trend, it seems that the trend 
stabilized temporality over p2.  One consistent interpretation of the overall rising trend 
is that as time goes by and the industry approaches maturity, the size of the knowledge 
base expands. This is clear from the increasing size of innovative activities and 
accumulated knowledge stock in the sector. As a result, the relative share of new 
technological areas compared to accumulated knowledge decreases. Unless the industry 
experiences a radical and pervasive technological discontinuity, it is intuitive to expect 
that the large share of new knowledge comes from existing known sources. This reflects 
the local character of knowledge where existing available knowledge is a prerequisite of 
knowledge generation processes (Saviotti, 2007).  
What seems counter intuitive is that the rising trend of depth complexity stalled over p2 
when industry was in low opportunity condition. We normally expect less investment in 
very new high-risk technological areas in non-favourable conditions and relatively 
increasing concentration in less-risky previously known knowledge domains. One 
explanation might be that under high technological opportunity periods (p1 and p3), 
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Therefore, innovators tend to allocate an increasing share of their effort and more 
resources to existing technological areas, as reflected in the rising trend of depth 
complexity. When such incentives and resources are not available, the level of depth 
complexity stays stable. As a result, we may conclude that depth complexity could have 
a direct relationship with the innovation opportunities, if there is no radical 
technological discontinuity in the sector. The higher the number of innovation 
opportunities, the higher the level of cumulativeness of knowledge at a sectoral level. 
The trends of breadth and systemic complexity in figure 5.1 (b) & (c) present broadly 
two-phase patterns. They seem related, yet moving in opposite direction, with a 
transitional period in early p2. Total and unrelated variety (breadth complexity) 
expresses an upward trend over p1. After achieving their peaks in early p2, they turn to 
a downward trend over p3, when related variety takes an upward trend. In contrast, 
systemic complexity has an overall declining trend over p1 which turns to an upward 
trend over p3, after it hits its bottom in early p2. Looking at the knowledge base as a 
complex system represented by a knowledge network (section 5.2), we know that 
variety represents the nodes, while systemic complexity represent the links and the 
connectivity of the network.  
The observed patters are very similar to the proposition of previous studies that after a 
discontinuity we expect to observe emergence of new nodes in the knowledge network, 
followed by a wave of formation of new links (Saviotti, 2009 & 2011). 
The total variety (TV) begins with an upward trend over p1 which peaks around 1983 
and takes an overall gradual downward trend towards the end of p3. The first period is 
considered as the period of high instability and uncertainly, because of increasing 
technological variety in the sector. Not only do new technological classes emerge and 
are added to the knowledge base of the industry, the industry moves towards more equal 
distribution of innovation within different technological classes. This pushes up 
technological variety, moving the sector towards higher breadth complexity. 
The rise of technological variety supports the idea that many new knowledge sources, 
mostly external to the existing knowledge base of the industry, are added to the sector. 
New nodes are added to the structure of the knowledge network, while at the same time 
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the distribution among different domains becomes more equal in terms of the size of 
innovative activities. This is similar to what Krafft et al. (2009 & 2011) call a random 
search period when companies try many new knowledge pieces that might show some 
potential for the future of the industry. Major technical fields of the industry are not 
established yet and large trial and error activities might be experienced. Since 
companies are bringing new and dissimilar knowledge sources together; they are also 
taking considerable risks. However, the historical evidence shows that they were willing 
and also able to take these risks due to the high oil prices of that period and a special 
political economy environment which supported these big technical jumps (chapter 4). 
In other words, the search strategies of innovators are dominated by explorative 
activities, as the industry is experiencing a new knowledge discontinuity. The new 
paradigm has not emerged yet and the trajectory of technical change is still not clear for 
the participants (Dosi, 1982).  
In contrast to breadth complexity, the trend of systemic complexity over most of p1 
takes a downward trend. As suggested by Saviotti (2011), it could be explained by 
higher rate of creation of new nodes, compared to new links between new and existing 
nodes. When new promising technological fields are explored, it takes some time for the 
innovators to understand the complementarity and the relationships between new and 
existing knowledge domains. The high technical risks involved in new knowledge 
domains also may prevent innovators from exploring possible complementarities and 
productive links, before emergence of a relatively clear picture of the trajectory and 
potential of the new technologies. We expect the emergence of novelty first to create 
new but poorly connected nodes, and therefore temporarily reduce the connectivity of 
the knowledge network (Saviotti, 2011). The first period in upstream petroleum industry 
is the manifestation of this proposition. Emergence of new but poorly connected nodes 
increases technological variety or breadth complexity of the knowledge base, while 
reduce its connectivity and total level of systemic complexity.   
As predicted by the knowledge network theory, the situation began to change when the 
directions of both breadth and systemic complexity reversed in early p2 with a few 
years delay for systemic complexity. Technological variety took a downward trend in 
about 1983, followed by rising measure of connectivity of the knowledge network 
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began in 1987. This could be explained by the diffusion and establishment of new 
technological fields explored in p1, when the rate of creation of new links overtakes the 
rate of emergence of new nodes. It does not mean that the emergence of new 
technological domains is stopped, but their relative size became marginal compared to 
the established technological fields. As a result, the power of the new nodes to reshape 
the overall structure of the knowledge network was limited. 
By the end of p1 and during p2, the most promising fields which involve the highest 
technological opportunities gradually become known to industry participants. 
According to Krafft et al. (2009, 2011), we could say that search strategies gradually 
become organized rather than being random. The explorative behaviours are gradually 
replaced by exploitative strategies applied in the most productive technological areas. 
This change in strategic behaviour is reflected in the decreasing trend of total variety 
over p2 which also continues during p3. We see that innovators increasingly innovate 
more within certain technological classes which proved promising and fruitful, instead 
of spreading their R&D investment across many fields. This interpretation is based on 
decreasing total variety which reflects increasing concentration and unequal distribution 
of innovative activities within different technological fields.  
Now, it is worth looking at the changing combination of related and unrelated variety in 
total variety before analyzing the reversed trend of systemic complexity after early p2. 
In fact, deep understanding of the change in pattern of nodes could pave the way to 
explain why the pattern of connectivity of the knowledge base reversed. As is evident 
from figure 5.1 (b), unrelated variety is always larger than related variety and its value 
is the main determinant of total variety. As a result, the overall pattern of unrelated 
variety is the main determinant of total variety, increasing during p1 and decreasing 
after early p2. The prolonged dominance of unrelated variety could be the reflection of 
highly diverse range of fields with far cognitive distances forming the knowledge base 
of the sector. The description of the knowledge base of the sector in chapter 4 made it 
clear how different disciplines from chemistry to mechanical engineering, marine 
engineering, electronics, telecommunication, etc. are applied in upstream projects. As a 
result, the coherence of the knowledge base in this sector seems less than in sectors like 
biotechnology, telecommunications and electronics which are formed of relatively more 
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homogeneous pieces of knowledge (Krafft et al. 2009). This could be deduced from the 
much larger share of related variety in these sectors, compared to upstream petroleum 
industry with exclusive dominance of related variety.  
However, the increasing trend of related variety combined with decreasing unrelated 
variety after early p2 illustrates that coherence has increased over p2 and p3. The 
analysis of the relative trend of related variety, compared to unrelated variety supports 
the previous finding that the nature of search strategies over p2 and p3 is more focused 
and concentrated. In other words, although technological differentiations happen, they 
are more around and in the vicinity of particular core technologies of the sector which 
identify as key technologies for the operation of upstream projects. This is reflected in 
the rising trend of related variety after early p2. It means that the future technological 
trajectory of the sector has become clearer; therefore innovators seem more confident 
with respect to general domains of investment for innovation. This situation could have 
important implications for systemic complexity, because innovators could exploit the 
complementarities and linkages between established technological domains.       
As explained before, systemic complexity matters where strong complementarities are 
discovered. This is why recent accounts in the theory of knowledge tend to describe it 
as a ‘co-relational’ entity (Saviotti, 2004, 2007) where different concepts create 
knowledge if joined together. Therefore, generation of new knowledge in these 
conditions requires full understanding of the interdependencies and access to a 
divergent range of complementary pieces. When the processes of systemic complexity 
are dominant, the knowledge base of the industry is not developed just by accumulation 
of knowledge in existing knowledge domains (depth complexity) or simple addition of 
new technical domains to existing ones (breadth complexity), but through interactions 
and recombinations between existing and new technologies. These systemic interactions 
create a new kind of complexity where simple analysis of breadth and depth is 
inadequate to capture its pattern.   
Systemic complexity is considered low when the knowledge base is relatively divisible 
and decomposable into pieces, and interdependencies are not well defined. In contrast, 
systemic complexity is considered high when the relationships between different 
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technologies are relatively strong and stable. The interdependencies are defined and 
synergies and complementarities between technologies are discovered.  
We expect the first situation to be observed more in the early stages of industry life 
cycle or after a large scale discontinuity. The most fruitful links and interactions have 
not still been explored and companies are searching to find out how the combination of 
different knowledge domains could create value. The decline of network connectivity 
over p1 illustrates a reduction of systemic complexity in this period, resulting from the 
emergence of new but unconnected technologies.    
On the other hand, we expect higher systemic complexity when an industry is in its later 
stages. When new technologies are established and their complementarities are 
explored, companies could generate new knowledge through recombination processes. 
This could be a more productive knowledge generation process, because new 
knowledge is the outcome of the combination of existing knowledge. As a result of this 
emergent strong complementariness, the knowledge base of the sector is not easily 
divisible or decomposable and systemic complexity becomes increasingly high. The rise 
of knowledge network connectivity after early p2 suggests increasing systemic 
complexity of upstream petroleum industry in this phase.  
The high complementarity and systemic complexity increases investment returns on 
innovation, yet it increases barriers to entry for latecomers. “As far as knowledge 
complexity is concerned, it is clear that the larger the number of the bits of knowledge 
that can be recombined, the larger is the chances of generating new relevant knowledge” 
(Antonelli, 2003 p. 598). However, the dominance of systemic complexity after early p2 
creates important challenges and implications for catch-up processes. It is by definition 
more to the advantage of those who possesses the knowledge components, and against 
those who miss one or more of the critical components. These implications of systemic 
complexity for latecomers will be analyzed in the next chapters.    
5.7. Knowledge based perspective to the industry life cycle   
In this section, I combine the dynamics of three dimensions of complexity in order to 
provide a knowledge based perspective to the industry life cycle. The conventional 
industry life cycle approach (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) can by no means explain 
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the dynamics and transformation of the upstream petroleum industry, because of the 
emergence of systemic knowledge base complexity. In contrast, the knowledge life 
cycle approach seems very helpful to explain how established traditional industries 
evolve and transform in the era of knowledge based economy. Not only it is useful to 
explore the regularities in the evolution and dynamics of industries, this picture is 
required to examine the broad idea that industrial organization and geographies of 
innovation are at least partly determined by dynamics of sectoral knowledge bases 
(Saviotti, 2011). Therefore, this chapter is a prerequisite building block for the next two 
chapters which address the dynamics of sectoral and geographical patterns of 
innovation. 
Generally speaking, we could recognize two main phases and a transitional phase 
between them in dynamics of knowledge base. These three phases correspond almost to 
the three periods of the industry explored in the chapter 4: period 1 from early 1970s to 
mid-1980s, period 2 from mid-1980s to mid-1990s and period 3 from mid-1990s up to 
the end of observation. The first and third periods are the main periods, because the 
dynamics of all three dimensions of complexity present a clear, though different trend. 
Early part of the second period could be defined as the transitional period where the 
broad trends in all three dimensions seem to be changing.  
The first period is when industry was at the stage of new birth preparing itself for a new 
geopolitical and geographical expansion. Technological innovation was seen as a key to 
diversify supply sources. High oil prices funded new knowledge generation processes in 
the sector, creating an emergence knowledge base discontinuity. In this period, the 
knowledge base of the industry is mainly developed through exploration of new 
technological fields broadening the scope of the knowledge base of the sector. This 
process is clearly reflected in increasing unrelated variety, illustrating the move towards 
higher breadth complexity in the knowledge base. In contrast, systemic complexity is 
decreasing, because links and relationships between new and old technological fields 
are formed at a lower rate of emergence of new technological areas. Using knowledge 
network terminology, formation of new ties lags the formation of new nodes leading to 
lower systemic complexity and connectivity of the knowledge base. This is clearly 
reflected in decreasing weighted average degree centrality (WACD) of the knowledge 
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base. Nonetheless, the depth complexity of the sector keeps rising, because the size of 
innovation in existing fields is larger than innovation in new technological areas.   
During the early second period, a transition happened which consequently led to the 
third period when the trends of breadth and systemic complexity reversed. Breadth 
complexity took a downward trend, as reflected in decreasing total and unrelated 
variety. This is because the most promising technological areas have been explored, and 
technological differentiations have mainly happened around these explored promising 
areas. This is also visible from the rise of related variety over the third period, while 
total variety is decreasing. The knowledge base of the sector is being developed mainly 
through exploitation and recombination of existing technological areas and linkages 
between them. The outcome is the dominance of systemic complexity in this period, as 
reflected in rise of the weighted average degree centrality (WADC) of the knowledge 
network. The rising depth complexity is the only similar dimension to the first period 
because the share of knowledge generation in existing areas keeps rising.        
The famous debate about the distinction between creative destruction vs. creative 
accumulation (Pavitt, 1999; Granstrand et al., 1997, Malerba, 2004) seems relevant to 
the dynamics of knowledge base complexity. The question that stems from this 
dichotomy is whether the knowledge base of the industry is developed by the 
mechanism of “creative destruction where the new displaces the old one” or by the 
mechanism of “creative accumulation” where the new is built on and adds to the old 
(Pavitt, 1999, p. 183). In other words, the question is whether new technologies are 
‘competence destroying’ of dominant organizations which facilitates the entrance of 
newcomers, or ‘competence enhancing’ reinforcing the role of existing big companies 
because of their access to the existing accumulated knowledge. The question is whether 
this dichotomy could describe the dynamics of the knowledge base of the upstream 
petroleum industry; or whether the three-dimensional perspective could provide a more 
articulated and subtle description. 
What is clear from the dynamics of depth complexity at the level of the upstream 
petroleum industry is that knowledge ‘destruction’ is always marginal and decreasing, 
while ‘accumulation’ is pervasive and increasing. In other words, there are very few 
technological fields which are dropped while the lion’s and increasing share of 
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knowledge generation processes at sectoral level occurs in existing technological 
classes. In addition, the changes in all-three dimensions are incremental with no rapid 
destructive periods. However, our evidence supports the idea that what changes from 
one period to other is better described as a change in the type of dominant accumulative 
processes. The advantage of the three-dimensional perspective to the knowledge base 
complexity is to reveal how the nature of accumulation process may change over the 
industry life cycle.  
While the dynamics of depth complexity shows that the first and third period could be 
equally described as ‘creative accumulation’, the diverging dynamics of breadth and 
systemic complexity illustrate that the nature of accumulation processes in the two 
periods fundamentally differ. The knowledge base over the first period is mainly 
developed through the breadth complexity mechanism (broadening) while over the third 
period the systemic complexity (recombination) mechanism is dominant.  
With regard to the type of accumulation, the dominance of breadth complexity could 
create narrow cumulativeness over the first period while dominance of systemic 
complexity over the third period generates wide cumulativeness. I do not use high vs. 
low cumulativeness, because I believe they are qualitatively different in their scope, not 
quantitatively in their scale. When systemic complexity is strong and interactions are 
intensive between different knowledge domains, introduction of innovation is possible 
only if all related pieces of knowledge are available. In other words, when systemic 
complexity is high at sectoral level, a wide range of related and interacting technologies 
are required to introduce the systemic innovations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). This 
is the direct result of complementarity which leads to wide cumulativeness and implies 
less decomposability of the knowledge base (Antonelli, 2003; Yayavaram and Ahuja 
2008). 
In contrast, when systemic complexity is low, the combination of depth and breadth 
complexity creates narrow cumulativeness and relative high decomposability.  
Accumulation of sophisticated and advanced technology is still necessary but within 
particular fields. The level of cross fertilization and recombination is low and 
cumulativeness is defined within specialised fields. As a result, specialization rather 
than diversification is advantageous for innovators. In this condition, it is easier to 
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introduce stand-alone innovations, because of weaker interdependencies across different 
technological domains.  
The rise of systemic complexity does not mean less innovative performance, but implies 
innovation largely within well defined trajectories (Dosi, 1982). In fact, the surge of 
innovation opportunities in the third period could be interpreted as higher productivity 
and increasing investment returns on innovation. This is because more organized search 
strategies imply achieving better outcomes, while applying fewer efforts and resources. 
Therefore, high technological opportunities in the first and the third periods (chapter 4) 
should be seen as similar outcomes of different creative and search processes. In the 
first period, the innovation stream is the result of randomly more diffused exploratory 
processes. In contrast, the innovation stream of the third period is the product of more 
organised recombinative knowledge generation processes.         
Given the dynamics of three-dimensional complexity, the first period may be described 
as the ‘fluidity’ stage. The structure of the knowledge base is shaky and continuously 
changing, breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is decreasing.  
Random search is dominant over organized search and explorative strategies are 
dominant over exploitation of available knowledge domains. In contrast, the third 
period could be described as the ‘maturity’ phase, where the structure of the knowledge 
based is rather stable. Systemic complexity is increasing, breadth complexity is 
decreasing, organized search is dominant over random search, and firms employ more 
exploitation than exploration strategies. The second period could be considered as the 
‘transition’ phase when the balance of this behaviour gradually changes, perhaps in 
search for higher productivity in knowledge generation processes.  
However, the definition of these three phases according to the knowledge base 
perspective is very different from conventional industry life cycle (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978). Rather than looking at the horizontal structure of the industry, it looks 
at the structure of the knowledge base (Saviotti, 2008, 2011). Moreover, there is no 
assumption about the diminishing rate of innovation when industry matures. In contrast 
more efficient and productive search and recombination processes may increase the 
innovative capacity of the sector. In addition, change in the knowledge structure could 
have important implications for industrial organization, the governance of sectoral 
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knowledge base and the geographical patterns of the innovation, topics which will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.          
5.8. Conclusion  
The main contribution of this chapter is the provision of a more comprehensive and 
precise picture of the industry lifecycle in the upstream petroleum industry drawn from 
a dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity. In other 
words, a ‘knowledge based perspective’ to industry life cycle proved a useful analytical 
tool to study industrial dynamics in the era of knowledge based economies, and was 
more relevant than traditional indicators like firm size and number. It is good to see that 
technological opportunities can be very high in an old and mature industry; and become 
even greater than in the early stages of the industry. Therefore, the rate of innovation 
and degree of technological opportunities is only a very partial indicator to distinguish 
the main phases of industry. 
Instead, a patent based description of the dynamics of knowledge base complexity is a 
more powerful tool to understand industry lifecycle and recognize its main phases. The 
combination of opportunities and dimensions of complexity is perhaps a better way to 
describe the dynamics of the knowledge base and follow their implications for industry 
organization and geography of knowledge and innovation (the topics of two subsequent 
chapters). This tool proved useful in an industry which is not usually recognized as 
knowledge intensive and where patents are not the main method for protection of 
innovation. Therefore, its descriptive power is expected to be higher in other industries. 
In other words, when an analytical tool works at minimal conditions, we except higher 
performance when applied in better conditions, i.e. in industries with higher knowledge 
and patent intensity. This study is an extension of recent research on the lifecycle of 
knowledge intensive industries (Grebel et al., 2006; Krafft, et al, 2009 & 2011), 
illustrating the usefulness of the approach even in traditional industries. This suggests 
that knowledge economy is not crystallized in particular sectors, but is a widespread 
phenomenon encompassing all sectors of the economy.   
Next, the conceptual distinction between the three dimensions of complexity proved not 
only meaningful but important, as it may have different implications for organization 
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and strategy of innovation and also geography of knowledge. Searching for the main 
factors behind difficulty of technological catch-up, my broad hypothesis in the 
beginning of the research was to nominate increasing technological complexity as one 
of important explanatory factors. However, the concept of complexity for me was rather 
vague and unclear. The status of the literature also was not satisfying, because of rather 
vague conception and different interpretations of the concept. I think the suggestion of 
the three-dimensional perspective of complexity, and more importantly my attempt to 
measure them over time was an important step forward to address this gap in the 
literature.  
Application of this conceptual frame and methodological approach in the case of 
upstream petroleum industry also provided interesting new results. In line with recent 
findings (McGahan and Silverman, 2001; Grebel et al., 2006), my evidence also does 
not support the idea that mature industries (in the conventional sense) like petroleum 
industry have necessarily fewer technological opportunities. In fact, we need a more 
complete definition or a refinement to distinguish different cycles of industries. 
My data appears to provide convincing evidence to distinguish between two main 
cycles of upstream petroleum industry and a transition phase between the two, 
characterized by the dynamics of complexity and the structure of knowledge base. 
According to evidence provided, we could label them as ‘fluidity’, ‘transition’ and 
‘maturity’ phases. These three phases almost correspond to the main three periods 
explored in the chapter 4 based on the technological opportunities of the sector. But we 
need to be careful as the meaning assigned to these phases is very different to the 
conventional (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or even now ‘pre-historic’ perspective. 
The focus here is not on the horizontal structure of the industry, but on the structure of 
the ‘knowledge base’.  
As analysis of the dynamics of knowledge base complexity shows, the first period can 
be described as the period of dominance of breadth complexity where companies follow 
random search and exploration strategies. The knowledge structure is relatively shaky 
and changing. These features imply narrow cumulativeness for this period. New fields 
are continuously added to the knowledge base of the sector, but cross fertilizations and 
linkages lag and are limited. In contrast, the third period is best described as the period 
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of increasing systemic complexity, where recombination and cross-fertilization within 
defined trajectories become dominant. Firms tend to follow more organized search and 
exploitation strategies. The aim is to benefit from knowledge complementarities and 
introduce systemic innovations. The result is a relatively stable knowledge structure and 
wide cumulativeness which stem from complementarities and cross fertilizations. The 
second period is the phase of transition between these two different periods. 
In summary, the first hypothesis (H1) of this thesis that upstream petroleum industry 
has moved towards technological complexity is empirically supported. However a more 
subtle and articulated meaning of complexity emerged in this study. We found that the 
dominant type of complexity in different periods may change. In upstream petroleum 
industry, depth complexity is shown as a pervasive aspect of complexity which often 
increases over time. Breadth complexity rises in the early phases then the last period has 
increasing systemic complexity.   
The next chapters analyze the sectoral, organizational and geographical dynamics of 
innovation associated with dynamics of knowledge base complexity. From both an 
academic and policy perceptive, it is important to explore how firms and companies 
respond or adjust their behaviour when facing complexity. Also, the implications of 
complexity for catch-up processes are of particular interest. I investigate whether we 
observe associations between the dynamics of knowledge base complexity and 
governance of knowledge at sectoral (Hypothesis 2) and organisational level 
(Hypothesis 3) in the next chapter. I also explore its implication for international 
geography of innovation (Hypothesis 4) in the chapter 7. 
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6. Chapter 6: Governance of knowledge base complexity 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The central aim of this chapter is to understand the mechanisms by which economic 
agents manage and coordinate the dynamics of knowledge base complexity. The current 
literature often answers this question without distinguishing between different 
dimensions of knowledge base complexity. This is one reason why different authors 
come to different conclusions about the appropriate governance systems for complex 
knowledge bases. Some suggest emergence of more decentralized governance systems 
as an organisational response to complexity (for example Ernst, 2005a & 2005b). 
Others propose more centralized and vertically integrated structures are a more 
appropriate system for the governance of complexity (for example Pavitt, 1999). 
Although confusing, those views are not necessarily contradictory, because they 
concern different dimensions of complexity without explicit distinction. Looking at the 
upstream petroleum industry, I show that the three-dimensional perspective to 
knowledge base complexity helps to explain the dynamics of governance system.  
The relationship between dynamics of knowledge base complexity and appropriate 
governance system will be examined with reference to two complementary analytical 
frames. The first frame formulates this relationship in terms of the association between 
technological regimes and sectoral (Schumpeterian) patterns of innovation, extensively 
described in chapter 3. This line of research is pushed further in two respects. First, we 
extend the concept of knowledge base complexity using the three-dimensional 
perspective. Second, we extend current quantitative econometric studies of the 
relationship between technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation to an 
inter-temporal design. This extension helps us to examine empirically the dynamic 
relationship between technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovation which 
are often analyzed in a static perspective. This approach paves the way to explain 
transformations of sectoral innovation systems. Based on this frame, we argue in section 
6.4 that a change in dominant type of knowledge base complexity from breadth to 
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systemic type is an important driver of transformation of upstream petroleum industry 
from Schumpeter I to II mode.  
The second type of framing, based on distinction between the roles of different 
organizations in the innovation networks, provides deeper insights compared to the first. 
I call this strand a functional approach, because it considers the role of different actors 
in the innovation processes, analyzing the different functions they serve. The weakness 
of the first type of framing is its rather implicit homogeneous view of all innovators. It 
implicitly assumes the similarity of responses of all innovators to an emergent 
complexity. As a result, it neglects the possibility of operation of different type of 
agents dealing with complexity in a division of labour where they can serve different 
functions in the innovation processes. Such an approach is not able to capture possible 
changes in the role of different actors operating in the system of innovation as 
complementary and distinctive agents. 
The advantage of the second framing is that it disaggregates the data to distinguish the 
behaviours of various types of agents and their changes over time. As a result, it enables 
us to see how different agents collectively and in relationship with each other manage 
and coordinate the changing nature of knowledge base complexity. The main 
contribution to the existing literature is the illustration of the emergence of new systems 
integrators (Davies, 2005) in the innovations system. These are integrated services 
companies, that play an important role in the governance of emerged systemic 
complexity. We argue that the rise of systemic complexity in the knowledge base of 
upstream petroleum industry has been an important determinant of transformation of 
certain service companies towards new systems integrators of the sector. This deep 
understanding of micro processes involved in governance of complexity paves the way 
for the analysis of the role of geography in managing complexity and catch-up 
processes, the issue which will be addressed in the next chapter.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 briefly introduces the background 
literature and explains how knowledge base complexity could shape the governance 
system of knowledge. This issue can be formulated within two analytical frames. The 
first is the Schumpeterian approach, where the relationship between technological 
regimes and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation is analyzed. Because this strand of 
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research is extensively discussed in chapter 3, I do not review it here. I focus on the 
functional strand of research where functions of different agents in organizational 
arrangements in dealing with complexity are examined.  
Building on this functional literature and the Schumpeterian tradition introduced in the 
chapter 3, two hypotheses are formulated in section 6.3. They articulate the association 
of the dynamics of knowledge governance system and dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity. Section 6.4 examines the first hypothesis, arguing that increasing systemic 
complexity can shift the sector from Schumpeter I to II. Section 6.5 examines the 
second hypothesis, arguing that new systems integrators are essential for the governance 
of increasing systemic complexity. We explore the evolving role of systems integrators 
involved in the governance of systemic complexity. The last section combines the 
findings and concludes.   
6.2.   Governance of complex knowledge in the literature 
The appropriate system of governance of complexity in the knowledge base has been 
the subject of hot academic debates. In addition to the Schumpeterian tradition which 
analyzes the role of knowledge base complexity as one of the elements of technological 
regimes in shaping sectoral patterns of innovation, other strands of innovation studies 
have also addressed this issue. We call this second strand a functional approach, 
because the function of different organizational arrangements in dealing with 
complexity is taken into account. As the Schumpeterian approach is discussed in 
chapter 3, I only review the functional approach in this chapter. 
Three typical organizational forms for the governance of knowledge can be found in the 
literature. First, vertically integrated firms which tend to generate and coordinate the 
knowledge base through hierarchy and systems of command. Second, vertically 
disintegrated and modular organizations which tend to manage the knowledge base 
through market based transactions. Finally, networks which combine some features of 
both in a hybrid structure based on partnerships and collaborations (Brusoni and 
Prencipe 2001b; Antonelli, 2003; Patrucco, 2011).          
The important role of vertically integrated firms in generation and management of new 
knowledge is highlighted in the seminal works of Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1977). 
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They explain the logic of economy of scale and scope in the expansion of modern 
organizations and the role of R&D departments in the production of new knowledge. 
Most empirical support for this idea came from American companies in the first half of 
the twenty first century, where oil companies were cited as an illustrating example. In 
addition, Teece (1984) argued that vertical integration is more efficient in the case of 
systemic innovations where change in one part often involves change in other parts of 
the system. He explained that markets are often unable to coordinate complementarities 
because of their weakness in settling the conflicts embedded in the nature of systemic 
innovations. With particular attention to the American oil industry, Teece (1976) argued 
against divesture of oil companies, because of its damaging impact on innovation 
processes.         
Relying on a more recent set of evidence based on Simons’ (1962) view on complex 
systems, the modularity literature puts forward a different and rather contradictory 
argument. The central claim is that when systems become too complex and interactions 
between different elements are dense, coordination through integrated structures is 
almost impossible. Under these conditions, modular organizations which operate based 
on market mechanism are more efficient to coordinate and manage this excessive 
complexity (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). This is because in modular designs, complex 
systems are broken up into a number of relatively independent modules which interact 
on a weak basis through standardized interfaces (Baldwin Clark, 2000; Langlois, 2002). 
According to the modularity perspective, increasing complexity of products and 
production processes in more recent times has pushed companies to outsource some 
functions and move towards higher levels of specialisation (Langlois, 2003). This is 
because not every individual company can carry all the knowledge required in an 
industry. In addition, significant gains can be harvested from this modularization as 
predicted by Adam Smith (1776), because of a finer vertical division of labour leading 
to specialization and higher productivity (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 1999). Moreover, 
emergence of markets for technology (Arora. and Gambardella, 1994) facilitated by 
intellectual property regimes and diffusion of ICT, has reinforced a dis-integration and 
decentralization trend. Langlois (2003) has described this long term trend as the 
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vanishing hand or the return of the Smithian (1776) invisible hand, against Chandlerian 
(1977) visible hand which temporarily emerged in early twenties century.  
Observation of multi-technology corporations (Granstrand et al., 1997) and complex 
products and systems (CoPS) sectors (Prencipe, 2005 &2 006) raised a number of 
criticisms to this broad modularity approach. This approach, at least in its strong form, 
pays little attention to the serious limits of modularity (Ernst, 2005a) and specialization 
(Brusoni, 2005; Cacciatori et al., 2005). Knowledge is not like information which is 
easily decomposable. In contrast and in line with endogenous complexity and 
evolutionary approach, knowledge should be seen as a system and outcome of a 
recombination process. As a result, it is not easily decomposable to different modules to 
be recomposed easily in markets through a simple price mechanism (Arrow, 1969). This 
is why some argue that the idea of virtual company is not applicable in complex sectors 
(Paoli and Prencipe, 1999), although it may hold in other modular sectors.  
One aim of this revisionist approach (Ernst, 2005) is to explain the emergence of 
alternative governance structures. A modularly approach on its own is unable to explain 
the existence of large and technologically diversified companies operating side by side 
with specialized firms in hybrid structures. When markets are not efficient, close 
cooperation in hybrid structures may work better. Networks have therefore become the 
subject of a number of studies as environments in which both big multi-technology and 
smaller specialized companies cooperate and collaborate to generate and coordinate 
complex knowledge. There is increasing consensus among scholars that networks 
include a variety of hybrid structures which can combine the advantages of markets and 
hierarchies at the same time (Brusoni and Prencipe 2001a & 2001b; Antonelli, 2003; 
Consoli and Patrucco, 2011). 
Elaborating on contrasting evidence, scholars have tried to explain why decentralization 
in governance of knowledge is not observed in some sectors, as predicted by the 
modularity literature. Attempts have been made to understand the emergence of a 
variety of inter-organizational hybrid arrangements. It has been argued that division of 
knowledge does not necessarily follow the division of labour. In other words, there are 
many occasions where “firms know more than they make” and knowledge boundaries 
go well beyond production boundaries (Brusoni et al., 2001). Those companies known 
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as systems integrators may outsource parts of production activities, particularly in 
complex products, without necessarily outsourcing the correspondent knowledge 
domain. In simple words, “there is no one-to-one mapping between product, 
organisational and knowledge modularity” (Acha and Brusoni, 2008, p. 45). In order to 
coordinate changes in supply chain and learn about new technologies, systems 
integrators often develop and maintain technological capabilities in a variety of 
domains. Achieving dynamic efficiency pushes them to hold distributed competences in 
various knowledge domains rather than being technologically specialized with 
distinctive competences.  This function explains why “multi-technology” corporations 
emerge and diversify their technological capabilities (Grandstand et al., 1997). 
Moreover, distributed capabilities allow systems integrators to design and continuously 
revise the template by which complex tasks are decomposed and outsourced to other 
partners. Without enough knowledge about the latest innovations in different modules, 
systems integrators are not able to update a template which composes efficiently at 
design level what is decomposed at production level (Acha and Brusoni, 2008). The 
template refers to the architectural knowledge they have about overall working of the 
system (Henderson, 1996). This template is not something given, but is an interpretative 
framework shaped by distributed knowledge through which interdependencies are 
defined and integrity is maintained. This interpretive framework defines the point of 
salience or important elements according to which the outsourcing scheme is shaped 
(Acha, 2003). This capability grants a unique role to system integrators in the 
innovation network.  
The concept of loosely coupled networks was proposed in order to clarify some 
ambiguities in the debate about appropriate forms of organizing technological 
knowledge in complex systems. Loosely coupled networks are characterised as hybrid 
combinations between markets and hierarchies, because they express two key features at 
the same time. First, the ability to master and generate an increasingly diverse range of 
specialized knowledge in order to keep novelty in the system. This capability is called 
‘distinctiveness’. Second, the capacity to coordinate learning and integrate the dispersed 
bodies of specialized knowledge among different organizations through a coherent 
governance system. This is called ‘responsiveness’ (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001b). 
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On the one hand, increasing division of labour implies rapid expansion in the number of 
specialized bodies of knowledge needed to be combined in the final product. On the 
other, greater integration and coordination capacity is required to keep the network 
coherent and guarantee alignment between various specialized knowledge flows. While 
the first task is more a function of specialised entities in the network, the second is more 
the responsibility of systems integrators. Greater specialization and division of labour 
among specialized firms requires a broadening of the knowledge base of the systems 
integrators. This allows them to understand external sources of knowledge, manage the 
integration of outscored components, and coordinate the collective and distributed 
innovation processes.              
Loosely coupled networks should not be seen as a fixed pre-defined structure but as a 
range of possibilities between two extremes of markets and hierarchies. A number of 
factors define which structure is more appropriate. The degree of coupling could vary 
depending on the predictability of interdependencies and rate of change in component 
technologies (Brusoni et al., 2001). However, as the semiconductor industrial sector 
shows, there is not necessarily one optimal form of governance and it may also depend 
on the firm’s history and strategy (Linden and Somaya, 2003). Even the same company 
may employ mixed modes of governance in order to leverage a comparative advantage 
(Jacobides, 2008), as shown in the case of the mortgage banking industry (Jacobides 
and Hitt, 2005). 
Dynamic analysis of modes of governance has shown that industries can swing between 
integration and disintegration, as the outcome of dynamic co-evolution between firm 
capabilities, learning processes and transaction costs (Jacobides and Winter, 2005; 
Rosiello 2007; Jacobides, 2008; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). Some of these studies 
also touch upon the changing role of the knowledge base in triggering both 
disintegration and re-integration processes (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2006; Acha and Brusoni, 2008). However, they are yet to provide a full 
understanding of the nature of the knowledge base and its implications for the way in 
which- firms organize knowledge generation, sharing and integration processes. This 
field is becoming a very important research area where concrete insights are 
increasingly demanded (Brusoni et al., 2009).  
 152 
6.3. Hypotheses 
Building on a combination of these functional studies and the Schumpeterian approach 
reviewed in the chapter 3, we examine how dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
can shape the governance of knowledge in the upstream petroleum industry. The central 
aim of this chapter is to answer the second research question of this PhD thesis: 
Q2: How is the governance system of sectoral knowledge base adapted to the dynamics 
of technological complexity? And how have different firms responded or adjusted to the 
dynamics of technological complexity? 
This question will be answered using the two analytical frames mentioned above. These 
generate two different, yet related and complementary hypotheses.  
Under the first frame based on Schumpeterian approach, we develop our second thesis 
hypothesis (H2) which describes the association between knowledge base complexity 
and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation. This largely follows the Schumpeterian logic 
described in chapter 3. 
Under the second frame we develop our third hypothesis (H3) to describe the 
relationship between knowledge base complexity and the role of different players 
(specialists vs. systems integrators) in the innovation network. This is largely based on 
the functional literature discussed in this chapter. 
I believe that these two frames provide complementary answers to the research 
question, considering different aspects of governance of knowledge. The Schumpeterian 
approach is most concerned with the relative role of firm size and experience in the 
knowledge generation process. As a result, it analyzes the role of small vs. big and new 
vs. incumbent companies in the innovation processes of different sectors. On the other 
hand, the functional approach is most concerned with the role of different organizations 
in different organizational arrangements with respect to innovation and knowledge 
generation process. This is why it considers the role of specialist vs. diversified and 
systems integrators in innovation networks and is concerned with the advantages and 
disadvantages of markets vs. hierarchies in dealing with knowledge base complexity.     
Having theoretical insights from both framings and the empirical assessment of 
dynamics of knowledge base complexity in upstream petroleum industry from chapter 5 
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we propose two hypotheses. We observed that over p1, breadth complexity in the 
knowledge base of the sector is increasing while its connectivity and systemic 
complexity is decreasing (period 1). In this phase, the sector is mostly in its random 
search period and exploration strategy is dominant. Because the structure of the 
knowledge base is changing and is not yet established, the cognitive barriers to entry are 
relatively low, and cumulativeness is low and narrow (See section 5.6 and 5.7). 
The complementarities between new and old knowledge domains have not been fully 
explored and recombination process and linkages are not effective. In terms of 
knowledge network, poorly connected nodes emerge. As a result, access to a wide range 
of complementary knowledge is not necessary for innovation processes in this stage. 
Therefore we expect an increasing role for small and new companies relative to the role 
of big and established companies in the organization of innovation processes. In short, 
we expect the sector to move towards a Schumpeter Mark I mode. Since the level of 
systemic interdependencies and complementarities is low, we expect many companies 
to leverage the gains and benefits of finer division of labour and employ a technological 
specialization strategy.  
In contrast, we observed that after early part of period 2 (p2) and over p3, systemic 
complexity expresses a relatively sharp rising trend while breadth complexly gradually 
declines. As explained in chapter 5, when systemic complexity increases, the sector 
moves towards a more organized search period and exploitative strategies are pervasive. 
Core technological domains are realized, technological trajectories are relatively clear 
and most of the productive complementarities and technical interdependencies are 
explored by key players. Big companies therefore can gain from economy of scale and 
scope in knowledge generation and utilization processes. Cognitive barriers for small 
specialised companies are relatively higher, because successful innovation involves 
combination and recombination of various range of knowledge domains.  
In addition, increasing returns stemming from complementarities and fungeability of 
knowledge (Antonelli, 2003) favours big technologically diversified companies. As a 
result of the wider cumulativeness and higher appropriability mechanisms which 
emerge, big companies manage to benefit from cross-fertilization between different 
knowledge domains and their wide range of applications. The entry barriers for new 
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companies will be higher and growth opportunities for small ones are limited. As a 
result, it is reasonable to expect that the sector becomes similar to or moves towards a 
Schumpeter Mark II mode. Also, systemic interdependencies imply that at least some 
companies as systems integrators broaden their technological boundaries in order to 
mediate the dynamics of knowledge flows in the network and coordinate technical 
changes in the sector. 
Of course, as the loose network perspective (previous section) suggests, alongside 
systems integrators, we may still, and actually should have, some specialists who 
contribute to both the breadth (bringing new knowledge domains) and depth (deepening 
the current specialized knowledge domains) complexity of the sector. However, as 
theory suggests, it is the responsibility more of systems integrators to manage excessive 
systemic complexity, mediating the technical interdependencies and system wide 
interactions. Accordingly, the two hypotheses based on two analytical frames are 
formulated, as follows:                             
According to the Schumpeterian analytical frame: 
Hypothesis 2: we expect the sector to move towards Schumpeter Mark I over p1 when 
breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is decreasing. We also expect 
a shift towards Schumpeter Mark II after early p2 when systemic complexity is 
increasing and breadth complexity declines. 
According to the functional analytical frame: 
Hypothesis 3: we expect most of the agents to follow a technological specialization 
strategy over p1 when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is 
decreasing. We also expect some of the agents which become system integrators to shift 
towards a technological diversification strategy after early p2 when systemic 
complexity is increasing and breadth complexity declines.  
As figure 5.1 shows, the dynamics of complexity expresses two main phases and a 
turning point in early p2. This is why the two hypotheses are framed according to 
‘before and after’ the early part of period 2 (p2). Thus, the second half of p2 and p3 
show similar properties after the turning point observed in early p2. The three phase 
periodization suggested in chapter 4 was based on the dynamics of technological 
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opportunities. However, the dynamics of complexity do not necessarily correspond 
exactly to the dynamics of opportunities. In our subsequent analysis we examine the 
dynamics of the sector in two main phases.  
The next two sections focus on operationalization and empirical examination of these 
two hypotheses. We also provide a discussion about the new theoretical insights which 
can be drawn from the empirical observations.  In order to distinguish the governance of   
knowledge under a Schumpeterian approach, we use the term ‘sectoral patterns of 
innovation’ in line with the literature discussed in the chapter 3. In parallel, we reserve 
the term ‘organizational patterns of innovation’ to refer to the governance of knowledge 
within functional approach in the second framing, reflecting the different roles or 
functions of different organizations in the innovation processes.           
6.4. Sectoral patterns of innovation 
In this section, we analyze the sectoral pattern of innovation as one aspect of the 
dynamics of the knowledge governance system. This framework is concerned with the 
relative role of big vs. small, and new vs. incumbent innovators in the innovation 
process. Following established literature (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1997; Breschi et 
al., 2000), we use a set of variables to examine whether the sector is moving towards 
Schumpeter I over p1 and shifts towards Schumpeter II after early p2, as predicted by 
the hypothesis 2. Although we use a similar set of variables, there is a fundamental 
difference between this study and previous research, as explained in the chapter 3. 
These variables are normally used to distinguish different patterns of innovation in 
inter-sectoral studies. However, I employ them in an inter-temporal mode of analysis to 
explore the shift of sectoral patterns of innovation over time. This novel application is a 
step forward for extension of quantitative methods to the analysis of transformations of 
sectoral innovation systems which is a relatively neglected research area.               
Four indicators selected for the analysis of the dynamics of sectoral patterns of 
innovation are based on previous studies (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; 1997; Breschi et 
al., 2000). They are: concentration of innovative activities (C); the number of innovative 
firms (F); share of new entries (NE) to the innovation system in terms of the proportion 
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of patents registered by new innovators; and, stability of the ranking of innovative firms 
(STR).  
Although the variables of this inter-temporal research are similar to previous cross-
sectoral studies, their operational correspondence with archetypical Schumpeterian 
patterns of innovation is interpreted differently. Due to dynamic nature of the analysis, 
we are interested more in the trends of variables, rather than their relative values in 
cross-sectional designs. In other words, interpretation is performed based on relative 
change of the variables over time.  
Accordingly, positive or negative changes in these four variables will show toward 
which archetypical Schumpeterian patterns of innovation the industry is moving. I ask 
whether it is becoming closer to a typical Mark I or becoming similar to a typical Mark 
II type. Table 6.1 summarizes the operational account of archetypical Schumpeterian 
patterns of innovation in a dynamic perspective and the direction of the variables we 
expect to observe in each typical mode. The Schumpeter Mark I sector is relatively open 
to the entrance of new or small firms. Therefore, we expect that over time, new firm 
entry and the number of innovating firms will increase, and as a result the concentration 
of innovative activities will decrease. This implies the relative low stability of the 
ranking of innovators, because new or small innovators have the opportunity to 
challenge the position of top innovators. 
Schumpeterian patterns 
of innovation  
Schumpeter Mark I 
Widening 
Schumpeter Mark II 
Deepening 
Concentration (C)  ↓ ↑ 
Number of firms (F) ↑ ↓ - 
Entry of new firms (NE) ↑ ↓ 
Stability of ranking (STR) L H 
 
In contrast, a typical Schumpeter Mark II sector is relatively closed to new or small 
innovators and works in favour of large innovators. Therefore, we expect to observe a 
decreasing trend in the contribution of new firms. The number of firms may be 
relatively stable (as shown in table 6.1) or even decrease over time, depending on the 
Table  6-1 Archetypical Schumpeterian patterns of innovation in dynamic 
perspective 
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size of exiting firms. This implies a rise in concentration of innovative activities in the 
sector which leads to relative stability particularly among big innovators. 
To explore in the different periods, the Schumpeterian patterns of innovation, we need 
to measure the changes over time of these four variables. Comparison of the observed 
trends with table 6.1 reveals the dominant pattern. We stick to the three main periods 
explored in the chapter 4. In order to smooth the trends and ignore the short term 
fluctuations, the measures are drawn from data collapsed within 4 years of the 
beginning and the end of the main periods.  
The first main period (p1: 1970-83) is formed of three sub periods (p1-0: 1970-73; p1-1: 
1974-1977; p1-2: 1980-83). The second main period (p2: 1984-1993) is formed of two 
sub-periods (p2-1: 1984-1987; p2-2: 1990-93). The third main period (p3: 1996-2005) 
is formed of two sub periods (p3-1: 1996-99; p3-2: 2002-2005). The length of the first 
period is 14 years, but the length of both the second and third periods are 10 years. 
Therefore, p1 is divided into one introductory sub-period (p1-0) and two other sub- 
periods (p1-1, p1-2). This means that all three main periods cover 10 years with two 4-
year sub periods at both sides and a two year gap in the middle, leaving out the 





Using this periodization helps to control for the impact of change in technological 
opportunities on the selected variables, and therefore unravels the role of knowledge 
base complexity in the dynamics of sectoral patterns of innovation. The advantage of 
this sub periodization is that we can trace the dynamics of sectoral patterns of 
innovation over the main periods (p1, p2 and p3) and compare them.  
In the next sections, I present and explain the dynamics of four indicators of 
Schumpeterian patterns of individually. In section 6.3.4, I combine the results to explore 
whether the dominant Schumpeterian patterns of innovation have changed over time. In 
addition, I discuss how the observed dynamics in Schumpeterian patterns could be 
P1-0 
 70                 73   74                  77      80                 83   84                 87      90                 93          96                  99     02                  05               
P1-1 P1-2 P2-1 P2-2 P3-1 P3-2 
                 P1        P2    P3 
Figure  6-1 Periodization of the analysis 
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associated with dynamics of knowledge base complexity and change in technological 
regimes. The empirical findings support the second hypothesis of this research 
suggesting an association change in the dominant type of knowledge base complexity 
and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation from mode I to mode II. In addition, we 
suggest that positive (or negative) change in technological opportunities tend to 
strengthen (or weaken) the existing Schumpeterian pattern without altering it. 
Accordingly, a theoretical fretwork is suggested to explain the dynamics of 
Schumpeterian pattern of innovation according to the combination of knowledge base 
complexity and technological regimes.      
6.4.1. Concentration and number of innovators  
The top part of the figure 6.2 shows the trend of concentration over time for different 
size groups using a corrected version of Herfindahl index of concentration. The 
advantage of this corrected version is that it controls for small sample bias (Hall, 2000; 
Corrocher et al., 2007). I repeated the indicator for different subset of companies 
defined by innovation size (for N<40, N<100, N>40, N>100 and All companies: N is 
firms’ total innovation size) to check the robustness of the results in different size 
groups. The top left side of the figure (a) displays C for large innovation size group and 
top right side of the figure (b) shows it for smaller sizes. Regardless of the size 
categories, all of the indicators present an overall U shape pattern reaching their lowest 
points in p1-2 or p2-1. The two lowest figures show the number of innovative firms 
over time, by innovation size category.  
According to these figures concentration (C) decreases in p1 (and even up to p2-1 for 
larger groups). In parallel, firm numbers (F) increase in almost all size categories. High 
technological opportunities driven by high oil prices seem to have worked as a powerful 
incentive for smaller firms to catch-up with major innovators. The increasing number of 
innovative companies in all groups also confirms the key role of new innovators in p1. 
Their considerable share in innovative activities challenged the relative position of big 
existing innovators pushing down the C index.  Another complementary mechanism for 
the increasing number of firms and decreasing concentration could have been the 
progressive outsourcing strategy of oil operators to supply and service companies, as 
explained in chapter 4. 
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As oil prices collapsed in p2-1 and the declining trend continued in the second period, 
the upstream petroleum industry was not very rewarding for innovation. Over p2, F 
slightly decreased and C took a clear upward trend. One reasonable explanation could 
be the higher vulnerability of some smaller firms, when a continued low opportunity 
environment would dry up their innovative efforts. Due to the high risk and uncertainty 
involved in innovative activities, many firms may cut R&D investment in poor market 
conditions. As we know from chapter 4, the number of patents has a negative trend in 
p2. Yet increasing concentration of innovative activities, combined with reduction in the 
number of innovative firms, suggests vulnerability of smaller firms which exit from the 
system of innovation. In fact p2 is the only period with negative net entry. In addition, a 
wave of M&A activities, triggered by low oil prices in p2 could be a complementary 
mechanism responsible for higher concentration. Nonetheless, acceleration of 
outsourcing strategies by oil operators should have compromised the trend of 
concentration in p2, which otherwise would be sharper.  
The beginning of the third and final period (p3) presents an interesting and puzzling 
pattern. By the end of p2 and the beginning of p3 a new wave of innovative entry is 
observable resulting in a sharp rise of F (fig 6.1 d) in all size categories, with the 
exception of super big innovators (N>100) (fig 6.1 c). This should have been driven by 
the jump in technological opportunities observed after p2-1 (chapter 4). Although F 
transforms sharply from a negative trend in p2 to a sharp positive trend in p3, there is no 
expected corresponding drop in C. In contrast, C continues its upward trend which is 
reinforced over p3. 
This pattern reflects the relative low and weakening share of new entrants in p3, 
compared to big incumbents (figs 6.1a & b). In addition, the short term jump of F before 
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Figure  6-2 Concentration of innovative activities (a & b) and the number of innovative firms (c & d): by innovation size 
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These patterns suggest a fundamental difference between p1 and p3. We observe that 
high opportunity environments in both periods encourage new innovators to enter into 
the sector - reflected in the rise of F. However C presents opposite trends - decreasing in 
p1, but increasing in p3. The key question is: what could explain the fact that in p1 new 
small innovators could benefit from high opportunity conditions and challenge the 
position of bigger established firms, whilst in p3, established big innovators gain much 
more than new innovators from expanding innovation. The trend of these two indicators 
corroborates the hypothesis of a shift in the Schumpeterian pattern of innovation after 
the early part of p2. 
The answer lies in the changing nature of technological regimes, particularly the 
complexity of the knowledge base. Our analysis in chapter 5 provides convincing 
evidence that increasing systemic complexity of the knowledge base favours big 
innovators. Similar arguments have been raised about the other elements of 
technological regimes such as appropriability and cumulativeness, although complexity 
is a relatively neglected element. Ceteris paribus, Breschi et al. (2000) explain that high 
technological opportunities favour a reduction in concentration, because they allow for 
entry of new innovators. The opposite relationship also holds for low opportunity 
conditions. Nonetheless, according to several different theoretical models (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Jovanovic and Lach, 1988; Winter, 1984; Dosi et al. 1995), under 
conditions of high technological appropriability and cumulativeness, high technological 
opportunity leads to rise of concentration. This is because this combination with 
technological opportunities creates major difference between big incumbents and small 
new innovators in terms of innovation rates. On the one hand, high appropriability 
limits the extent of knowledge spillovers creating relative advantage for big successful 
innovators. On the other hand, cumulativeness and concentration have a positive 
relationship, because the ability of existing big innovators to introduce new innovations 
is higher.  
A similar argument holds for systemic complexity where the difference between p1 and 
p3 can be explained by their underlying technological regimes. While in p1, small 
innovators could benefit from high opportunities because of low systemic complexity; 
this is not the case for p3. Systemic complexity in p3 would increase the cognitive 
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barriers to entry for small and newcomer companies. Although there are high 
technological opportunities driven by recombination processes (as shown in chapter 5), 
they are mostly available to large technologically diversified companies. This is because 
they have access to the required knowledge segments as well as integrative and 
combinational capabilities. Small and new firms may innovate in specialized niche 
technical areas, but their relative role is lower. Under these conditions big incumbents 
are at an advantage compared to small and new comers, because they benefit from their 
investment in innovation processes without serious worries about free riding and large 
externalities (Breschi et al., 2000). As explained in chapter 4, many M&A activities 
over p2 and p3 have also been of ‘technology led’ type, driven by technological 
interdependencies, moving the industry towards higher concentration. 
6.4.2. Share of new entry to the system of innovation 
This section analyzes the relative chance of new innovators in comparison with 
incumbents to contribute to the development of the knowledge base of the industry. 
Table 6.2 shows the number of patents of existing and new firms in each sub-period; 
and also the new innovators' share of patents (NE) in each sub-period. This is measured 
for different innovation sizes of firms (with the minimum patent size of 1, 5 and 10), in 
order to get insights about the role of size for successful entry. The trend of NE is also 
shown in figure 6.3 for visual presentation.  
(a) New  firms’ share of patents: by size  
Sub 
periods 




























p1-1 1297 693 34.82 1272 222 14.86 1222 108 8.12 
p1-2 2205 1232 35.85 2166 442 16.95 2062 298 12.63 
p2-1 2802 1033 26.94 2714 195 6.70 2588 67 2.52 
p2-2 2528 1112 30.55 2459 223 8.31 2348 97 3.97 
p3-1 4226 1957 31.65 4127 595 12.60 3952 337 7.86 
p3-2 5291 1732 24.66 5089 203 3.84 4853 45 0.92 
 
According to table 6.2, the share of new entry during period 1 (p1) increases from about 
34.8 percent to 35.9 confirming a 1% rise in the chance of new innovators. This is 
considered significant, because the indicator is drawn from the whole population. A test 
Table  6-2 New entries to the innovation system: by different innovation size 
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of significance is irrelevant, because no sampling method is applied. The amount of 
increase is even greater for bigger innovators (about 2% and 4% for 5 and 10 IPFs 
minimum size), suggesting the increasing possibility of moving up of the hierarchy 
among larger firms. Overall, the new entry indicators confirm the increasing chance of 
new innovators over p1 for all size of the firms.  
Transition from p1 to p2 is accompanied by about a 10 percent reduction of new entry 
for all size ranges. It is rather intuitive that the arrival of low opportunity conditions in 
p2 has worked against new entries, as the expected returns on R&D has reduced. Over 
p2, when low innovation opportunity conditions are established and companies have 
adjusted to the external shock, part of this lost contribution of new entrants recovered. 
This is reflected in the rise of NE for all size innovators. This is rather counter intuitive, 
because low opportunity conditions do not motivate new innovative entries. We 
normally expect a fall or stability of new entries. 














p1-1 p1-2 p2-1 p2-2 p3-1 p3-2
share of the IPFs of new firms: by size
Entry to the innovation system
1 IPF min size 5 IPF min size
10 IPF min size
 
 
According to the historical analysis of chapter 4, the most reasonable explanation is the 
accelerated outsourcing strategies of operators over this period which created new 
innovation opportunities for the service sector. In fact in many cases, operators 
supported the formation of specialized service companies as a result of poor market 
Figure  6-3 The percentage share of the IPFs by new innovators 
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conditions. A horizontal disintegration strategy was followed to reduce fixed costs and 
increase specialization, efficiency and responsiveness. This rather long term response of 
oil operators to the unsuitable economic environment created a new division of labour 
in which part of the locus of innovation in upstream petroleum industry transferred to 
new entities. As a result, our evidence tends to attribute the rise of new entries over p2 
to the emergence of a new division of knowledge in the industry. 
The distinction between short term and long term responses of the sectoral innovation 
system to low opportunity conditions is an interesting finding. The short term response 
of industry to low opportunities was reduction of new entries. However, the long term 
response was formation of a new division of knowledge or more precisely new industry 
architecture (Brusoni and Jacobides, et al., 2009). This favoured new entrants and 
launched a new knowledge dynamic. Transition from the low opportunity conditions of 
p2 to high opportunity conditions in p3 amplified these new entrants as reflected in the 
continued rise of NE for all sizes ranges from p2 to p3. 
Over p3, we observe a relative reduction of new entrants in all groups, to their lowest 
levels over the whole period of observation. In contrast to the high opportunity 
conditions of p1 over which new entries experienced their maximum level, the 
possibility of new entries over p3 seems to reach to its most limited status. Ceteris 
paribus, the standard theory of patterns of innovation predicts a positive relationship 
between opportunities and new entries (Breschi, et al., 2000). It means we expect to 
observe increasing entry rates in both p1 and p3.  
These predictions however are conditional on the nature of technological regimes. For 
example, high new entry is expected under low cumulativeness conditions when 
“would-be innovators are not at major disadvantage with respect to incumbent firms” 
(p.393). Our analysis in chapter 5 suggests that the difference between p1 and p3 in 
terms of new entries can be attributed to the dynamics of knowledge base complexity. 
New entrants are at a high disadvantage in p3 compared to p1 because of the change in 
underlying technological regimes.  As explained in chapter 5, the rise of systemic 
complexity over p3 can involve wider cumulativeness implying higher cognitive 
barriers to entry. This constrains the exploitation of high technological opportunities by 
new and small companies in this period.   
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6.4.3. Stability of ranking of innovative companies 
Stability of ranking of innovators is the last indicator of the sectoral pattern of 
innovation that I examined. I computed the Spearman correlation coefficient of the 
ranking of patentees. This measure is usually interpreted as an index for the degree of 
creative accumulation vs. creative destruction at firm level for cross-sectional analysis 
of different industries (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995, 1996, 1997). Unfortunately, I 
could not find robust and consistent patterns in inter-temporal analysis of this indicator. 
Several types of anomalies were observed which together make this index quite 
challenging and difficult to interpret. These inconsistent patterns could be the synthetic 
product of several phenomena such as structural changes (combination of outsourcing 
and M&A activities) and dynamics of technological regimes which is not possible to 
disentangle easily. Due to these difficulties I do not include the result of this measure in 
my further analysis. I think this proxy is not a robust and reliable indicator to capture 
the degree of creative accumulation vs. creative destruction, when the sector is involved 
in continued structure changes. This is so at least in inter-temporal analysis, even if not 
the case in cross-section approach.      
6.4.4. Sectoral patterns of innovation and knowledge base complexity 
So far, the dynamics of the sectoral pattern of innovation in the upstream petroleum 
industry are analyzed with respect to three indicators over 3 main periods. Table 6.3 
summarizes the changing pattern of these indicators. Also, it shows the observed 
dominant pattern in each period drawn with reference to typical Schumpeterian model 
(table 6.1). Arrows specify the magnitude of changes in the indicators over that period, 
according to the data presented in previous sections. According to these results, p1 
could be characterised as strong Mark I, because of a considerable reduction in the 
concentration, a large increase in the number of firms and the rise of new entrants.  
The second period presents a pattern which is more similar to Mark II, although its 
signals are still weak. Concentration (C) began a slight upward trend and F reduced to 
some extent, as technological opportunities were relatively low. Although NE shows an 
upward trend over p2, this can be explained by the accelerated outsourcing of oil 
operators driven by low oil prices. In the absence of this structural change, we could 
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have observed higher concentration, less number of innovative firms, and downward 
new entries. This is why I think it is better to label this period as weakly Mark II, 
putting aside the effect of structural change on new entries. The analysis of knowledge 
base complexity in chapter 5 also supports the idea that p2 is the beginning of the rise of 
systemic complexity. As I explained, systemic complexity favours big incumbents and 
works against small and newcomer firms. This is reflected, although not still very 







The signs of Schumpeter Mark II get considerable strength when technological 
opportunities increase over p3. Although technological opportunities are high, new 
entries are reduced and the number of firms stays relatively stable. Most importantly, 
the upward trend of concentration accelerated. When the three indicators are combined 
together, the picture looks like a relatively strong Mark II. The high barriers of entry in 
this period for new small companies and relative advantage of big incumbents is 
attributable to the systemic complexity of the knowledge base.  
The above analysis had two parallel objectives: first to describe the dynamics of sectoral 
patterns of innovation. I argued that that the upstream petroleum industry presents an 
interesting dynamic, beginning with a strong Mark I over p1 which gradually weakens 
and transforms to a weak Mark II over p2. This weak mark II style is reinforced over 
time, ended up in a pattern resembling a very strong Mark II. The second aim also was 
to examine whether these dynamics are associated with changes in technological 
regimes. Dynamics of two particular elements of technological regimes were 
emphasised: technological opportunities and knowledge base complexity.  




3rd  period 
 
Schumpeterian pattern of 
innovation 
Strong I Weak II Strong II 
Concentration (C)  ↓↓ ↑ ↑↑ 
Number of firms (F) ↑↑ ↓ - 
Entry of new firms (NE) ↑ ↑ ↓ 
Table  6-3 Dynamics of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation 
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The results suggest that change in technological opportunities tends to associate with 
the degree of change in existing patterns of innovation. The existing pattern of 
innovation is weakened when changing from high to low opportunity (as observed over 
transition from p1 to p2) and is reinforces when changing from low to high (as observed 
over transition from p2 to p3). However, this element of technological regime, on its 
own is unable to explain the shift in mode of Schumpeterian pattern of innovation from 
I to II. This is best understood by looking at the two extremes of p1 and p3, when two 
quite different patterns of innovation are observable while technological opportunities 
are high in both periods. If the concept of technological regimes is to convincingly 
explain the shifts in the mode of Schumpeterian pattern, at least one additional element 
should be taken into account. Our evidence in chapter 5 suggests that knowledge base 
complexity is a reasonable candidate in the case of the upstream petroleum industry. 
The results propose the dominance of breadth over p1 is consistent with Schumpeter 
Mark I. When systemic complexity of the knowledge base increases in early p2, the 
features of Mark II emerge in the sector. Higher opportunities in p3 reinforce this 
pattern.    
These findings clearly support the second hypothesis of this research. As predicted, the 
upstream sector seems to move toward Mark I over p1 and shift towards Mark II over 
p3.  
In addition, a novel theoretical framework can be drawn from the results which explain 
the dynamics of sectoral patterns of innovation according to the combination of 
technological opportunities and knowledge base complexity. The impact of the 
combination of these two dimensions of technological regimes on change of degree and 
mode of Schumpeterian pattern of innovation is visualized in a 2x2 matrix in figure 6.4. 
The vertical axis specifies the high vs. low technological opportunities and horizontal 
axis represents the dominant type of complexity. As I explained in the section 6.3, 
dominance of breadth vs. systemic complexity could favour the dominance of two 
different types of Schumpeterian pattern of innovation (Mark I on the left and Mark II 
on the right of the matrix differentiate these two types). Change of technological 
opportunities tends to weaken or reinforce the degree of existing pattern, whether it is 
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Mark I or II, but not alter its mode. Therefore, the top side represents the weak type and 













The evidence drawn for the upstream petroleum industry supports this novel theoretical 
framework. The curve in figure 6.4 shows how the upstream petroleum industry has 
trawled through different sectoral patterns of innovation in different periods. The circles 
represent the main three periods of p1, p2 and p3 beside which the trend of indicators is 
shown (according to the table 6.3). The location of each circle in the matrix represents 
the configuration of two elements of technological regimes shaping sectoral pattern of 
innovation. This theoretical framework can be empirically examined in other industries 
experiencing dynamics of technological opportunities and knowledge base complexity. 
It is a valuable analytical tool for further research in drivers of transformation of 
sectoral innovation systems.          
Figure  6-4 Technological regimes and Schumpeterian pattern of innovation 
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6.5. Organizational patterns of innovation 
Analysis of the evolution of sectoral patterns of innovation in the previous section 
supports the idea of their association with the nature of knowledge base complexity. 
Nonetheless, that approach is unable to distinguish between different actors who might 
play different and changing roles in management and governance of knowledge base 
complexity. Not all companies in the sector play similar roles in knowledge generation 
and utilization processes. Some are major knowledge producers. Others may only be 
users with a limited role in knowledge production processes. Some companies are 
knowledge specialists, concentrating on knowledge production in very narrow technical 
areas. Others might be multi-technology corporations creating knowledge in a large 
number of domains. In fact, knowledge specialization and integration are two sides of 
the same coin, both of which are required for the development of the knowledge base of 
an industry (Brusoni and Geuna, 2005). On the one hand, specialization is the process 
by which economically relevant knowledge is produced. On the other hand, we need to 
coordinate, integrate and control these distributed specialized knowledge in order to 
introduce better products and services and improve the production processes (Pavitt, 
1998; Loasby, 1999).  
Organizational pattern of innovation defines the role of different types of actors in 
governance of knowledge base complexity. In parallel with the concept of sectoral 
pattern of innovation which focuses on aggregated sectoral level dynamics, I define the 
concept of organisational patterns of innovation referring to disaggregated dynamics of 
the role of different types of actors. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between three 
main types of actors in the top 50 patentees in the sector. These are integrated oil 
companies (IOCs), integrated service companies (ISCs) and other specialized supply 
and service companies (SSCs). We explained how their different roles in the industry 
architecture changed over time in the chapter 4.  
In this section, I explore their different and evolving roles in knowledge production 
activities and innovation processes. The aim is to understand how different agents 
position themselves when facing the evolution of knowledge base complexity. I analyze 
their evolving roles in terms of dynamics of size (growth vs. de-growth) and direction 
(specialization vs. diversification) of knowledge activities. These measures are used to 
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examine the third hypothesis of this PhD formulated in the section 6.3. Before 
presenting the results of these two variables, the relative size of contribution of different 
types of companies is analyzed to explore how their relative position has changed over 
time.               
6.5.1. The share of knowledge contribution  
Figure 6.4 shows the trend of patenting by the top 50 patentees differentiating the share 
of different types of companies over time. Part (a) of the figure illustrates that these top 
50 patentees together are roughly responsible for more than half of innovations with a 
relatively smooth share over time. The number of International Patent Families (IPFs) is 
presented by each type of company (b), their share among all patentees (c) and also 
among top 50 patentees (d).  
There are some important facts in these figures which need consideration. Clearly, IOCs 
were the dominant innovators of the industry in early 1970s with about 35% of all 
patents and more than 60% among the 50 patentees. However, their share shows a 
decreasing trend until 1980 when they show a short term upward trend. This short term 
upward trend is probably driven by large R&D investments during oil shocks. If 
absolute trends are also taken into account (fig 6.4 b), it is obvious that the increasing 
contribution of ISCs is mainly responsible for the long term decline in the share of 
IOCs. However their deceasing level of innovative activities over p2 has also 
accelerated this negative trend. With the exception of p2, IOCs present a more or less 
stable behaviour in other periods in terms of absolute level of innovative activities.          
In contrast, the sharp increase of innovative activities by ISCs eroded the share of both 
IOCs and SSCs in 1990s and 2000s. In fact before 1990s, current ISCs were performing 
even less than SSCs. According to this data, the distinguishing concept of ISCs 
manifests itself only after the early 1990s. Before that, all supply and service companies 
present a more or less similar pattern. The formation of ISCs seems to have transferred 
the locus of innovation of the upstream sector from IOCs to ISCs, and ISCs become the 
leading technological innovators of the sector. In fact, ISCs were responsible for the 
largest share of resurgence of innovative activities after the mid-1990s, generating about 
40% of total innovations and about 70% of the share of top 50 patentees. Compared to 
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their marginal share in the early 70s, this considerable rise in the share of ISCs' 
innovative activities needs particular attention. We discuss this issue in section 6.5.3, 
after exploration of the innovation strategy of different players in the next section.  
6.5.2. Dynamics of  innovation strategy: size and direction 
In this part, we examine the innovation strategy of different types of actors over time to 
examine the third hypothesis of this PhD. The direction of innovation strategy is the 
main concern. We ask whether different types of players follow technological 
diversification or specialization in different periods. We also trace firms’ average size of 
innovative activities to control for the effect of size on direction. This is because the 
larger the size of innovative activities, the wider the possibility of technological 
diversification. We need to understand which actors, in which periods, are diversifying 
or specialising. Also, to what extend can their behaviours, in conjunction with each 
other, be associated with the nature of knowledge base complexity in different periods. 
Since early p2 seems to be the turning point, I explore the broad trends before and after 
early p2. They correspond to two major phases of the industry, over which knowledge 
base complexity and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation expressed different patterns. 
Following previous research (e.g. Cantwell and Santangelo, 2000; Cantwell and 
Vertova, 2004), the reciprocal of Coefficient of Variance (CV) of Revealed 
Technological Advantage (RTA) is used in order to measure the diversity (Div) of the 
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Figure  6-5 The trend of patenting by different types of companies 
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RTA is a proxy for technological specialization first suggested by Soete (1980). It is 
calculated for each technological class i in company j according to the above equation 
(4). This index measures a relative specialization of each company according to the 
share of a particular class in a firms patent portfolio weighted by share of that class over 
the whole industry. As explained by Cantwell and Santangelo (2000), the inverse of CV 
of RTA is a direct measure of diversification. It is high when a firm is relatively active 
in many technological fields and is low when a firm is specialized in a few fields and 
does not operate in many other fields.   
Only firms with a patent stock of at least 10 in each sub period are included in the 
analysis to avoid the problem of small numbers. Small numbers could create randomly 
very high or low RTAs. As a result, Div value may become meaningless (Cantwell and 
Vertova, 2004). I calculated Div mean value as the average diversity (ADiv) of the 
knowledge base of different types of companies in different periods (figure 6.6). The 
measures are based on 7-digit IPC class, as before. In order to control for the effect of 
innovation size on ADiv, the Average innovation Stock (ASto) of different companies 
in different periods is also presented in figure 6.7. It is presented on a logarithmic basis, 
because the size distribution is highly skewed. We can better understand whether firms 
are diversifying/specializing, as a result of size change (positive or negative growth) or 
following a genuine strategy with regard to change in their knowledge environment. In 
other words, we can explore the dynamics of actors' innovation strategy in terms of both 
direction (diversification vs. specialization) and size (positive or negative growth) at the 
same time.    
The figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate that on average all three types of companies are 
becoming relatively more specialized (less diversified as reflected in the decline of 
ADiv) before early p2, in spite of their size expansion. In other words, although all three 
types of companies are expanding their innovative activities, they are focusing more on 
their own area of specialization; therefore the development of knowledge base of the 
industry before early p2 is achieved by a specialized growth strategy in all three types of 
companies. This strategy is consistent with the rise of both breadth and depth 
complexity before p2, as predicted by the third hypotheses (H3). Table 6.4 summarizes 
the innovation strategy of three types of companies before and after early p2. 
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These specialized companies govern the depth complexity of the sector within that 
particular domain of specialization where they have core competences. This is 
consistent with narrow cumulativeness which motivates companies to build their own 
area of specialization and accumulate knowledge within it. The breadth complexity of 
the sector is also governed largely through a more market-based decentralized 
coordination mechanism aligning different specializing companies. This evidence 
suggests that none of the actors see technological diversification as an efficient strategy 
to respond to the specific knowledge requirements of the industry. In contrast they 
differentiate themselves by sticking to and deepening their own area of technological 
expertise. The breadth of knowledge at sectoral level is expanded by technologically 
specialized companies operating beside each other covering the increasing range of 
knowledge domains. New technological fields are added to the sectoral knowledge base 
mostly by specialized companies. This is possible, because systemic complexity is 
decreasing and technical interdependencies are not pervasive. Markets are perceived as 
effective to mix and match the breadth of the jigsaw puzzle of sectoral knowledge base.        
Since early p2, the technological pathway of different types of companies has begun to 
diverge and a new knowledge governance system is emerging. ISCs keep growing at a 
high pace (given the logarithmic scale of the figure). SSCs also continue their upward 
trend, while IOCs reduce their average innovative activity. It seems that ISCs benefited 
the most from acceleration of the outsourcing trend in p2 and have managed to master 
the technological requirements of the expanding services market. This is reflected in 
their continued hyper growth, as the trend of ASto after early p2 suggest. More 
importantly, they began their unique strategy of technological diversification as 
reflected in the rise of ADiv. Therefore the ISCs’ behaviour after early p2 is 
characterized as diversified growth strategy. This result is consistent with the prediction 
of the third hypothesis (H3) of this research. We argue, with evidence, that when the 
systemic knowledge complexity of the sector increases, we expect at least some systems 
integrator actors to become technologically diversified. In contrast, both IOCs and SSCs 
followed a specialization strategy over p3. We can compare and contrast the innovation 
strategy of different agents before and after early p2 in table 6.4.  
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Exploiting the combination of economy of scope alongside economy of scale justifies 
this concurrent expansion of size and diversity in ISCs. Compared to other agents, they 
managed to benefit from the synergies and interrelatedness between the diverse and 
increasing number of technological domains in their knowledge portfolio. In fact the 
technological behaviour of ISCs looks like a new entity in the sectoral innovations 
system which deals with technological interrelatedness and systemic interactions within 
different domains of the knowledge base. We do not see such strategy in other agents 
before or after p2. This is a very aggressive growth strategy towards technological 
diversification. By 2005, about 70% of all innovation activities of the top 50 patentees 
were concentrated within just four major integrated and technologically diversified 
service companies25
In contrast to ISCs, IOCs after p2 reduced the size of their innovative activities (decline 
of ASto) and followed a technological specialization strategy (significant fall of ADiv). 
This seems to be a continuation of the specialisation strategy that they employed before 
early p2. They aim to refocus on technological ‘core competencies’ and leave non-core 
technological activities for other companies. We could characterize their behaviour as 
specialized de-growth or refocusing strategy. SSCs also continued their previous 
strategy, operating a specialized growth strategy after p2. 
. 
The combination of these three different innovation strategies after p2 clearly suggests a 
radical shift in the vertical division of knowledge, transformation of organizational 
patterns of innovation and emergence of a new knowledge governance system. The 
ISCs go for strong diversified growth, the IOCs follow specialized de-growth and SSCs 
continued their previous specialized growth strategy. We interpret this new 
configuration as a “social solution of technical problems in complex systems” (Johnson, 
2005), which defined new roles for the old players.  
On the one hand, higher systemic complexity and interactions between different 
technological domains defined a new role served by ISCs. They increased their role in 
coordination and integration of new technological domains. On the other hand, ISCs 
                                                          
25 Schulmberger, Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Weatherford 
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explore combination and recombination possibilities and create new relationships 
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Therefore, operation of these technologically diverse companies creates extra systemic 
knowledge base complexity. The ISCs’ move towards total solutions and integrated 
Figure  6-6 Dynamics of innovation strategy (direction) by the type of company 
Figure  6-7 Dynamics of innovation strategy (Size) by the type of company 
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services which began in late 1980s could be viewed as both a consequence and a driver 
of higher systemic complexity in the knowledge base of the upstream industry. 
What triggered this new knowledge governance system was outsourcing and the 
refocusing of IOCs. Outsourcing should not be seen simply as transfer of some 
functions from one entity to another. Increasingly, the complexity of upstream projects 
required a new function to be served in the sector. This created a new demand by IOCs 
for total solutions, seeking structurally a new kind of service. The old structure of the 
system of innovation was not able to meet this new function, because agents to manage 
the added complexity did not exist. A new capability was required to mix and match 
increasingly diverse and specialized pieces of knowledge and handle the technological 
expertise of complex big projects. ISCs embraced this systemic complexity and 
emerged as the new technology leaders of the sector. In parallel SSCs also improved 
their capability to manage the excessive additional depth complexity of many 
knowledge domains.  
 
Type of companies  Before early p2 After early p2 
Integrated Service Companies Specialized growth Diversified growth 
International Oil Companies  Specialized growth Specialized de-growth 
Specialized Service and Supply 
Companies 
Specialized growth Specialized growth 
 
6.5.3. From ‘vanishing' to 'emerging' hand: toward a dynamic theory of 
knowledge governance 
The results provided in the previous section supports the third hypothesis of this 
research, establishing a dynamic association between knowledge base complexity and 
governance of sectoral knowledge bases. In addition, some novel aspects of empirical 
evidence explored in this chapter offer new insights for the refinement and extension of 
existing theoretical frameworks about dynamics of governance structures (Jacobides 
and Billinger, 2006; Nootboome, 2004, Rosiello, 2007). I argue that a co-evolutionary 
Table  6-4 Dynamics of innovation strategy of different types of companies 
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framework proposed by Jacobides and Winter (2005) provides a more articulated and 
comprehensive theoretical account, if it is combined with the dynamic and three-
dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity. In this extended framework, 
dynamics of knowledge governance is explained according to co-evolution between 
transaction costs and firm capabilities.   
Previous research provides valuable insights about the drivers of both technological 
specialization (dis-integration) and technological diversification (re-integration) in 
certain conditions. For example, recent waves of specialization are explained by the 
theory of 'vanishing hand' (Langlois, 2003), extension of 'modularity' into knowledge 
domain (Baldwinn and Clarck, 2000; Ernst, 2005a) and emergence of markets for 
technology (Snaches and Mahoney, 1996; Arora et al., 1997). Also Brusoni (2003a) 
explains the strong forces behind specialization and dis-integration. Technological 
diversification is also explained by the theory of 'multi-technology corporations' 
(Granstrand et al., 1997), 'cognitive limits of specialization' (Brusoni, 2005), and the 
role of 'systems integrators' in complex sectors (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni, and 
Prencipe, 2001a and 2001b; Pavitt, 2003, 2005).  
However, there are at least two novel aspects in the upstream petroleum industry which 
have not been well articulated in previous studies. First, the upstream sector presents a 
full dynamic cycle from integration to disintegration and back to what I call neo-
integration. I will explain why the term neo-integration is preferred, instead of re-
integration. Yet, the literature cited in the previous paragraph is dominated by static 
approaches. They tend to explain the formation of particular governance structures 
under particular conditions, but are less concerned about the drivers of change or 
dynamics of governance structure.  In other words, they do not explain how firms’ 
knowledge boundaries may change over time. Even if they take a dynamic approach, 
they often analyze a partial cycle, either a move towards diversification or 
specialization (e.g. Acha and Brusoni 2008; Busoni and Prencipe, 2006). There are very 
rare examples where both cycles are analyzed together in a unified theoretical 
framework. An exception is Cacciatori and Jacobides' (2005) analysis of the full cycle 
in building industry first towards dis-integration and then back to re-integration. 
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Second, and with regard to neo-integration, the literature often discusses the drivers of 
backward vertical integration in knowledge domains. In other words, it explains why 
systems integrators extend their knowledge boundaries into the domain of their 
suppliers when production is outsourced (Brusoni, and Prencipe, 2001a and 2001b). 
What is less discussed is the situation where some suppliers (Integrated service 
companies in the case of upstream petroleum industry) gradually take a forward vertical 
integration step and present an aggressive diversified growth innovation strategy. This 
is what I call knowledge neo-integration to distinguish it from re-integration. Re-
integration implies bringing back what has been outsourced before. Neo-integration 
implies taking a new responsibility which serves a new function in the sector.  
It could be misleading to view this transformation as re-distribution of existing 
knowledge activities. It is better understood as 'emergence' of a new ‘role’ (Brusoni, et 
al., 2009) occupied by ISCs to facilitate the governance of 'emergent' systemic 
knowledge base complexity. In other words, it is interpreted as a system-wide response 
to qualitatively new demand (explained in chapter 4) and technologically excessive 
systemic complexity (explained in chapter 5). By this, I do not deny that ISCs also take 
some responsibilities of IOCs, but what emerged in the sector is clearly far more than 
that. This growing trend towards one-stop-shop integrated solutions in the domain of 
service provision is often explained by seeking higher profit margins and revenues in 
volatile markets (Davies, 2005). However, we still need to explain why ISCs became so 
aggressive in knowledge generation and technology diversification, in addition to their 
new approach in service provision.  
I think Jacobides and Winter’s (2005) co-evolutionary framework is a very promising 
starting point to move towards a dynamic theory of knowledge governance. It is 
originally developed to explain the dynamics of vertical scope of production or industry 
architecture. The great advantage of this framework is its unified approach to 
explanation of both cycles of disintegration and re-integration processes in terms of co-
evolution between transaction costs and firm capabilities. Transaction-cost is perceived 
as a partially endogenous variable determined by firms' choices.  
According to this framework, natural selection forces tend to push firms to higher 
specialization in those segments where they have superior capabilities and therefore 
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higher profit margins. Their capability differences provide further incentives to 
intentionally reduce transactions costs, as they perceive higher gains from trade with 
each other. Higher specialization and change in vertical scope shapes a trajectory 
through which capability development processes are affected. This processes leads to a 
new distribution of capabilities along the vertical chain which may result in a new mix 
of participants and industry structure. I think this framework has great capacity to 
explain the dynamics of vertical scope of knowledge as well, if the dynamic and three-
dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity is considered. 
The first period of the upstream petroleum industry illustrates that dominance of breadth 
complexity is associated with prevalence of technological specialization. By definition, 
breadth complexity implies low transaction costs across different knowledge domains. 
Limited interdependencies allow firms to gain from technological specialization which 
shapes further their trajectory of capability accumulation. The transaction costs have 
been further reduced endogenously, as IOCs’ outsourcing schemes show (chapter 4). 
This trend suggests that breadth complexity could be efficiently managed by more 
market-based decentralized modes of knowledge governance. The industry ended with a 
new mix of more specialised actors, each focusing on a relatively narrower scope after 
the dis-integration cycle before early p2. If a snapshot of this period is taken, the 
'vanishing hand' idea (Langlois, 2003) seems applicable. However, the validity of this 
idea stops when industry goes back to neo-integration after early p2.   
Jacobides and Winter’s (2005 p. 406) framework predicts that the same variables may 
operate in a reverse direction toward integration. This may happen “when this cycle of 
specialization exhausts the benefits it can offer, or whenever a new knowledge base 
comes about that relies on a more integrated structure”. As a result “integrated firms 
may displace the specialized ones, and inverse process takes place.” (emphasis added). 
The case of upstream petroleum industry also presents an attractive example of this 
cycle, when a “new knowledge base” with systemic complexity emerges and pushes 
ISCs toward integration and diversification.  
Jacobides and Winter’s (2005) framework again seems applicable to the neo-integration 
cycle if dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to the knowledge base complexity 
is considered. The neo-integration process is often triggered with a widening gap 
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between what a vertically specialized structure could supply and what a changing 
environment demands (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005). This fits very well with the 
changing nature of the oil industry. The efficient exploitation of increasingly complex 
upstream projects was not possible with a highly specialized system. System-wide 
efficiencies required the combination of a different and increasing range of knowledge 
domains. The dominance of systemic complexity, by definition, means high and 
increasing transaction costs which encouraged higher integration in ISCs. 
IOCs motivation to simplify the organization of complex projects also reinforced this 
process where they released some integrative and project management tasks to some 
powerful service companies. Although they kept their system integration role at the top 
end of the value chain, the generation and integration of new technological knowledge 
mostly became the occupation of ISCs. These pull and push forces created a new 
intermediate market for integrated and total solutions. A new business of all-in-one 
services emerged, while the transaction-cost of discrete services increased. This is 
because the risk of possible mis-match between different products or services with the 
other parts of the system is high.  
This self-reinforcing mechanism is amplified through two main loops which gradually 
led to high knowledge generation and greater technological capability in ISCs. First, the 
new market for integrated solutions offers higher profit margins and a more stable 
revenue stream (Davies, 2005). This enables ISCs to conduct more R&D and innovation 
investment creating a financial loop. The second loop is of a cognitive type stemming 
from increasing systemic knowledge base complexity. Compared to other SSCs, ISCs 
have deeper access to systemic and architectural knowledge. Therefore, wider 
knowledge generation and innovation space is open to them. This knowledge enables 
them to be more aware of new innovation opportunities, particularly of a systemic type. 
It can also offer them higher cognitive ability to innovate through recombinative 
processes. The operation of these financial and cognitive loops can explain the surge of 
technological capabilities in ISCs. This is consistent with the view of some scholars 
who argue that vertical integration can lead to superior innovation ability (Raynor and 
Christensen, 2002; Christensen et al., 2002).  
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A new distribution of technological capabilities emerged in which new agents play new 
roles. This process engendered the emergence of a new system integrator in the same 
sector. IOCs have been the traditional systems integrators at the top end of the value 
chain. ISCs became new systems integrators after the middle of the 1990s, but with a 
different purpose at a different point of the value chain. IOCs' are more concerned with 
architectural or systemic knowledge of the whole upstream process. This involves 
integration of technological knowledge with geological, financial, economic and even 
social and political knowledge. This capability enables them to design and implement 
efficient portfolio of projects in a variety of geopolitical locations and over different 
time spans. ISCs are systems integrators more at the level of oil production facilities 
which increasingly involves combination and integration of advanced technologies. Of 
course, co-existence of multiple systems integrators which operate at different levels of 
the value chain is not a new phenomenon, as it is observed in other very complex 
sectors such as the aircraft industry (Hobday, 1998).  
This tentative extension of the co-evolutionary framework (Jacobides and Winter, 2005) 
into knowledge domains can shed light on novel aspects explored in the dynamics of the 
upstream petroleum sector. This conceptual framework provides valuable insights to 
explain the full cycle of dynamics of knowledge governance. In addition, the suggested 
framework explains why in particular industries some actors may take an aggressive 
diversified growth innovation strategy and follow a forward integration approach in 
knowledge domain. As explained, previous research either takes a static view to 
knowledge governance or at best addresses a partial cycle of industrial dynamics. Also 
when vertical integration as a partial cycle is considered, most previous research has 
focused on backward integration in the knowledge domain by systems integrators. The 
suggested framework aims to explain both dis-integration and neo-integration phases in 
terms of the same set of variables operating in reverse directions. Accordingly, the 
dynamics of knowledge governance can be explained in a unified framework integrating 
the insights of previous research. It is possible to understand why a sector first 
experiences a 'vanishing hand' pattern. It also clarifies why this trend may stop and turns 
back into a neo-integration pattern when the 'emerging hand' of new systems integrators 
such as ISCs becomes visible.  
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6.6. Conclusion  
This chapter was an intellectual attempt to explain how the changing nature of 
knowledge base complexity is associated with the governance structure of sectoral 
knowledge bases. It explained that the question of knowledge governance has been the 
subject of at least two relatively separate research programs which look at different, yet 
complementary aspects. First is the Schumpeterian tradition which tends to focus on the 
relative role of small vs. big and new vs. incumbent firms with regard to their 
contribution in the innovation processes. The second tradition is the combination 
different branches of organizational studies which commonly use a functional approach 
to the analysis of knowledge governance. This tradition tends to look at the division of 
knowledge between different players and their particular functions in the governance of 
sectoral knowledge base. In other words, the role of different actors is analyzed 
collectively and systematically to examine the dynamics of their innovation strategy in 
terms of direction (specialization vs. integration) of technological activity. It is clear 
that the two research programs highlight different aspects of knowledge governance and 
are complementary.  
Two hypotheses are developed based on these two analytical frames addressing the 
association between dynamics of knowledge base complexity and governance of 
sectoral knowledge. The former, based on Schumpeterian tradition, suggests that 
dominance of breadth complexity is more associated with Schumpeter Mark I, while the 
rise of systemic complexity implies a shift towards Schumpeter mark II. The latter 
hypothesis, based on the functional approach, suggests the dominance of a technological 
specialization strategy for innovators under breadth complexity. It also predicts the shift 
of systems integrators towards technological diversification when systemic complexity 
increases. 
This chapter offers three contributions in order to examine the suggested hypotheses. 
First, a methodology has been suggested in order to capture the dynamics and evolution 
of mode of knowledge governance under both different frames. The second contribution 
is the application of a suggested methodology in the upstream petroleum industry which 
illustrated novel empirical observations in the dynamics of the governance system of 
sectoral knowledge base. These empirical findings also brought new insights regarding 
 184 
the dynamic theory of governance of sectoral knowledge base, as the third novel aspect 
of this chapter.   
The second hypothesis of this PhD is supported by empirical observation. A shift of 
Schumpeterian patterns of innovation from Mark I to Mark II after early in period 2 is 
shown, when systemic knowledge base complexity increases. In addition, it is shown 
that the dynamics of technological opportunities is not sufficient to explain this shift of 
mode, although it can explain changes in the degree or strength of existing 
Schumpeterian patterns. However, if the dynamics of technological opportunities are 
analyzed in combination with knowledge base complexity as two different dimensions 
of technological regimes, they convincingly explain the dynamics of Schumpeterian 
patterns both in terms of degree and mode. In other words, a shift in the dominant type 
of complexity could alter the Schumpeterian mode, while a change in opportunities 
tends to weaken or strengthen the existing mode without altering it.  
The analysis of the upstream petroleum industry showed that small and new innovators 
could exploit increasing technological opportunities most when knowledge base 
complexity is predominantly of the breadth type and systemic complexity is decreasing. 
This resembles most, the features of Schumpeter Mark I mode. In contrast, when 
systemic complexity becomes dominant in the sector, the rise of technological 
opportunities is relatively more beneficial to large and incumbent companies. This 
situation characterizes the Schumpeter Mark II mode. As a result, the transformation of 
Schumpeterian pattern of innovation from mode I to mode II can be understood with 
reference to increasing systemic complexity of the knowledge base. In other words, the 
nature of knowledge components underlying the sector may have not change 
considerably. However, the intensity of interactions between knowledge components 
has increased, leading to higher systemic complexity and knowledge cumulativeness of 
the sector in recent periods. This situation has reinforced the relative position of 
incumbents compared to new firms and increases the barriers to entry. Put it differently, 
technical change has been more of ‘competence-enhancing’ type (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) where incumbents have higher absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989) to assimilate new but similar knowledge.    
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This analysis shows that high technological opportunities can reduce the gap between 
small and big innovators when systemic complexity is decreasing (Schumpeter Mark I). 
However, high technological opportunities are most likely to widen the gap between 
small and big innovators, if systemic complexity dominates the sector (Schumpeter 
Mark II).  
The third hypothesis of the PhD is also supported by empirical evidence. It is shown 
that before p2 when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is 
decreasing; all three types of actors take a specialized growth innovation strategy. 
However after early p2 when systemic complexity increases sharply, Integrated Service 
Companies emerge as the new systems integrators of the sector with aggressive 
diversified growth innovation strategy to cope with this excessive systemic knowledge 
base complexity. 
In addition, it is shown that there is no unified theory which could consistently explain 
two novel aspects of the dynamics of the knowledge governance explored in the 
upstream petroleum industry. The first novel aspect is the full cycle of dis-integration 
and back to what was characterized as neo-integration. The second is the emergence of 
integrated service companies as the new system integrators following a forward 
integration strategy. We observed that they became leading innovators following 
aggressive diversified growth innovation strategy. Some valuable but partial insights 
can be drawn from various strands of research to explain these two novel aspects, yet 
not in a unified theoretical framework. Nonetheless, a co-evolutionary framework 
(Jacobides and Winter’s, 2005) originally developed to explain the dynamics of vertical 
scope of production is proposed to be extended to the knowledge domain, as it seems 
very promising for the purpose of theoretical unity. This framework combines 
transaction costs as a partially endogenous variable and firm capabilities in order to 
explain the dynamics of governance structures. If the three-dimensional perspective to 
knowledge base complexity is integrated in the original framework, a dynamic theory of 
knowledge governance can be drawn. A tentative application of this unified theoretical 
framework in the case of upstream petroleum industry seems very promising.  
The dominance of the specialized growth innovation strategy by most of agents in the 
dis-integration period is explained by the relative low transaction costs stemming from 
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dominance of breadth complexity. The emergence of Integrated Service Companies as 
leading actors with aggressive diversified growth innovation strategies in the neo-
integration period is interpreted as a sector-wide response to the emergent systemic 
complexity. It is explained that systemic complexity involves high transaction costs in 
knowledge generation processes and requires new system integration capabilities. In 
fact integrated service companies are understood as the new agents in the sectoral 
innovation systems of upstream petroleum industry which gradually emerge to serve a 
new function. This new function is the governance of excessive systemic complexity 
emergent in the most recent period. While the analysis of the dis-integration period 
provides support for the vanishing hand idea (i.e. reliance on external knowledge 
sources increases), the neo-integration period can be seen as the emerging hand of 
corporate knowledge management becoming visible when a sector experiences 
increasing systemic complexity.  
The findings of this chapter extend our understanding of the drivers of change in 
systems of knowledge governance within two complementary traditions. Accordingly, a 
dynamic theory of governance of knowledge base complexity is suggested in   
Schumpeterian and functional versions. This facilitates integration of both traditions. It 
is possible, on this basis, to analyse the role of geography in coping with the dynamics 
of complexity and how knowledge is integrated and coordinated across geographical 
distances, the subject of the next chapter. This paves the way to understand the role of 
knowledge base complexity in technological catch-up of latecomer countries, and how 
geographical pattern of innovation can be affected by the dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity.   
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7. Chapter 7: Geography of knowledge base complexity 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the dynamics of sectoral and organizational 
patterns of innovation as two aspects of governance of knowledge base complexity in 
the upstream petroleum industry. This chapter extends the analysis to explore the 
possible implications of the evolution of knowledge base complexity for international 
geographical patterns of innovation and catch-up processes. Although the SIS literature 
has proposed hypothetical relationships between different dimensions of technological 
regimes and geography of innovation since the early developments of the research 
agenda (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Breschi, and Malerba, 2000), this relationship has 
rarely been empirically studied (Breschi, 2000 is an exception at sub-national level). 
Explicit analysis of the dynamics of this relationship is even scarcer within SIS 
literature, although some studies in the geography of innovation has marginally touched 
upon this issue. I found only two studies which directly address the role of technological 
complexity in the geography of innovation (Vertova, 2002) and catch-up processes 
(Ernst, 2005b).  
The present research is interested in investigating the extent to which the sectoral 
innovation system is open to late comer countries and allows for catch-up. I ask here 
whether there is a possibility of catch-up within the upstream petroleum industry. The 
question of catch-up and change in geographical patterns of innovation should be seen 
as two different sides of the same coin, because if there is no process of catching-up or 
falling behind, there is no change in geographical patterns of innovation. Therefore, 
there is a high level of persistency signalling lack of catch-up processes. On the other 
hand, if geographical patterns of innovation change, there should be some shifts in the 
relative position of each country and lack of persistency. It is clear that the main players 
which contribute to stability or change in geographical patterns of innovation are not 
countries as territories, but companies and perhaps other non-firm innovators which 
operate within these national territories. Nonetheless, I am asking the question at 
national level in order to understand what factors may impede or stimulate the 
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emergence of new innovative agents or relocation of existing innovators within new 
territories?  
Contributing factors to change and dynamics of geography of innovation are potentially 
very diverse and operate at different levels. These include broad global trends such as 
globalization, firm internationalization and liberalization of markets (Athreye and 
Cantwell, 2007), national specific factors like size and quality of demand (Cantwell, 
1995), or supportive national systems of innovation (Vertova, 2002). Sectoral and 
technology specific factors such as technological regimes, and cognitive dimensions of 
the industry such as complexity are another set of important factors (Lee and Lim, 2001; 
Vertova, 2002, Ernst, 2005b, Sorenson et al., 2006). This chapter focuses on this last 
element which has been a neglected area.  
This chapter offers three contributions at theoretical, methodological and empirical 
levels. First, it seeks to resolve some of the puzzling conceptual implication of 
complexity for geography of innovation raised in the literature arguing both for 
concentration attached to higher level of complexity (Vertova, 2002; Sorenson, 2005) 
and against it (Ernst, 2005b,). I argue that this puzzle is largely due to the lack of 
distinction between different dimensions of complexity which could have different and 
opposite geographical implications. Taking a dynamic and three-dimensional 
perspective to complexity, I also explain how change in the dominant type of 
complexity can have different geographical implications.  Second, a methodology is 
proposed which allows tracking of the dynamics of geography and catch-up processes, 
and examination of their association with the dynamics of knowledge base complexity. 
The third contribution is the application of the suggested methodology in the context of 
the upstream petroleum industry. This is an empirical extension of previous research on 
geography of innovation (Lee and Lim, 2001; Vertova, 2002, Ernst, 2005b, Sorenson et 
al., 2006). In addition, the findings shed light on the limits of internationalization theory 
of innovation, and pave the way for a dynamic theory of geography of knowledge base 
complexity. 
This chapter is organized in 8 sections. Section 7.2 employs the literature on the 
geography of complexity to propose some clarifications and formulate a hypothesis. 
Section 7.3 provides an overview of the hierarchy of innovator countries and their 
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relative contributions. The geographical data are explained in section 7.4. Exploration of 
the dynamics of international geography of innovation in upstream petroleum industry 
and examination of the catch-up hypothesis are the subjects of sections 7.5 and 7.6. 
Section 7.7 discusses the relevance of the empirical findings of the two previous 
sections with available theories. It suggests that the dynamic and multi-dimensional 
perspective to knowledge base complexity can offer analytical value and pave the way 
for a dynamic theory of the geography of knowledge base complexity.   
7.2. Geography of knowledge base complexity  
One of the earliest contributions concerning the link between complexity and geography 
of innovation is perhaps Patel and Pavitt‘s (1991) argument on ‘non- globalization’ of 
innovative activities. They argued that geographical concentration enables companies to 
cope with complexity in innovation processes.  They empirically supported this idea 
showing the patenting behaviour of big innovator companies. Later, Pavitt (1999) 
emphasised the role of both cognitive and organizational complexity in geographical 
concentration of innovative activities. He argued that the cognitive complexity of a 
system which is “made of numerous components and subsystems whose interaction are 
often non-linear and therefore impossible to predict” requires geographical 
concentration in order to facilitate coordination and exchange of tacit knowledge 
(Pavitt, 1999; P. X). Similarly, organisational complexity which in his definition 
implies mobilization of “wide and increasing range of fields of specialized knowledge”, 
could create strong incentives for geographical concentration to facilitate linkage 
between knowledge communities and learning processes (Pavitt, 1999; P. X). 
From these definitions, it is clear that Pavitt’s emphasis is on systemic complexity 
where interactions are dense and unpredictable and therefore the knowledge is hardly 
modular and decomposable. Similarly, Breschi (2000) argued that the more the 
knowledge base  is tacit, complex and part of a larger system, the more is there 
geographical concentration of the innovations, and vice versa. More recently Sorenson 
(2005) argued that complexity of knowledge, in the form of highly interacting pieces, 
leads to higher geographical concentration of industries, because complexity puts 
serious constrains on knowledge flows. His empirical evidence suggests that 10-15% of 
the variety in the geographical concentration of the industries can be explained by an 
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average measure of knowledge base complexity. In other words, the higher the 
knowledge complexity, the more geographically concentrated the sector. 
However, Ernst (2005b) documented a paradoxical case. In spite of increasing 
extraordinary cognitive and organizational complexity, the cheap design industry 
actually experienced geographical decentralization. Ernst (2005b) tackles the important 
question: ‘What makes it possible to exchange complex knowledge, even if innovation 
agents are located at distant locations?' (p. 51). His answer is that cognitive proximity 
through global innovation networks (GIN) is a suitable organizational solution to these 
particular kinds of complexities. But what makes this solution possible in the first place 
is the possibility of some degree of modularity which facilitates outsourcing specialized 
work to distant suppliers. Outsourcing and related geographical relocation of innovative 
activities could involve at least three types of gains. First, it reinforces specialization 
and facilitates knowledge growth at the level of components and modules. Second, it 
lowers costs, if the relocation goes to cheap countries. Third, it facilitates local 
customization according to the peculiarities of demand in each location.  
Given the possibility of modularity, it seems that Ernst's (2005b) argument applies when 
breadth complexity dominates and systemic complexity decreases. Nonetheless, he does 
not distinguish between different types of complexity. Since the knowledge base of the 
industry is relatively decomposable to independent components, it is possible for 
specialized agents to innovate at the level of components without necessarily having 
access to other bits of knowledge of the system. Under these conditions, where systemic 
complexity is low or lowered by transformation to breadth complexity through 
modularity strategy, market and semi-market decentralized systems could serve the 
coordination function. Therefore, vertically integrated coordination structures may not 
be needed to facilitate cross-border knowledge exchange. 
However in the case of high systemic complexity the situation is very different. Access 
to systemic or architectural knowledge is required when interdependencies are high, 
because one piece could have radical and unpredictable impacts on the outcome. As a 
result, it is very difficult for distant players to innovate when systemic complexity is 
high. In addition, diffusion of knowledge with systemic complexity over long distances 
is very challenging, because some pieces might be missed or distorted along the way. It 
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also implies higher absorptive capacitates in recipients (Sorenson et al., 2006; Sorenson, 
2005). We can conclude that a sector is relatively more open to innovators from other 
geographical domains when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity 
is decreasing. In contrast, coping with increasing systemic complexity is more 
challenging for distant agents. This theoretical analysis provides a basis to answer the 
third question of this research: 
Q3: What are the implications of dynamics of technological complexity for the 
international geography of innovation and catch-up processes? 
According to that theoretical account, the fourth and final hypothesis (H4) of this 
research proposes the following answer: 
Hypothesis 4: When breadth complexity increases and systemic complexity decreases, 
we expect to observe relatively more rapid geographical dispersion and wider catch-up 
opportunities. In contrast, we expect slower geographical dispersion or even a move to 
more concentration, with more limited catch-up experience when systemic complexity 
increases. 
7.3. Hierarchy of innovator countries in upstream petroleum industry 
Before the analysis of the dynamics of the international geographical patterns of 
innovation, it is good to get some insights about the relative position of different 
countries. Table 7.1 provides the ranking of innovative countries using location of 
patent inventor data. As explained in chapter 3, for international comparisons inventors’ 
country (IC) is the most relevant data for geographical studies.   
We observe in table 7.1 a very high concentration of innovative activities in a few top 
countries. More than 54 percent of all inventions between 1970 and 2005 have been 
located in the United States. The UK, France, Canada and Germany are next but far 
behind the US. These top 5 innovators are responsible for more than 80 percent of total 
patents and the top 10 for more than 90 per cent. It is interesting that some resource-rich 
countries, which are not usually considered as innovators such as Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates, appear in the list although they are near the bottom with 
marginal shares.  
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Another noticeable point is the emergence of three strange countries of British Virgin 
Islands, Panama and Netherlands Antilles in the list of innovative countries. These are 
countries where some big companies have registered offices probably due to tax and 
other regulatory issues. Since for some of the patents with missed location country of 
inventor the assignee countries are used (explained in chapter 3), these countries have 
come up in the list. For subsequent analysis I remove these countries as they are not 
relevant to the real geography of innovation.  
 
Rank Country Code IPF %IPF %CUM 
1 United States of America US 21300 54.47 54.47 
2 United Kingdom GB 3946 10.09 64.56 
3 France FR 2902 7.42 71.98 
4 Canada CA 2013 5.15 77.12 
5 Germany DE 1679 4.29 81.42 
6 Norway NO 1569 4.01 85.43 
7 Netherlands NL 1225 3.13 88.56 
8 Japan JP 684 1.75 90.31 
9 Russian Federation RU 390 1 91.31 
10 Sweden SE 346 0.88 92.19 
11 Australia AU 287 0.73 92.93 
12 Italy IT 277 0.71 93.64 
13 Brazil BR 182 0.47 94.10 
14 Belgium BE 181 0.46 94.56 
15 Virgin Islands (British) VG 170 0.43 95.00 
16 Switzerland CH 165 0.42 95.42 
17 China CN 158 0.4 95.82 
18 Panama PA 133 0.34 96.16 
19 Denmark DK 107 0.27 96.44 
20 South Africa ZA 93 0.24 96.68 
21 Austria AT 91 0.23 96.91 
22 Venezuela VE 84 0.21 97.12 
23 Finland FI 81 0.21 97.33 
24 United Arab Emirates AE 80 0.2 97.53 
25 Singapore SG 79 0.2 97.74 
26 Saudi Arabia SA 68 0.17 97.91 
27 Malaysia MY 52 0.13 98.04 
28 Hungary HU 51 0.13 98.17 
29 India IN 49 0.13 98.30 
30 Israel IL 46 0.12 98.42 
31 Ukraine UA 41 0.1 98.52 
  Other Other 578 1.48 100.00 
  Total Total 39107 100 100.00 
IPF: International  patent family  
CUM: Cumulative percentage   
Table  7-1 Ranking of countries based on location site of inventors 
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7.4. Geography data 
Although inventor country (IC) is usually used in geographical studies of innovation, it 
might be misleading if we are to explore catch-up countries and analyze catch-up 
processes. This is because these data do not distinguish between innovations performed 
by domestic or by foreign companies in a country. If we are to understand the 
possibility of catch-up, the changing balance of ownership vs. location could have 
different implications. This is because in extreme cases, we might have situations where 
big multinational companies just relocate their R&D centres to follow market expansion 
strategies, with limited knowledge spillovers to local companies and limited local 
innovation capacities. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine some countries becoming 
attractive locations for foreign and international companies to carry out innovative 
activities where the share of local innovators stays marginal. Tax, cost, or other market 
related factors may be incentives for such relocations.  
In order to tackle this issue in the data, we need to know who owns and may control the 
innovations and where are their original countries. Unfortunately, our dataset does not 
specify the original country of each company. Although the assignee country of each 
patent family exists in the data set, this information does not solve the problem. 
Inventive activities of foreign affiliates in other countries are often attributed to the host 
country if the affiliates are registered officially as a local company. In order to find the 
original country of the companies, I introduce and use the concept of assignee’s main 
invention country (AMIC). This concept assumes that the original country of each 
assignee company is the country where the majority of its inventions are located. For 
example, the majority of BP‘s inventive activities are located in the UK, although it also 
has some inventive activities in other countries such as US or Norway. In other words, 
we consider the number of patents owned by the companies of that country (captured by 
the concept of AMIC), regardless of the location of innovative activities.  
Using this concept, I am able to capture the relative position of countries in producing 
upstream knowledge and technology. I am also able to track the extent of inventive 
activities located in each country distinguishing between those done by local vs. non- 
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local companies or by collaboration between them. This distinction, as will be seen, 
provides some insights about the role of international knowledge flows in building local 
technological capabilities and catch-up processes.          
7.5. Geographical patterns of innovation  
In this section, I analyze the evolution of geographical concentration of innovation in 
different countries, the number of countries and the role of (companies from) new 
countries over time. These are considered as measures of international geographical 
patterns of innovation. These measures are the extension of the similar proxies used in 
the analysis of sectoral innovation systems in the previous chapter, extended to the 
geographical domains. According to these measures, we can examine the fourth 
hypothesis of this research with regard to availability and speed of catch-up processes in 
different periods and answer the third question raised in section 7.2. 
7.5.1. International geographical concentration of innovative activities  
The dynamics of international geographical concentration (IGC) of innovation across 
different countries are presented in figure 7.1 using the Herfindahl index, using both IC 
and AMIC sources (left axis). In addition, the number of contributing countries (N) is 
presented on the right axis. It shows that the number of countries both in terms of the 
location (IC) and ownership (AMIC) of innovation has increased over time. Except in 
early periods, the number of owner countries (AMIC) has always been less than the 
number of countries where innovative activities are located. Moreover, the gap has 
increased for most of the observed period, particularly after early p2. This means that 
the speed of entrance to new countries as the location of innovations is more than the 
speed of entrance of new owner countries.  
The comparative analysis of geographical concentration is even more informative. The 
comparative trend based on IC and AMIC shows that in the earliest periods (from p1-0 
to p2-1) concentration based on both sources experienced a similar downward trend and 
stayed close to each other. This means that some new centres of innovation emerged in 
new countries where most of innovations are also owned by local companies. As a 
result, the concentration index according to both sources (IC and AMIC) followed 
pretty similar patterns. However, they began to diverge after the period p2-1, largely 
 195 
because of an overall gradual upward trend of concentration of the ownership (AMIC) 
location of innovations. Concentration according to inventor location (IC) continued its 
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The meaning of these trends is that innovative activities, if considered by their owner 
countries (AMIC), became even more concentrated in p3-2 than its level two decades 
earlier in p2-1. In other words, the majority of technologies of the upstream petroleum 
industry is increasingly produced and controlled by big companies in a few major 
countries. These countries became centres of excellence feeding innovation into the 
international oil industry. The slower continuation of international geographical 
dispersion of inventors' location (IC) after p2-1 also is an evidence of relative higher 
difficulty for smaller or new countries (in terms of innovation size) to expand their 
innovation base. In other words, the scale economy of innovative activities at 
geographical level after p2-1 appears to increase.  
The figures are consistent with the predictions of the hypothesis that the rise of systemic 
complexity could lower catch-up speed, as entry barriers become higher.   Dominance 
of the systemic complexity of the knowledge base after early p2 could drive 
mechanisms against dispersion of innovative activities and increase concentration to 
facilitate exchange and coordination of complex knowledge flows. The findings support 
Figure  7-1 International geographical concentration of innovative activities (IGC) 
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that to manage and coordinate complex knowledge bases, cognitive and organizational 
proximity within different affiliates of the same company (although geographically 
distributed), is more important than spatial proximity. This is why innovations become 
more concentrated in terms of the ownership over p3, but continue to disperse 
geographically in terms of the location of innovation. This is in line with the strand of 
research which distinguishes between the role of geographic, organisational and 
cognitive proximity in managing complex knowledge bases (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; 
Boschma, 2005; Lagendijk and Lorentzen, 2007). A more detailed explanation is 
presented after analysis of other aspects of geographical patterns of innovation.  
7.5.2. Role of new innovator countries 
The analysis of concentration of innovative activities illustrates the dynamics of relative 
distribution of small vs. big innovator countries. However, it does not specifically speak 
about the extent to which innovators from new countries – previously not present - may 
have a chance of being involved in the innovative activities of a sector. In other words, 
change in concentration could be the result of either redistribution among existing 
countries, or emergence of new innovator countries. I address this issue by looking at 
the relative share of new innovator countries vs. existing ones in different periods, using 
both location (IC) and ownership (AMIC) country of innovation. Table 7.2 presents the 
results.  
The table shows clearly that the share of the new innovator countries declined over p1, 
reflecting a decreasing chance for companies from new countries to exploit 
technological opportunities in this sector. Comparison of these trends with the trend of 
the role of new innovator companies (table 6.2) suggests that sectoral and geographical 
patterns do not necessarily follow the same logic. For example, I argued that high 
opportunity conditions in p1 motivated new companies to enter the industry, as the 
increasing share of new companies in table 6.2 shows. However, declining share of new 
countries over p1 shows that the new companies came mostly from existing countries. 
In other words, high technological opportunities were mostly to the benefit of 
companies of active countries already in the system of innovation rather than new 
countries. This pattern suggests that technological opportunities that brought new 
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entrant companies were largely bounded within already active national territories. In 
other words, technological opportunities are more visible for those already present in the 
sector who could leverage their benefits. The outsiders share of this expanding pie was 
decreasing. This observation is consistent with the argument that innovation 
opportunities are mostly visible to the insiders of existing social networks (Sorenson, 
2005; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). Similarly, the role of new innovator countries also 
declined over p2 both in terms of innovator location (IC) and ownership (AMICO). 
Similar explanations may apply. 






















Share of new 
Innovator 
Countries 
p1-1 2039 122 5.98 2064 74 3.59 
p1-2 3136 56 1.79 3132 47 1.5 
p2-1 3399 75 2.21 3361 64 1.9 
p2-2 3284 32 0.97 3167 10 0.32 
p3-1 5667 44 0.78 5323 37 0.7 
p3-2 7347 90 1.22 6451 28 0.43 
 
The pattern of change in the share of new innovators countries over p3 is different from 
two previous periods suggesting a considerable change in the nature of the industry. We 
observed that the share of new countries over p3 in terms of ownership further declined. 
However in terms of inventors’ location country, the share of new countries increased. 
This suggests that companies in existing countries performed geographical expansion of 
their innovative activities into foreign countries. I analyze more this globalization of 
innovation activities in section 7.7.         
Another observation is that on average, the level of new entry reaches its lowest level 
over p3. Given the high opportunity conditions of this period, the lower level of new 
entries could at least be partly attributed to increasing systemic complexity. In other 
words higher cognitive barriers for the companies of new countries prevent them 
exploiting the emergent opportunities in p3. The systemic nature of innovation 
dominating in this period implies access to a diverse range of knowledge domains from 
Table  7-2 The role of new innovator countries over main periods 
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both different technological domains and different parts of the value chain. This 
decreases the entry possibility of innovators from new countries which do not have 
access to this diverse range of knowledge, whether internally or from external sources in 
the same country. In contrast, it is easier for innovators in existing active countries to 
get access to diverse knowledge sources which are necessary inputs for systemic 
innovations. This seems consistent with predictions of the fourth hypothesis, suggesting 
more limited catch-up opportunities when systemic complexity increases.      
7.6. Technological catch-up  
In spite of high entry barriers for companies of new countries, there might be some 
exceptional countries which have managed to escape from their historically low position 
in the hierarchy of innovators. There might be countries with higher than average 
growth rates over a long enough period to reduce the gap with leading countries. We 
define these as catch- up countries and propose a methodology to explore them. 
7.6.1. Methodology 
I employ the Galtonian regression model which regresses the distribution of a normal 
bivariate variable at two different points of time. This method is often used in order to 
evaluate the cumulativeness and incremental change in specialization. It allows 
statistical examination of both the degree and pattern of change in the distribution of a 
variable. The Galtonian regression model was originally suggested by Hart and Paris 
(1956) in economics and also employed by Dalum and Laursen (1996) for the analysis 
of trade specialization.  
This method became quite popular in the study of cumulative, path dependent and 
incremental nature of technical change. However, the essence of the method is to 
explore the convergence vs. divergence processes based on distribution patterns of one 
variable at two different points of time. As a result, it could be simply applied in other 
similar contexts, such as the examination of catch-up phenomena in this study. We aim 
to examine both the degree and pattern of change in the distribution of innovation 
among countries between two different points of time. If catch-up processes are 
effective, statistically significant convergence should be observed among innovation 
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performance of different countries. On the other hand, if strong countries become 
stronger and weak countries become weaker, we should observe the divergence.  
Using this methodology, we set a simple regression model (formula 1) to examine 
convergence vs. divergence. In this model, the distribution of a variable for the second 
time period ( 2tV ) is set as the dependent variable while that of the first time period is 
the independent variable ( 1tV ). The item 2tε  is also a stochastic disturbance term which 
is independent of 1tV .  
212 . ttt VV εβα ++=                                           (1) 
Cumulativeness and incremental nature of change in the variable under consideration 
are two complementary hypothesises that are usually evaluated with this regression 
model. The aim is to analyze how the state of distribution in the second instance is 
influenced by its first instance. Cumulativeness implies the path-dependency in the 
sense that past situations shape the future positions. Incremental change, on the other 
hand, postulates the extent to which change is gradual over time vs. being radical and 
disruptive. Table 7.3 summarizes the ways in which these hypothesises are tested 
(Cantwell and Santangelo, 2006).   









corroborate H0 is rejected and β>0 
Equivalence of ρ >0 or  
• mobility effect as inverse 
measure of cumulativeness 
bellow one (1- ρ <1) 
•  Existence of some degree of 
cumulativeness 
H0 is rejected and β>1 : divergence 
• negative regression effect (1- β)<0 
 
H0 is rejected and 0<β<1 : convergence 
‘regression towards the mean’ 
•  positive regression effect  0<(1- β)<1 
 
H0 is rejected and  β<0 : overturn 
•  positive regression effect 1<(1- β) 
reject  H0 is not Rejected (β=0) or β<0  
Equivalence of ρ <0 or ≅ρ 0  
• mobility effect as inverse 
measure of cumulativeness above 
one (1- ρ )>1 or (1- ρ ) ≅ 1 
• Randomness  
H0 is not rejected : persistence 
β=1 is equivalence of  
• no regression effect (1- β)=0 
 
Table  7-3 Statistical test for cumulativeness and incremental change 
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Regarding cumulativeness, we test to reject the hypothesis that H0: β=0 against the 
alternative that H1: β≠0. The regression coefficient (β) indicates the degree of 
cumulativeness or correlation of the variable between two periods. This is equivalent to 
test that H0: ρ =0 against the alternative that H1: ρ ≠0 when ρ is the correlation 
coefficient. Accordingly, we evaluate the degree to which different countries have 
moved their position in the ranking between two periods. If we could reject the 
hypothesis and ρ  is positive, we interpret the existence of some degree of 
cumulativeness. Otherwise, there is no meaningful relationship between the two 
distributions and some kind of randomness is perceived.  Mobility effect is an inverse 
measure of cumulativeness defined as (1- ρ ). If the mobility effect is below one, we 
could say that there is some degree of cumulativeness. If it is equal or greater than one, 
there is enough mobility up and down the raking between two periods to interpret the 
absence of cumulativeness. 
Regarding incremental change, we test to reject the hypothesis that H0: β=1 against the 
alternative that H1: β≠1. If we cannot reject the hypothesis, it means that β is not 
statistically different from unity. Therefore, the distribution of a countries’ innovation 
performance has not changed on average. In other words, the pattern of distribution has 
remained stable and persistent. If the null hypothesis is rejected and β>1, there has been 
a divergence process at work. Advantaged countries relatively gained and 
disadvantaged countries lost their share. On the other hand, if 0<β<1, it implies some 
gains in disadvantaged countries and some lost share in advantaged countries. In other 
words, on average the process of convergence is at work. It is usually referred to as 
‘regression towards the mean’ (Galton, 1889 cited in Hart (1976)). In the special case of 
β<0, the position of advantaged and disadvantaged countries is reversed. This indicates 
the pattern of overturn.  
The Regression effect is the measure of degree of incremental change, which is defined 
as (1- β). When there is no regression effect (1- β=0), it implies relative stability of the 
position of countries. If some disadvantaged countries gain momentum, there should be 
some advantaged countries falling behind to create average stability. Therefore the 
overall effect on the distribution is neutral. When the negative regression effect is 
observed, the process of incremental change has worked for divergence. On the other 
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hand, when regression effect is positive but below one, the process of incremental 
change has worked in favour of convergence.  
Overall, we test for β being greater than zero to examine cumulativeness. 
Cumulativeness and incremental change exist together if β is significantly greater than 
zero and also significantly less than unity. If β is significantly greater than one (no or 
negative regression effect), cumulativeness prevails. 
Although β is a good measure to capture the pattern of change over the time, it is unable 
to show us alone how the overall degree of distribution has changed towards more or 
less dispersion. In other words, it is argued that positive regression effect (β<1) is 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for higher dispersion. In parallel, negative 
regression effect (β>1) also is not necessary condition for overall increase in 
concentration of the distribution (Cantwell and Immarino, 2001; Cantwell, 1989).  
The relative standard deviation of distributions between two points of time can clarify 
whether the final distribution is more equally distributed or not.  Dalum and Laursen 
(1998) show that this indicator can be measured according to the flowing equation:  














t      (2) 
They argue that if ρ/β = 1 dispersion of the distribution of the variable has remained 
unchanged. If ρ/β < 1 convergence happens: dispersion of the distribution of the 
variable decreases and the regression effect prevails over the mobility effect. On the 
other hand if ρ/β  >1 then the process of concentration happens in total, and dispersion 
of the distribution becomes less equal. Although the positive regression effect by its 
own suggests occurrence of convergence due to the proportional movement of 
categories toward the mean (β<1), mobility effect prevails regression effect because of 
the proportional change in the position of the categories leading to overall 
concentration. 
This regression model offers practical application for the examination of catch-up 
processes. In our analysis, ρ/β = 1 implies persistency of relative position of different 
countries. If ρ/β < 1, there has been some catch-up processes reducing the relative gap 
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among different countries. In contrast, ρ/β  >1 suggests that average gap among 
countries have increased. Our evidence does not support the catch-up hypothesis.       
7.6.2. Results 
Applying the Galtonian regression model, we can examine whether the innovation 
performance of the countries converged, diverged, or has been on average stable. That 
is, whether the innovation gap between countries has grown on average, reduced or 
remained the same. If the convergence hypothesis is not rejected, we could accept that 
at least some countries have caught up with leaders and therefore the overall gap among 
countries partly reduced. I used logarithm of countries’ innovation performance in order 
to normalize the distribution for the linear regression, aggregated over p1 and p3 to 
examine the catch-up processes between these two periods.  
We performed the test using both country of inventors (IC) and owners (AMIC) data 
and the results are presented in parts (a) and (b) of figure 7.2 respectively. The figure 
shows the scatter plot and fitted regression line (solid line). The results of the statistical 
tests are provided in table 7.4. It is evident from the scatter plot that the relationship is 
relatively linear. Linear regression can be a reliable estimator. The coefficient of the 
regression model (β) is 0.58 and 0.67 using IC and AMIC respectively, if all countries 
of the dataset are included in the model.  
For the statistical analysis of cumulativeness, the hypothesis (H0: β=0) against its 
alternative (H1: β≠0) is rejected. In other words, we accept that β>0 and therefore 
cumulativeness of knowledge prevails. The test of persistence of the position of 
countries between two different periods (H0: β=1) does not receive empirical support. 
Given β<1, our empirical evidence supports the idea that catch-up processes have 
incrementally taken place between two periods. In other words, we can statistically 
accept that some countries have managed to catch up and eroded the share of some 
other leading countries which have to some degree slipped back. 
Although β<1, the visual analysis of the pattern of the position of different countries in 
the scatter plot raises a complementary question. According to figure 7.2, it seems that a 
cluster of small innovation size countries on the bottom left of the pattern (within the 
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red circle) have been influential in decreasing the  β coefficient from unity and rotating 
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Figure  7-2 Scatter plot and linear regression of patent size (log): (a) IC; (b) AMIC 
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In the language of  Galtonian’ regression model, we accept the hypothesis that countries 
have experienced ‘regression to the mean’, but it seems that a large part of regression 
effect (1- β) is attributable to small  countries shown by the red circle (defined 
heuristically  when log patent size<2). This pattern suggests that in the absence of these 
small innovators with relatively high growth rates, we may not have enough empirical 
evidence to support that catch-up has indeed taken place. We observe catch-up only 
because of the rise of share of a few small innovator countries, not because of more 
equal distribution among all countries.   
 
 
In order to evaluate this idea, I repeated the same tests with these small innovators 
excluded from the analysis. The dash-line in the figure 7.2 shows the new regression 
model. In this case β coefficients are no longer statistically different from unity. 
Therefore the regression effect (1- β) disappears. The interpretation is that the relative 
share of non-small innovator countries (when small innovator countries are excluded) 
has not changed overall. In other words our empirical evidence does not support the 
idea that overall catch-up has taken place within non-small innovator countries. This is 
because the share that the disadvantaged countries gained has been balanced with the 
lost share of others which have further fallen behind.  
As explained previously, change in relative distribution of innovation among countries 
could be judged on the ground of ρ/β  where ρ is the correlation coefficient. The 
results of ρ/β  which are presented in the table 7.4 confirms that if all the countries in 
the sample are included in the analysis, catch-up phenomena is observable in the 









All  0.58 *** *** 0.78 0.75 
Non Small 0.98 ***  0.83 1.18 
Country source:(AMIC) 
All  0.67 *** ** 0.79 0.86 
Non Small 1.04 ***   0.88 1.19 
* %10; ** %5; *** %1 
IC: Inventors' country 




sample, because ρ/β <1. However among non-small countries this is not the case, as 
ρ/β >1 signalling the increasing gap among big countries. 
The conclusion is that the upstream petroleum industry presents a relatively high degree 
of cumulativeness at country level and at the same time some incremental change in the 
share of different countries over time. The direction of these incremental changes has 
been toward convergence and more equal dispersion of innovative activities from p1 to 
p3 if all countries of the sample are considered in the analysis, and therefore catch-up 
hypothesis is supported. However, among non-small innovator countries, a persistent 
pattern is observed where a move towards more unequal dispersion is present from p1 
to p3. It means that among non-small innovator countries, the shares gained by some 
catch-up countries have been compensated by the lost share of others left behind. The 
overall result is the persistence of the relative position of different countries among non-
small innovator countries.  
These results provide some insights about catch-up processes. One interpretation is that 
it is relatively easy to grow innovation, if a country is beginning from a relatively small 
size. Countries with very small innovation base could simply double their innovative 
activities and catch up. However among big innovators, catch-up or changing relative 
position in the ranking is a big challenge. Related to this argument is the emergence of 
scale and scope economy after a certain threshold. This could stem from the knowledge 
recombination process, creating increasing returns for investment in knowledge 
(Antonelli, 2003) when a critical mass is formed. It implies the below a certain level, 
returns on scale and scope have not an increasing feature and therefore relative change 
in the position of countries and jumps are possible.     
7.6.3. Exploring catch-up countries 
We explore the pattern of catch-up countries in this section.  Finding these catch-up 
countries can help us understand how and why catch-up happens in some countries. The 
difference between the actual patent size of the countries and that estimated by the 
above model (or residual) is interpreted as the extent of catch-up by different countries. 
This is a reasonable index because it measures how far countries have gone compared 
with others, considering their relative position in the size distribution. In other words, 
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each country is compared with its peers in terms of its size group, not with much bigger 
or smaller players. This method controls for the effect of size on the possibility and the 
extent of catch-up processes.  
I define the top quartile of the residuals, as the catch-up range in order to distinguish 
more successful countries in building technological capabilities. They are located 
relatively far from the regression line. All the countries with residuals within the range 
of the top quartile are considered as catch-up countries.  They have on average been 
able to move more rapidly than other countries and erode some share of leading 
innovators. Given this definition, the catch-up countries are listed in table 7.5 sorted 
according to their innovation size. They are listed based on both sources of location of 
inventors (IC) and owners (AMIC).  
This table provides some informative insights about the nature of catch-up in upstream 
petroleum industry. First, two very different groups of technological catch-up countries 
are recognizable: big players with several hundred patents and small players which at 
most achieved about 100 patents in p3. There is a huge innovation gap between the two. 
Except for the US which has always been the leading innovator, only UK, Norway and 
Canada among big innovators have performed better than average and gained relatively 
higher shares. These three countries have large innovation bases and have become 
major contributors to the knowledge base of the industry. On the other hand China, 
Brazil, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are included in the catch-up countries, 
as a small group, because of a better relative performance among their peers. They have 
experienced high growth, but from very small or non-existence base. In spite of rapid 
growth, we can call them catch-up countries, but in a very weak sense, because they are 
still very marginal players in terms of patents.   
Another related point is the relatively low and limited number of catch-up countries. 
The number is even less (6) when ownership (AMIC) is considered, compared with the 
number of catch-up countries based on the location of innovation (IC) which is 8. The 
disappearance of Canada and United Arab Emirates from the AMIC list means that 
innovations invented in these countries are largely owned by foreign or non-local 
companies. In other words, FDI is an important source of innovations where foreign 
companies have established their R&D facilitates in these countries. If the small players 
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are not considered, only UK, Norway and Canada (just by IC) can be identified as 
influential technology producers. This means that escaping from the position dictated by 
historical path, though possible, appears extremely difficult and very limited in this 
sector. This situation seems very different compared with some other industries like 
ICT, where the technological catch-up of a relatively large number of countries has been 
observed (Ernst, 2005b). The question is what is specific to this industry? And how 
might this rare number of catch-up countries be explained? 









in p3 Residual  
 Big innovators  Country source:(IC) 
1 United States 5027 8344 8.52 9.03 1.11 
2 United Kingdom 340 2082 5.83 7.64 1.29 
3 Canada 218 1016 5.38 6.92 0.83 
4 Norway 80 958 4.38 6.86 1.35 
5 China 2 99 0.69 4.60 1.23 
6 Brazil 3 89 1.10 4.49 0.89 
7 Saudi Arabia 0 54 0.00 3.99 1.03 
8 United .Arab Emirates 1 51 0.00 3.93 0.97 
    Country source:(AMIC) 
1 United States 4929 8925 8.50 9.10 1.16 
2 United Kingdom 334 1316 5.81 7.18 1.05 
3 Norway 84 816 4.43 6.70 1.51 
4 Brazil 3 62 1.10 4.13 1.17 
5 China 0 40 0.00 3.69 1.47 
6 Saudi Arabia 0 36 0.00 3.58 1.37 
IPF: International patent families 
IC: Inventors' country; AMIC: Assignee's main invention country 
 
I showed in chapter 5 that technological opportunities in upstream petroleum should not 
be a major problem. The high growth rate of innovations since the middle of the 1990s 
could have potentially motivated companies from many countries to gain benefits. 
Industry began an innovation boom due to demand for new techniques and, provision 
and application of a different range of scientific and technological disciplines. But this 
innovation boom benefited a very limited number of countries. Looking at the mix of 
the catch-up countries and their historical context can provide some insights. First, all of 
Table  7-5 Catch-up countries in upstream petroleum industries 
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these catch-up countries are among the major oil producing countries and this include 
both small and big players. This implies that local demand for innovation is an 
important driver for catch-up. However, this is not a sufficient explanatory variable, as 
there are many other oil producing countries with high demand for innovation. Yet, they 
have not joined the club of catch-up countries, even within the small players.  
On the other hand, major catch-up countries are among advanced industrial nations 
which have been producing oil for a long time. After US which has been historically the 
major player in the oil business, UK and Norway are generally industrial advanced 
countries. They mobilized their technological resources into oil business in order to 
meet the technological requirements of the North Sea oil, when discovered in the 1960s. 
Canada is also a major oil producer and also holder of many unconventional reserves 
which are highly technology demanding. It is interesting that other advanced industrial 
countries, even technologically very competent ones like Germany could not enjoy the 
same as UK, Norway and Canada did. This may reflect the location and sector 
specificity of the knowledge required for technological innovation. The general 
technological capabilities of advanced industrial countries, though necessary, are not 
directly applicable. The production knowledge and experience of oil producing 
countries is an important input into innovation processes, to which non producing 
countries do not have easy access. This is in line with the idea of the geography of 
opportunities (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) which is hidden for outsiders, even if they 
have the technical competence to exploit it.         
However, the limited size of the innovation base of small catch-up countries implies 
that without an established wide technological and industrial base, there are serious 
limits to the degree of catch-up in upstream petroleum. There is a huge distance 
between exploration, development and production capabilities; and technological 
innovation capabilities (Bell and Pavitt 1995; Bell, 2007). Even for countries like China 
and Brazil with a successful record of technological innovation in other industries, 
technological catch-up in this industry has been extremely limited, at least in terms of 
patenting. This pattern suggests that only companies of advanced industrial countries 
with access to a wide range of both internal and external knowledge sources can cope 
with the increasing complexity of the innovation processes in this sector. Without 
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access to this pool of accumulated knowledge, oil producing countries may become 
marginal innovators, perhaps to meet some of their very specific local needs or technical 
niches. However, their large scale exploration and production operations are performed 
largely with foreign produced technology: either imported in the form of capital goods; 
bought through licensing; or even through turnkey projects which are normally 
outsourced to affiliates of foreign companies. This is what happens in most oil 
producing countries which lack indigenous technological capabilities.    
7.7. Knowledge base complexity, geography of innovation and catch-up 
This section discusses the interpretation of empirical results and their relevance to the 
dynamics of knowledge base complexity. It argues for the analytical power of the multi-
dimensional concept of knowledge base complexity in understanding dynamics of the 
geography of innovation, because it can compensate for some of the limits of 
international theory of innovation. It paves the way for a dynamic theory of the 
geography of complexity.  
In terms of technological requirements, today’s upstream projects are very different 
from some years ago. Not only has the depth and breadth of knowledge increased, 
accumulated systemic complexity also calls for coordination and integration capabilities 
which are largely located in companies from just a few advanced industrial countries. 
The dominance of systemic complexity has increased the need for internal coordination 
of technological innovation in major innovative companies, although their innovative 
activities have become geographically more dispersed. This suggests that, to cope with 
increasing systemic complexity, organizational and cognitive proximity (Boschma, 
2005; Boschma and Frenken, 2010) through vertically integrated big companies is not 
only more important than geographical proximity but is an essential element of 
complexity management. In other words, company’s vertically integrated internal 
structures appear as more effective vehicles for transmission and integration of different 
segments of specialized knowledge from different geographical locations. Not only do 
they mix and match various internal knowledge sources, they also combine global and 
local knowledge sources to provide customized efficient solutions.  
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While they have access to advanced global knowledge sources, they also combine it 
with local expertise in order to introduce customised services which meet local 
specificity of demand. This is of particular importance in resources based industries like 
upstream petroleum industry where location specific characteristics in terms of 
geological and geophysical conditions must be considered in the design and 
implementation of projects. There is no one uniform globally applicable design and 
engineering for upstream projects, although there are some general elements. As a 
result, global and local knowledge should be viewed as complementary sources, both 
essential to cope with increasing complexity. This is in fact the task of both types of 
systems integrators (operators and service companies) to collaborate and cooperate.  
7.7.1. Understanding the dynamics of geography of knowledge   
A simple classification of different types of innovation and looking at the dynamics of 
their share over time provides some insights about the dynamics of geography of 
knowledge. I distinguished between three types of invention in order to capture more 
directly the divergence between inventors’ location and ownership country of patents 
observed in the figure 7.1. Here are the definitions of these different types of inventions: 
• Local: Patents which are invented in a country and also owned by companies of that 
country. 
• Foreign: Patents which are invented in a country, but assigned to the foreign 
companies operating in the host country. In other words, these are the result of R&D 
activities by foreign affiliates in other countries.  
• Collaborative: Patents which are invented in a country, but co-owned by companies 
of that country and companies of other countries. Co-ownership implies that 
companies from both host country (invention country) and other foreign countries 
have been involved and have collaborated in the invention process. 
These definitions are mutually exclusive and each patent can only be classified in one of 
the above categories. The trends for catch-up countries, US and non-catch-up countries 
are presented separately in the figure 7.3 to explore the possibility of different 
behaviours. Non-catch-up countries are defined as ‘all other countries’, excluding catch-
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Figure  7-3 Share of different type of inventions according to ownership 
 212 
Figure 7.3 (a) shows the share of catch-up countries vs. US and non-catch- up countries, 
confirming the rising share of catch-up countries particularly between p1 and p3. They 
collectively overtook non-catch-up countries at the beginning of p3. It also shows that 
the share of catch-up countries has collectively increased at the expense of decline in the 
US share. Figure 7.3 (b) and (d) illustrates that the share of foreign inventions has 
gradually increased from p1 to p2 when its upward trend accelerated. This trend shows 
that the gap between the share of local and foreign inventions has largely reduced over 
p3.  This implies that the geographical dispersion of innovative activities over this 
period occurs through increasingly internationalisation of innovative activities of big 
multi-national companies.  
In contrast, the large gap between the share of local and foreign inventions over p1 
shows that, in comparison with p3, international geographical dispersion over this 
period is more attributable to the role of local inventions emerging both within catch-up 
and non-catch-up countries. The share of collaborative inventions which can be an 
index for collaborative R&D between local and foreign companies has also increased 
over time, but less than foreign inventions. Nonetheless, it can be a reflection of the 
increasing necessity to combine local and global knowledge sources to cope with the 
increasing systemic complexity of upstream projects. 
As expected, patents invented within US have always been dominated by local 
inventions owned by US companies and this situation has hardly changed over time. 
This is because of the large size of local inventions compared with collaborative and 
foreign inventions in the US. It also may reflect the very advanced, large and 
progressive national system of innovation which creates and utilizes almost all the 
knowledge required to cope with different types of complexity at different points of 
time which makes US companies highly competitive. Given the large size and diverse 
range of innovations produced by leading US companies, we can say that this national 
system of innovation to a large extent feeds into the global SIS of upstream petroleum 
industry. As the technological leader of the sector, US reliance on foreign produced 
knowledge or external collaboration is very marginal.  
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7.7.2. Is internationalization theory sufficient? 
One might argue that the observed trend is simply the same as the well-known trend of 
internationalization of innovation carried out by leading companies in different 
industries. In this view, internalization of innovation follows internationalization of 
MNC’s production. Indeed, “the peculiarities of foreign production conditions and 
demand have required leading MNCs historically to develop innovations abroad, related 
to those that had been pioneered at home” (Cantwell, 1995, p.171). It may have nothing 
to do with management of systemic complexity of the knowledge base of the industry. 
At first glance, the internationalization argument seems applicable to the oil industry. 
When operating production regions are exhausted and production sites move around the 
globe, upstream companies need to move their R&D facilities in order to develop 
demand specific solutions. The land-based character of oil production imposes some 
limits for achieving scale economies and shapes the nature of technological 
developments in upstream industry (Prudham, 2005). Economies of scope have become 
more relevant in the upstream end of the value chain. Firms need to “develop 
technological solutions capable of addressing the heterogeneity of exploration 
conditions and reservoir types” (Bridge, 2008, p. 407, emphasis added). This 
localization is not limited to technical knowledge but extends to market, financial, 
social, political, environmental and organizational knowledge (Bridge and Wood, 
2005). If the upstream companies are to stay competitive, they need to geographically 
disperse their knowledge generating units to cope with the strong local nature of the 
industry.   
The argument seems reasonable and valid, but does not sufficiently explain at least three 
aspects of dynamics of the geographical pattern of innovation and more importantly the 
mix of catch-up countries. The first aspect is the timing of internationalization. The oil 
industry has been internationalized from the beginning of the twentieth century. Yet, 
internalization of innovation is rather a much more recent phenomenon in this industry, 
as the trend of foreign patents in figure 7.3 suggests.  
The second aspect is that overall catch-up processes stopped in p3, and the trend of 
geographical dispersion of innovation visibly slowed down, when systemic complexity 
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increased. The gradual share transfer from US to a few catch-up countries stopped and 
was even somehow reversed in p3. US began to regain its share and catch-up countries 
could not increase their share in p3 (figure 7.3 a). Related to this issue is the slow down 
in the trend of geographical dispersion of innovations in terms of inventors’ country 
(IC) after p2 and more importantly its discontinuation over p3, as shown by figure 7.1.  
The third noticeable aspect is the divergence of concentration trends between assignee 
and inventors’ country after p2 (figure 7.1). Although internalization theory proposes a 
higher dispersion of innovative activities over time, it does not provide an explicit 
explanation about the conditions under which change in the location of innovation 
happens with or without change in ownership structure.   
7.7.3. How does complexity perspective help? 
The dynamic concept of three-dimensional complexity could shed some light on these 
aspects and offer additional analytical value. To begin with the third aspect, I explained 
that when breadth complexity is dominant, it is likely that companies innovate in one 
segment of the industry without access to the knowledge of the other parts. In these 
conditions, we can observe more equal dispersion (less concentration) of innovation, 
even without internationalization of companies. Based on foreign patenting trends in the 
figure 7.3, there was a very limited internationalization in p1.  Therefore, a large part of 
the more equal geographical dispersion of innovation (figure 7.1) in this period should 
be attributed to local innovations in catch-up countries. This is compatible with the 
Schumpeter Mark I nature of this period when cognitive barriers to entry were relatively 
low.  
In contrast, when systemic complexity is in place, coordination and integration of 
knowledge over large distances may become a critical issue and disintegrated structures 
may not be sufficient. The internal structure of big vertically integrated companies 
becomes advantageous for integration of the increasingly diverse range of knowledge 
domains involved in complex projects. However, relevant segments of knowledge may 
be geographically dispersed in different specialized locations and clusters. Therefore 
organizational and cognitive proximity (Boschma, 2005) matters more to cope with 
systemic complexity over geographical distance. Diffusion of ICT in all sectors of the 
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economy including upstream sector also could have facilitated this internal knowledge 
coordination capability within multinational companies over large distances 
(Santangelo, 2001).  
When systemic complexity increases, the leading companies in the sector which largely 
originate from industrial advanced countries are better placed than other companies. 
They have access to a diverse range of geographically distributed knowledge. They also 
benefit from internal integration capability over large distances which enables them to 
“go global” (Bridge and Wood, 2005). Cantwell (1995) uses the term new 
“globalization of technology” to describe this new recent situation in contrast with the 
earlier ‘internationalization’ hypothesis. However he does not talk directly about the 
role of systemic complexity. He explains that these companies enjoy benefits from 
economies of scale, scope and geographical agglomeration all at the same time in their 
knowledge production activities. This feature enables big multinational companies to 
overcome systemic complexities arising in the sector and implement locally customised 
operations using globally available specialized advanced knowledge.  
This distinction between internalization and globalization is intentional and in line with 
Cantwell’s (1995) terminology, as explained above. This is to emphasise not only that 
the extent of foreign patenting has been different over the latest period (p3) compared to 
the earlier periods; its aim and nature also have been different. In fact this should reflect 
the particular type of knowledge base complexity to which companies were facing. 
Companies follow an internationalization of innovation in order to produce different 
complementary kinds of knowledge to customize their products or services for local 
peculiarities. This is more about the breadth and depth complexity needed, as they 
extend their home grown knowledge. However, according to Cantwell (1995), when a 
strategy of globalization of technology is followed, leading companies develop “internal 
international networks to exploit the locationally differentiated potential of foreign 
centres of excellence” (p. 155). They seek to integrate local and global knowledge 
sources through their integrated networks to cope with the increasing systemic 
complexity.  
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The key difference is that there is no intensive knowledge integration exercise between 
different geographical locations, when the aim is internationalisation. However, 
globalization of innovation involves intensive integration and exchange of 
geographically distributed knowledge sources in order to cope with increasing systemic 
complexity.  Cantwell (1995) showed this issue by tracing the different technological 
specialization of innovation activities at home and abroad in leading companies over 
time. I developed a different and more direct method to trace the intensity of knowledge 
flows between home and abroad in the innovation processes. A typology of inventions 
is introduced in order to recognize the dominant strategy of the companies over 
different periods:  
• Indigenous inventions: patents owned by companies of each country which is also 
invented due to research in that country.   
• Offshore inventions: patents owned by companies of each country which is 
invented due to research carried out abroad with no inventor from the home country.   
• Co-inventor inventions: patents owned by companies of each country which is 
invented by at least one inventor located in the home country and one inventor 
located abroad. 
These definitions are mutually exclusive and each patent can only be classified in one 
category. The share of each type of patent over time is presented in figure 7.4 for 
different groups of countries separately. The share of these countries in innovative 
activities (a) is also presented. Consistently, the share of co-inventor patents in all three 
groups of countries overtakes the share of offshore patents over p3 while p1 witnessed a 
reverse situation. As predicted, the intensity of knowledge exchange and integration 
exercises between innovators of different locations has increased over time. This is a 
reflection of the shift from dominance of internationalization in p1 to globalization in 
p3. Inventors of the companies at home and abroad have been working relatively 
independent of each other in p1, as the lower percentage of co-patenting suggests. 
Although the share of foreign patenting has been rising (figure 7.3), the co-invention or 
cooperation between a parent company with its affiliate or with other foreign companies 
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Figure  7-4 Share of different type of inventions in terms of inventors’ location 
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This confirms the fact that both the level and nature of foreign patenting have 
changed over time, consistent with dynamics of knowledge base complexity. 
In sum, the evidence presented shows that the dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity is helpful to explain diverging trends of geographical concentration of 
innovation when measured on the base of inventor (IC) and owner (AMIC) country 
(figure 7.1). It was shown that the change in the aim and nature of foreign patenting 
from offshore type in earlier periods to co-invention in p3 is associated with a shift 
from breadth to systemic complexity. The rise of systemic complexity offers unique 
advantages to big multi-national companies in knowledge generation processes, 
because they can benefit from economy of scale, scope and agglomeration across the 
globe at the same time (Cantwell, 1995). While the ownership share of big multi-
nationals gains momentum, they geographically disperse the location of their 
innovative activities to get access to specialized knowledge in different centres of 
excellence. As a result, these companies go well ahead of other more local 
companies in less advanced countries giving raise to divergence between two 
geographical trends. This is not driven by change in the location of production sites, 
but by search for advanced knowledge in different centres of excellence to be 
integrated in companies’ knowledge base.  
However, before that period, international geographical dispersion was driven by the 
combination of the rise of local innovations by home companies of catch-up 
countries (figure 7.3) and some offshore inventions by multi-national companies 
(Figure 7.4). Both are compatible with dominance of breadth complexity and less 
systemic complexity in that period.  As a result, the trend of geographical dispersion 
in p1 (figure 7.1) both in terms of inventor and owner country are closer to each 
other. We observed that the internationalization theory of innovation is not adequate 
to explain the diverging geographical trends between the location and ownership of 
innovation trends in p3. In contrast, increasing systemic complexity, which is also 
consistent with globalization theory of innovation, is better equipped to explain the 
observed diverging pattern.  
So far, the third unexplained aspect of dynamics of geography of innovation in the 
sector which mentioned in previous section is addressed. It is argued that the 
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dynamics of knowledge base complexity could clarify this unexplained geographical 
aspect. 
The other aspects of dynamics of geography innovation can also be explained with 
reference to the dynamics of knowledge base complexity. With regard to the second 
aspect, increasing systemic complexity in p3 can explain the discontinuities observed 
in the rising trend of the share of catch-up countries and recovery of American 
hegemony in the sector (figure 7.4 a). Companies from other countries than 
American companies are in a worse position to cope with the systemic complexity of 
the industry over p3. US companies have been more successful than others in 
managing and benefiting from systemic complexity, because of their access to a 
different range of knowledge segments at both local and global level. On the one 
hand, they originate from a rich national system of innovation which generates 
diverse ranges of knowledge. On the other hand their globalization offers access to 
the variety of local knowledge worldwide.  
Their system integration capabilities also support knowledge generation through 
recombination of local and global knowledge processes. These conditions enable 
them to exercise better than others economy of scale, scope and agglomeration at the 
same time, which explains their higher growth rates over p3. Although p3 is a special 
ceremony for the big companies to embrace increasing systemic complexity, the 
biggest of the big companies from US gain more than relatively smaller big 
companies from other territories (UK, Norway, Canada). The stalled international 
geographical dispersion trend over p3 is also due to the re-concentration of 
innovation both within the US as a location of innovation and as the origin of big 
innovator companies (figure 7.1).  
The dynamic concept of three-dimensional complexity can also address the first 
aspect mentioned above with regard to the mismatch between timing of 
internalization of oil production and innovation in the sector. Internationalization 
theory predicts co-occurrence of internationalization of production and innovation 
which does not apply to this sector. Complexity perspective on the other hand 
suggests the degree and type of international innovative activities by leading 
companies develop in accordance with the degree and type of complexity. We 
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observed that internalization of innovation is associated with increasing breadth 
complexity, while increasing systemic complexity is more consistent with the new 
globalization of innovation. 
Although oil production has been very international since the early twentieth century, 
it seems that internationalization of innovation is a much more recent event in the 
sector. As figure 7.3 suggests, foreign patenting begins in the early 1970s. Again, the 
dynamic complexity perspective offers insights to understand why doing R&D 
abroad was not critical before. The answer is that localized R&D was not very 
critical because of low levels of complexity in the upstream projects. Cheap and 
easily accessible oil reservoirs from major producing fields at that time did not need 
sophisticated technology and local customization. Although local specifity has 
always been a feature of oil industry, it seems that standard and generally produced 
tools for the upstream projects were efficient enough for simpler and somehow 
standard projects of that time. Therefore, foreign R&D activities were not seen very 
fundamental and important for competitiveness. We can label this period as the time 
of ‘non- internationalization’ of innovation when most innovations were of a local 
type with the dominance of US in knowledge generation (see trend of US share in 
figure 7.4 a).  
To sum up, the dynamics of complexity argument appears convincing to explain the 
changing dynamics of geography of innovation. We observe ‘non-internalization’ of 
innovation before 1970s when US had technological hegemony and the knowledge 
base of the sector was relatively simple. The 1970s and 1980s is the period of catch-
up and ‘internationalization’ of innovation which is consistent with increasing 
breadth complexity. The increasing systemic knowledge base complexity since the 
mid-1990s also triggered the transformation to ‘globalization’ of innovation when 
catch-processes stopped and US exercised a new technological hegemony. 
The dynamic and three-dimensional complexity not only offers analytical value to 
understand the dynamics of geography of innovation, it also provides some insights 
for catch-up theories. The mix and dynamics of share of catch-up countries suggest 
that the catch-up process is not fully demand driven, but also strongly conditioned to 
the pre-existence of some local innovation capabilities on the supply side. These 
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local capabilities could attract foreign companies in one hand and support local 
companies when they face different types of complexity. Lack of local capabilities 
can explain why many countries are not able to catch-up and take advantage of the 
flourishing technological opportunities in the sector. Without these local capabilities, 
companies are not able to deal with breadth and depth complexity, let alone the extra 
challenge of systemic complexity. Accordingly we could understand why catch-up 
processes in 1970s and 1980s were led by a few advanced industrial oil producing 
countries (UK, Norway, Canada). We can also understand why even these marginal 
catch-up efforts stopped and international geographical pattern re-concentrated when 
systemic complexity increased in the 1990s.  
7.8. Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to unravel the relationship between dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity and the international geography of innovation with particular emphasis 
on understanding catch-up processes. The case of upstream petroleum industry offers 
a rich and unique opportunity to combine both dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity and interesting dynamics in geographical patterns of innovation. Putting 
the dynamic and three-dimensional perspective of the knowledge base complexity at 
the centre of analysis, this chapter provides three main contributions to the field of 
geography of knowledge base complexity.   
First, at the conceptual level, it removes some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies 
in the literature with regard to the geographical impacts of complexity. The second 
contribution is of methodological type. A set of measures and statistical tests are 
combined in order to describe the dynamics of geography of innovation and their 
association with the dynamics of knowledge base complexity, as formulated in the 
fourth hypothesis of this PhD research. Third, application of the suggested 
methodology provides broad empirical support for this hypothesis, while offering 
some analytical insights with regard to the dynamics of geographical patterns of 
innovation and catch-up processes. This is a step forward towards a dynamic theory 
of the geography of knowledge base complexity, in which the geographical dynamics 
of innovation progress in accordance with the changing nature of knowledge base 
complexity.  
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At a conceptual level, we argue that systemic complexity implies higher 
geographical proximity, because coordination and integration of different pieces of 
knowledge is challenging over long distances when there are intensive interactions. 
However, if the complexity is more of the breadth and depth type and systemic 
interactions are limited, the possibility of geographical dispersion is higher. This 
distinction clarifies some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the literature with 
regard to the geographical implications of complexity. In fact, different dimensions 
of complexity have different geographical impacts. Some of the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the literature come from a lack of clear distinction between these 
dimensions and their various impacts.    
Using a dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base complexity, 
we formulated the fourth hypothesis (H4) of this research. We expect easier new 
entries and more opportunities for latecomer catch-up, and therefore more rapid 
geographical dispersion, when systemic complexity is low and breadth and depth 
complexity are dominant. In contrast, increasing systemic complexity implies higher 
barriers to entry. Therefore it provides fewer catch-up opportunities and we expect 
slower geographical dispersion or even moves towards higher geographical 
concentration.  
We found empirical evidence to support the hypothesis in the upstream petroleum 
industry. It is shown that increasing breadth complexity in p1 provides wider 
opportunities for catch-up of other countries and more rapid geographical dispersion. 
In contrast, increasing systemic complexity slows down geographical dispersion. It 
seems that this condition is more in favour of bigger innovator countries and the 
companies originate there. However the analysis also shows that those wider 
opportunities in the conditions of breadth complexity are not open equally to 
everybody. The co-existence of local sectoral production as a demand side for 
innovation and supportive national systems of innovation in the supply side are 
preconditions both to realize these innovation opportunities and exploit them at a 
global level. Without these preconditions, it is very unlikely that companies from 
latecomer countries in the sector will overcome the cognitive barrier.  Many oil 
producing countries gain higher positions in the technological hierarchy of the 
petroleum industry. In addition, the results suggest that in dealing with systemic 
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complexity, the cognitive and organizational proximity available in internal networks 
of big multinational companies may be more important than geographical proximity.  
In addition, the empirical results offer some theoretical insights about the dynamics 
of geographical patterns of innovation. I argue that the standard internationalization 
theory of innovation is not sufficient to explain three aspects of geographical 
dynamics. These are: the temporal mismatch between the international geography of 
oil production and innovation; the slow down and eventual halt of geographical 
dispersion of the upstream petroleum industry in later periods; and, divergence of 
geographical dispersion trends when measured with base on inventors and assignee' 
countries. These three aspects of the dynamics of geographical patterns of innovation 
are better understood in the light of the dynamic and three-dimensional concept of 
knowledge base complexity. We found that observed dynamics in geographical 
patterns of innovation progress in accordance with the dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity. The knowledge base of the industry goes from the state of relative 
simplicity, to the dominance of breadth, and then systemic complexity. In parallel, 
the geographical dynamics of innovation move from relative non-internationalization 
to internationalization and finally to a new globalization of innovation. These 
findings offer valuable insights for the development of a dynamic theory of the 
geography of knowledge base complexity, as an attractive area for further research. 
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8. Chapter 8: Summary and conclusions 
 
8.1. Introduction  
This chapter summarises the findings of this research, linking them together and 
locating them within previous research on the 'knowledge' and 'learning' approaches 
to resource based development. The chapter also discusses the policy implications of 
the findings, describes the limitations of the research and provides some suggestions 
for further research in the field.  
We explained that this thesis is situated between two gaps. We found that there is a 
lack of adequate understanding about the dynamics of the knowledge base in 
resource based industries. On the other hand, the dynamics of knowledge base 
complexity is a relatively neglected area in sectoral innovation systems approaches. 
Although mentioned as an important element of technological regimes, it has not 
been well articulated. Looking at the dynamics of knowledge base complexity in the 
upstream petroleum industry, this thesis aimed to address both gaps. On the one 
hand, it increases our understanding of the dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
and its role in transformation of sectoral innovation systems. On the other, it feeds 
into the natural resource based development literature, providing a deeper picture of 
the opportunities and challenges involved in these sectors regarding the underlying 
knowledge and innovation processes.  
We review the research objectives and questions in section 8.2. The overarching 
research question which guided this research and the three operational research 
questions of this thesis are addressed. Section 8.3 combines and summarizes the 
findings and explains the main contributions of the thesis. Section 8.4 discusses the 
policy implications and the practical lessons which can be drawn from the findings. 
The limitations of the research and suggestions for future research are discussed in 
section 8.5.   
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8.2. Research objectives and questions 
We explained that dominant approaches in the resource based development literature 
tend to provide an exogenous and static picture of natural resource industries, where 
the role of knowledge and innovation is relatively neglected (Andersen, 2012). This 
conventional 'resource curse' view (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008) tends to 
conceptualize resource based industries as the sectors with 'inherently' limited 
innovation and developmental capacity (Lorentzen, 2008a). Such weaknesses, along 
with recent changes in the global economy (Morris et al., 2011), have pushed 
researchers to look for alternative analytical approaches. Referring to some common 
elements in this emerging research agenda, they are labelled as a ‘knowledge’ 
(Lorentzen, 2008a) or ‘learning’ (Wright, 2001; Andersen, 2012) approach to 
resource based development. According to these new approaches, the performance 
and contribution of natural resource sectors to the economy is not something given, 
but a function of learning, innovation and knowledge accumulation in society.  
Our observation confirms the richness of technological opportunities in the 
petroleum industry and its resurgence since the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that many oil producing countries have not been able to harness these opportunities. 
In other words, many still operate under a production-oriented paradigm, while 
innovations are concentrated only in a few industrial countries. 
Accordingly, the overarching question which informed my doctoral research was: 
Can the new ‘learning’ approaches to resource based industries  provide a 
complementary explanation for the oil producing countries’ struggle to enjoy the 
innovation opportunities emerged in upstream petroleum industry, given the 
limitations of the conventional  ‘resource curse’ view? 
It is explained that there are basically two ways to answer the overacting question. 
One way is to focus on the context of individual countries and find the internal and 
structural factors which stifle or at least do not support learning processes. This 
approach tends to look at poor policies or unsupportive institutions. The second way 
is to look at the characteristics of what needs to be learned or the nature of 
knowledge. Some kinds of knowledge can be easily obtained. However, there are 
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other kinds which are difficult to learn. The aircraft industry is an example with 
difficult to learn knowledge. Although the aircraft industry has been a commercial 
industry for a long time, still few countries have the technological capability for 
production and innovation. Obviously, the two ways to answer the overarching 
question are complementary and do not exclude each other. We follow the second 
route to answer our overarching research questions, as it has been less addressed in 
previous research.  
In other words, we are more interested to explore the ‘cognitive’ barriers for new 
participants to enter in the innovation processes. The intuitive hypothetical answer is 
that increasing technological complexity has played an important role to prevent 
latecomer countries from knowledge base development in the upstream petroleum 
industry. This broad hypothesis translated to three main research questions which 
guided the current thesis:  
1- How has technological complexity in the upstream petroleum industry 
evolved over time? 
 
2- How is the governance system of sectoral knowledge base adapted to the 
dynamics of technological complexity? And how have different firms 
responded or adjusted to the dynamics of technological complexity? 
 
3- What are the implications of dynamics of technological complexity for 
the international geography of innovation and catch-up processes? 
To address the first question I explored whether the patent data support the idea that 
upstream petroleum industry has become technologically more complex. For the 
second question I investigated how did firms’ technological and innovative 
behaviour change or adjust according to the dynamics of technological complexity. 
For the third question, I explored how change in the technological complexity 
affected the dynamics of geography of knowledge and innovation at an international 
level and shape catch-up possibilities. The second question is a mediatory question, 
linking the first and third question through exploration of firms’ technological 
behaviour. This is based on the belief that the dynamics of complexity can only 
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affect the geography of innovation and knowledge through firms’ strategy towards 
knowledge and organization of innovation (figure 8.1). Firms decide how and where 
to perform their innovative activities.  As a result, we are unable to understand 
deeply the impact of technological complexity on the geography of innovation, 










In order to answer these questions, this research presents three main contributions. At 
the theoretical level, we propose a dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to 
knowledge base complexity. We argue that this view offers analytical values to 
explain patterns of innovation at sectoral, organizational and geographical levels. In 
addition, we clarify some of the conceptual ambiguities and theoretical 
inconsistencies about the impact of technological complexity in the literature. The 
second contribution is methodological where we develop a quantitative methodology 
to capture the dynamics of knowledge base complexity and examine its association 
with patterns of innovation. The third contribution was empirical. The application of 
the suggested methodology in a resource based sector is an empirical extension of 
studies of sectoral knowledge bases which previously were concerned with new 
modern sectors neglecting the importance of established industries.    
8.3. Summary of the findings  
In this section, I review the hypotheses developed in connection with the three 
research questions and present the main empirical findings of this thesis. I also 










Figure  8-1 Relationships between research questions 
 228 
The sectoral innovation systems approach is introduced as the broad relevant 
analytical framework. We argued that application of this approach in conjunction 
with the industry architecture framework provides new insights about the dynamics 
and transformation of   the upstream petroleum industry. This is because this 
approach puts knowledge and technological regimes at the centre of analysis and 
systematically analyzes the role of various interacting factors in the dynamics of 
innovation. In addition, it avoids sectoral generalizations and puts the emphasis on 
sector-specific analysis. As a result, we can provide a more comprehensive and 
'history friendly' (Malerba, et al., 1999) model of industry evolution.   
We found that the upstream petroleum industry has been a very dynamic sector since 
1970 with major transformations over time. Three distinctive phases are explored 
over which the configuration and performance of the sector has changed. The 
analysis of patent data shows that technological opportunities in the first period 
(from early 1970s to the mid-1980s) was high, as reflected in a rising innovation 
trend. While the innovation trend in the second period (from mid-1980s to mid- 
1990s) experienced a gradual negative trend, the rate of innovation growth increased 
sharply after the mid-1990s. As a result, the third period of the sector is characterized 
as a period of technological explosion. The main driver of transition from the first to 
second period was the collapse of oil prices which reduced financial resources and 
contracted the demand for innovation. In addition, the deleterious impact of vertical 
disintegration or divesture on innovation stimulated by low oil prices has been 
supported in the literature (Teece and Armour, 1976). In contrast, expansion of a 
‘qualitatively’ different demand for innovation in complex upstream projects in harsh 
and less accessible environments was the major factor behind transition from the 
second to the third period. Moreover, vertical integration strategies had positive 
impacts on the innovation performance of the sector.  
A related theoretical conclusion is that standard application of conventional industry 
lifecycle (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) is not able to explain innovation in an 
industry as mature as the upstream petroleum sector. Given the simplistic view of 
this model, more systemic approaches such as SIS can provide deeper insights about 
the innovation divers, industrial dynamics and its structural consequences. Analysis 
of upstream SIS illustrates the sector as a highly dynamic and innovative, particularly 
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in the most recent period. It is shown that major disciplines such as mechanics, 
chemistry, physics and geophysics, electronics and even biology and biotechnology 
all contributed to the knowledge base of the sector. In addition, the upstream 
petroleum knowledge base has considerable overlaps with other industries such as 
mining, polymer and plastics, instrumentation, electrical and communication, and the 
chemicals industry. My analysis of the main patentees also confirms that the 
upstream industry is an active innovator from insider participants. As a result 
viewing it as only a passive receiver of innovation from other sectors is wrong. A 
different range of operators, integrated service companies and specialized firms as 
well as non-firm organizations like public R&D institutes and universities, are all 
involved in the innovation processes. Integrated service companies are positioned at 
the top of the list of innovators. We dig more into the dynamics and transformation 
of upstream petroleum industry through the analysis of dynamics of technological 
complexity and its role in the industry evolution and patterns of innovation.   
8.3.1.  Dynamics of knowledge base  complexity 
In response to the first research question, we began with the underlying hypothesis 
that: 
Hypotheses 1: Upstream petroleum industry has gradually moved towards higher 
degrees of technological complexity.  
This hypothesis is empirically supported. However a more subtle and articulated 
meaning of complexity emerged in this study. Using background research on the 
concept of complexity, we proposed a dynamic and three-dimensional perspective 
capturing three different aspects of evolving knowledge base complexity. We found 
that the dominant type of complexity in different periods may change. In the 
upstream petroleum industry, depth complexity is shown as a pervasive aspect of 
complexity which often increases over time. Breadth complexity rises in the early 
phases while more recently we have the period of increasing systemic complexity.   
Drawing from the dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base 
complexity conceptual contribution of this thesis, we presented a more 
comprehensive and precise picture of the industry lifecycle in the upstream 
petroleum industry. In other words, a ‘knowledge based perspective’ to industry 
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lifecycle proved a useful analytical tool and more relevant than traditional indicators 
like firm size and number, in order to study industrial dynamics in the era of 
knowledge based economies.  It is good to recall the fact that technological 
opportunities can be very high in an old and mature industry in the conventional 
sense; and even become greater than in the early stages of the industry. Therefore, 
the rate of innovation and degree of technological opportunities is only a very partial 
indicator to distinguish the main phases of industry. 
This study is an extension of recent research on the lifecycle of knowledge intensive 
industries (Grebel et al., 2006; Krafft, et al, 2009 & 2011), illustrating the usefulness 
of the approach even in traditional established industries. This suggests that 
knowledge economy is not crystallized in particular sectors, but is a widespread 
phenomenon in all sectors of the economy. The suggestion of a three-dimensional 
conception of complexity, and more importantly my attempt to measure them over 
time, was an important step forward to address this gap in the literature  
My data appear to provide convincing evidence to distinguish between two main 
cycles of upstream petroleum industry and a transition phase between the two, 
according to the dynamics of complexity and structure of knowledge base. 
According to evidence provided, we could label them as ‘fluidity’, ‘transition’ and 
‘maturity’ phases as an analogy. This three phases almost correspond to the main 
three periods explored, based on the technological opportunities of the sector. But we 
need to be careful as the meaning assigned to these phases is very different to the 
conventional (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or ‘pre-historic’ perspective. The 
focus here is not on the horizontal structure of the industry, but on the structure of the 
‘knowledge base’.  
As the analysis of dynamics of knowledge base complexity shows, the period before 
the early parts of period 2 (p2) can be described as the period of dominance of 
breadth complexity associated with random search and exploration strategy. 
Knowledge structure is relatively shaky and changing. These features imply narrow 
cumulativeness for this period. New fields are continuously added to the knowledge 
base of the sector, but cross fertilizations and linkages lag and are limited. In 
contrast, the period after the early second period (p2) is best described as the period 
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of increasing systemic complexity, where recombination and cross-fertilizations 
within defined trajectories become dominant. This characterizes the period of 
organized search and exploitation of the technologies explored in the previous phase. 
The result is a relatively stable knowledge structure and wide cumulativeness which 
stem from complementarities and cross fertilizations.  
8.3.2. Governance of evolving knowledge base complexity 
Given the three-dimensional picture drawn from the evolution of knowledge base 
complexity in the upstream petroleum industry, we also expect the knowledge 
governance system to change over time. Two related and complementary hypotheses 
are proposed based on two different strands of the literature, in order to respond to 
the second research question of the thesis. Examination of these two related and 
complementary hypotheses sheds light on the ways in which the changing nature of 
the sectoral knowledge base affects and shapes the relative role of different 
participants in the knowledge environment. The main concern was to explain the 
dynamics of sectoral governance of knowledge as a function of evolving knowledge 
base complexity.  
It was explained that the question of knowledge governance in different sectors has 
been the subject of at least two relatively separate research programs which look at 
different, yet complementary aspects. First is the Schumpeterian tradition which 
tends to focus on the relative role of small vs. big and new vs. incumbent firms with 
regard to their contribution in the innovation processes and the development of 
sectoral knowledge base. According to this tradition, we examined the second 
hypothesis of this thesis. 
Hypothesis 2: we expect the sector to move towards Schumpeter Mark I over p1 
when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is decreasing. We 
also expect a shift towards Schumpeter Mark II after early p2 when systemic 
complexity is increasing and breadth complexity declines. 
The second tradition tends to look at the division of knowledge between different 
players and their particular functions in the governance of the sectoral knowledge 
base. In other words, the role of different actors is explored collectively and 
systematically to analyze the dynamics of direction (specialization vs. 
 232 
diversification) of their innovation strategy. According to this tradition, the third 
hypothesis claims that:  
Hypothesis 3: we expect most of the agents to follow a technological specialization 
strategy over p1 when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity is 
decreasing. We also expect some of the agents which become system integrators to 
shift towards a technological diversification strategy after early p2 when systemic 
complexity is increasing and breadth complexity declines.  
It is clear that both research programs highlight different aspects of the knowledge 
governance and are complementary to each other. However, the existence of one 
common gap in both research traditions was an academic opportunity to remove the 
distinction between them and offer novel contributions. The dominance of a static 
mode of analysis has narrowed the scope of questions they can answer, although 
there is no inherent conceptual and theoretical limit for their extension to a more 
dynamic mode of analysis. The introduction of a dynamic and three-dimensional 
perspective to knowledge base complexity provides a unique opportunity to offer 
dynamism to both approaches and reduce the distinction between their visions, based 
on the shared concepts incorporated in them. The case of upstream petroleum 
industry offered a unique opportunity for empirical examination of this suggestion.  
We found empirical evidence in support of both hypotheses. In terms of H2, we 
found that Schumpeterian patterns of innovation in the upstream petroleum industry 
shifted from mode I in earlier periods to what resembles mode II in more recent 
times. This is explained with the dominance of breadth complexity in the earlier 
periods which later converted to increasing systemic complexity in more recent 
times.  
As the by-product of examination of this hypothesis, a broader theoretical 
contribution to the Schumpeterian approach is suggested. We proposed a dynamic 
theoretical framework in which the dynamics of Schumpeterian patterns of 
innovation can be explained in terms of the combination of two dimensions of 
technological regimes. It was shown that knowledge base complexity, if combined 
with technological opportunities, could convincingly explain the dynamics of 
Schumpeterian patterns both in terms of degree and mode. While the shift in 
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complexity type from breadth to systemic can alter the Schumpeterian mode, a 
change in opportunities tends to affect the degree of existing mode (weaken or 
strengthen) without altering it. The combinations of these two dimensions of 
technological regimes provide a basis for a dynamic theory of knowledge 
governance.      
The analysis of upstream petroleum industry provides empirical support for this 
Schumpeterian version of the dynamic theory of knowledge governance. We showed 
that small and new innovators can exploit increasing technological opportunities 
most when knowledge base complexity is predominantly of the breadth type and 
systemic complexity is low. This most resembles the features of Schumpeter Mark I. 
In contrast, when the systemic complexity increases in the sector, the rise of 
technological opportunities is relatively more beneficial to large and incumbent 
companies. This situation characterizes the Schumpeter Mark II mode. As a result, 
the transformation of Schumpeterian pattern of innovation from mode I to mode II 
can be understood with reference to the increasing systemic complexity of the 
knowledge base. This analysis shows that high technological opportunities can 
reduce the gap between small and big innovators only when systemic complexity is 
low (Schumpeter Mark I). However, if systemic complexity dominates the sector 
(Schumpeter Mark II), high technological opportunities are most likely to widen the 
gap between small and big innovators. This argument similarly applies to new vs. 
incumbent innovators.                                        
The third hypothesis of the PhD is also supported by empirical evidence. It is shown 
that before early p2 when breadth complexity is increasing and systemic complexity 
is decreasing; all three types of actors take a specialized growth innovation strategy. 
However over p2 and p3 when systemic complexity increases sharply, Integrated 
Service Companies emerge as the new systems integrators of the sector with 
aggressive diversified growth innovation strategy to cope with this excessive 
systemic knowledge base complexity. In other words, when interactions and 
interrelatedness between different technological domains are intensified, market 
based decentralized mechanism may not be sufficient for governance of systemic 
complexity. As a result vertically integrated systems integrators manage this type of 
complexity via their internal innovation network.   
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In addition, it is shown that there is no unified theory which can consistently explain 
two novel aspects of the dynamics of the knowledge governance explored in the 
upstream petroleum industry. The first is the full cycle of disintegration and back to 
what I characterized as neo-integration. The second novel aspect is the emergence of 
integrated service companies as new system integrators and their forward integration 
strategy. We observed that they became leading innovators following aggressive 
diversified growth innovation strategy. These two novel aspects can be explained 
according to the dynamics of knowledge base complexity embodied in a co-
evolutionary framework. The framework originally was proposed (Jacobides and 
Winter, 2005) to explain change in the vertical scope of production and division of 
labour among different firms.  I suggest a similar application in the knowledge 
domain to explain the dynamics of division of knowledge among firms, and 
governance of the sectoral knowledge base.  
This framework combines transaction costs as a partial endogenous variable and 
firms' capabilities in order to explain the dynamics of governance structures. A 
dynamic theory of knowledge governance is proposed based on the tentative 
application of this unified theoretical framework in the case of upstream petroleum 
industry.  
The dominance of a specialized growth innovation strategy by most of the agents in 
the dis-integration period is explained by relative low transaction costs stemming 
from dominance of the breadth type of complexity. The emergence of Integrated 
Service Companies as leading actors with aggressive diversified growth innovation 
strategies in the neo-integration period is interpreted as a sector-wide response to the 
emergent systemic complexity. It is explained that systemic complexity involves 
high transaction costs in knowledge generation processes and requires new system 
integration capabilities. In fact integrated service companies are understood as new 
agents in the sectoral innovation systems of upstream petroleum industry which are 
gradually created to serve a new function. This new function, the governance of 
excessive systemic complexity, emerged in the most recent period.  
The dis-integration period seems consistent with the vanishing hand (Langlois, 
2003) idea where reliance on external knowledge sources increases and companies 
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tend to specialize and outsource their non-core knowledge activities. However neo-
integration period suggests that an emerging hand of corporate management can 
become critical when systemic complexity prevails. New/latecomers - be they 
organisations or nations - find it difficult to learn/absorb the set of integrated 
knowledge required to do a proper job and be competitive. Since this has been 
accumulated over several decades by incumbents, latecomers struggle to catch up 
with leaders.  
In addition to the methodological and empirical contributions involved in the 
examination of the two hypotheses regarding the governance of complexity, an 
important theoretical implication is drawn. It is argued that integration of dynamic 
and three-dimensional perceptive of knowledge base complexity can extend two 
existing research traditions, providing two complementary theories of the dynamics 
of knowledge governance. One is rooted in the Schumpeterian tradition, while the 
other takes a functional approach based on transaction-cost economics and resource-
based theories of the firm. These theoretical contributions deepen our understanding 
of the drivers of change in systems of knowledge governance as a sector-wide 
response to shifts in knowledge base complexity. This also facilitates integration of 
both traditions. It is possible, on this basis, to analyse the role of geography in coping 
with the dynamics of complexity and how knowledge is integrated and coordinated 
across geographical distances. This paves the way to understand the role of 
knowledge base complexity in technological catch-up of latecomer countries, and 
how the dynamics of geographical pattern of innovation is affected by the dynamics 
of knowledge base complexity. 
8.3.3. Geographical implications of evolving knowledge base 
complexity  
In order to answer the third research question which addresses the geographical 
implications of the knowledge base complexity, the following hypothesis is 
proposed:  
Hypothesis 4: When breadth complexity increases and systemic complexity 
decreases, we expect to observe relatively more rapid geographical dispersion and 
wider catch-up opportunities. In contrast, we expect slower geographical dispersion 
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or even a move to more concentration, with more limited catch-up experience when 
systemic complexity increases. 
In other words, systemic complexity seems to favour incumbents (be they firms or 
countries) at the expenses of new/latecomers. We examined whether this occurrence 
is reflected in the dynamics of geography of innovation patterns? 
We found empirical evidence in the upstream petroleum industry in support of the 
hypothesis. It is shown that the increasing breadth complexity in p1 provides wider 
opportunities for catch-up of other countries and more rapid geographical dispersion. 
In contrast, increasing systemic complexity slows down geographical dispersion. It 
seems this condition is more in favour of bigger innovator countries and companies 
that originate there. 
However the analysis also shows that those wider possibilities in the conditions of 
dominance of breadth complexity are not open equally to everybody. The co-
existence of local sectoral production experience as a demand side of innovation and 
supportive national systems of innovation in the supply side are preconditions to both 
realize these innovation opportunities and exploit them at global level. Without these 
preconditions, it is very unlikely for companies of latecomer countries in the sector 
to overcome the cognitive barriers which inhibit many oil producing countries from 
gaining higher positions in the technological hierarchy of petroleum industry.  
Consequently, only a few latecomer advanced countries (UK, Norway, and Canada) 
are recognized as important catch-up nations, while a few other less developed 
countries (Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) have changed marginally.  In addition, 
the results suggest the idea that in dealing with systemic complexity, cognitive and 
organizational proximity achievable through the internal networks of big 
multinational companies might be more important than geographical proximity.    
The empirical evidence of geographical patterns of innovation offer conceptual 
clarifications and valuable theoretical insights. We observed that systemic 
complexity implies higher geographical proximity, because coordination and 
integration of different segments of knowledge is challenging over long distances 
when there are intensive interactions. However, if the complexity is more of the 
breadth and depth type, when systemic interactions are limited, the possibility of 
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geographical dispersion is higher. This distinction clarifies some of the ambiguities 
and inconsistencies in the literature with regard to the geographical implications of 
complexity. In fact, different dimensions of complexity can be associated with 
different geographical impacts. Some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
literature come from lack of clear distinction between these dimensions and their 
various impacts.    
In addition, the empirical results offer some theoretical insights concerning the 
dynamics of geographical patterns of innovation. We found that the standard 
internationalization theory of innovation is not sufficient to explain three aspects of 
geographical dynamics. These are: temporal mismatch between international 
geography of oil production and innovation; slowing down and eventually stop in 
geographical dispersion in later periods of upstream petroleum industry; and, 
divergence of geographical dispersion trends when measured based on inventors and 
assignee' countries. These three aspects in the dynamics of geographical patterns of 
innovation are better understood in the light of the dynamic and three-dimensional 
concept of knowledge base complexity. We also found that the observed dynamics in 
the international geography of innovation progress in accordance with the dynamics 
of knowledge base complexity over time. The knowledge base of the industry goes 
from a state of relative simplicity to the dominance of breadth and then systemic 
complexity. In parallel, the geographical dynamics of innovation advance from 
relative non-internationalization, to internationalization, and finally to globalization. 
The findings offer valuable insights for development of a dynamic theory of 
geography of knowledge base complexity, as an attractive area for further research.  
In sum, the dynamic and three-dimensional perspective to knowledge base 
complexity offers three theoretical implications. First, understating the industry 
lifecycle with reference to the structure of the knowledge base. Second, provision of 
a dynamic theory of governance of knowledge base complexity within two 
complementary frames of Schumpeterian and functional approaches. Third, 
explaining the dynamics of geographical patterns of innovation and catch-up 
processes. These results also have some policy implications explained in the next 
section.     
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8.4. Implications for policy 
The empirical analysis presented above suggests that the upstream petroleum 
industry involves both considerable opportunities and significant challenges for 
economic development in resource based countries. The role of policy is therefore 
defined in support of economic agents to overcome the challenges and exploit the 
opportunities and transform the danger of resource curse to the fruits of a blessing. 
No industrial policy can be successful without deep understanding of the nature of 
the evolution of the industry and its underlying knowledge processes. The insights 
presented in this thesis with regard to evolving knowledge base complexity and their 
implications for patterns of innovation at sectoral, organizational and geographical 
level can inform industrial policy in several ways. 
First, the evidence presented clearly illustrates widespread and increasing innovation 
opportunities in upstream petroleum industry which justify policy interventions 
targeting knowledge-centred development agenda. According to the new industrial 
policy approach (Rodrik, 2007, 2008; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006), technological 
dynamism and potential knowledge spillovers are crucial for an industry to be the 
subject of policy interventions. In contrast to what is normally portrayed by the 
resource curse thesis, the upstream petroleum industry illustrates a pattern of 
growing innovation opportunities, a broad scientific and technological base, and 
wide inter-sectoral interaction with other industries. Other secondary evidence also 
shows that the sector can be a source of skill-intensive job creation and knowledge 
based growth, if its wide network of supplier base and input industries are taken into 
account (Sæthe et al., 2011; Oil and Gas UK, 2011). 
Underestimation of learning opportunities in the upstream petroleum industry is a 
wrong conclusion, often implicitly drawn from a conjecture that industries matter in 
their developmental opportunities. Although the general statement which has been 
subject of an old debate (from Prebisch, 1950; Kaldor, 1981; Reinert, 1998; to 
Hausmann and Rodrick, 2006) is acceptable, the immediate conclusion that all 
resource-based industries are of low opportunity category is not acceptable. Today’s 
situation within the petroleum industry clearly falsifies this assumption, even if it has 
been the case years ago.   
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Accordingly, the role of policy is to create an environment in which these innovation 
opportunities are realized and exploited properly in resource producing countries. It 
is far more important to analyse ‘how’ these countries produce their natural resources 
than ‘what’ they produce (Lorentzen, 2008a). The role of industrial and innovation 
policy is to contribute to the shaping of this ‘how’. As explained in section 8.3, the 
necessary conditions for productivity growth, formation of forward and backward 
linkages and innovative capacities are technological learning and accumulation of 
capabilities. Without these capabilities, the economic agents are unable first to 
realize the high potential innovation opportunities involved in resource based 
industries, and second, take entrepreneurial action in order to transform these 
opportunities into profitable economic activities. In other words, “learning how to 
seize technological and organizational opportunities is a fundamental driver of 
industrialization” (Cimoli et al., 2009a, p. 10).  
The metaphor of ‘fishing in the sea’ is illustrative (Dosi et al., 2006). Innovation 
opportunities refer to the fishing potential of the sea determined by the size (depth 
and width) and richness of the sea. However, ‘the rate of fishing’ from the sea by 
different fishermen depends on their skills and capabilities. If inexperienced 
fishermen are unable to catch high volumes of fish and make profits out of them, we 
cannot blame the sea for its low fishing potential (or blame the sector for its low 
innovation potential). The solution is to support learning processes and increase the 
capabilities which allow firms to realize and exploit opportunities. 
However, learning, knowledge accumulation and formation of capabilities are not 
automatic self-sustained processes particularly in the latecomer context. This is why 
public policy should play a role. As previous research has argued (Bell, 2007; 
Rodrik, 2007), these activities are subject to large technological, information and 
coordination externalities. As a result, the standard argument applies - that 
investments in creating knowledge assets and learning processes will be considerably 
less than what is socially efficient and desirable. This is because if they are initiated 
by some economic agents, other enterprises can get access to the knowledge 
generated, information produced, and benefit from infrastructure and linkages 
created, without compensation to the original investor. Consequently, there is an 
important role for the government to support these activities by different means.  
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In this view, ‘industrial policies are a predicament’ and governments are ‘doomed to 
choose’ (Hausmann and Rodrick, 2006). This is because countries inevitably have 
the choice to shape the future paths of knowledge accumulation and capability 
building. “Even the choice of not having any (implicit or explicit) industrial policy is 
a choice in itself, that is, the acceptance of the current international division of 
intellectual and physical labor, and with that the current distribution of learning 
opportunities” (Cimoli et al., 2009a, p. 2). However, this choice is not a sustainable 
and reliable development path, because the general economic environment in less 
developed countries is often not conductive to learning processes, depriving them 
from benefits of emerging innovation opportunities.       
Second, the evolution of the knowledge base complexity in the upstream petroleum 
industry offers another and perhaps more important implication for policy. Although 
accumulation of learning capabilities is a key to embrace innovation, what needs to 
be learnt is not a ‘fixed’ target on the shelf. If it were, most of the countries soon or 
later will have achieved the goal, whatever their efforts and speed of learning. On top 
of learning obstacles explained above, the evolving knowledge base complexity of 
the sector plays the role of a moving target for latecomers, which increases the entry 
barrier to the innovators’ club. The more complex is the knowledge, the more 
challenging are the processes of learning and diffusion to the latecomers. The 
increasing nature of knowledge cumulativeness arsing from complexity could be an 
important factor, preventing technological convergence between different countries 
starting at different technological levels (Dosi, 1982).    
Even when the rising complexity is of the breadth type, the window of opportunities 
is open only for those who are able to recognize these opportunities.  Without prior 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and technological capabilities in 
particular specialized fields, economic agents cannot make sense of emerging 
opportunities and exploit them. When the complexity turns to the systemic type, 
which implies simultaneous specialization, in increasing different range of fields and 
the ability to integrate and combine them, the learning challenges for latecomers are 
much greater. This is because the specialized knowledge on its own loses its 
advantage and is only valuable if other pieces of complementary knowledge are 
available or accessible, and also with the knowledge to combine and recombine them 
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in the system. This is why system integrators in upstream petroleum industry play an 
increasing role in the knowledge production processes. They not only develop 
specialized knowledge internally and know where the knowledge can be found 
externally, their core capability is the ability to coordinate and integrate these 
distributed pieces of knowledge. These system integration capabilities allow 
monitoring and shaping of the future trajectory of innovations, coordinating technical 
change in the supply chain and designing new system architectures (Granstrand, et 
al., 1997). 
Learning increasingly complex knowledge is subject to higher coordination costs, 
longer time periods, and perhaps wider externalities. In addition, it involves great 
levels of absorptive capacity and investment in research and development. This is 
why it is very unlikely that private companies will invest in the development of 
capabilities in complex industries. The aircraft industry as an example of complex 
sectors is an illustrative case. It is far from reality to believe that Boeing in the US 
and Airbus in Europe could have been developed without strong government 
support, not only in technological learning and R&D investments, but also by 
securing the market (Niosi and Zhegu, 2008). 
The challenge of technological catch-up in such complex industries for latecomers is 
even higher, as their companies are not supported by an advanced national 
innovation system. Irrespective of the opportunities available in the international 
knowledge frontier of many industries (such as aircraft or petroleum), the lack or gap 
in capabilities is a key obstacle for entrepreneurial exploration of these opportunities 
and exploitation of their economic benefits (Cimoli et al., 2009a). When industries 
like aircraft or upstream petroleum are systematically complex, filling the gap is 
more challenging and costly, because of the existence of a strong collective element. 
Complex industries are metaphorically like the far deep sea with plenty of fish. 
Although the challenge is not shortage of fish, fishing in this sea is different from 
fishing in easily accessible seas. Complementary assets (Teece, 1986) and 
capabilities like advanced ships, equipped with monitoring instruments, are required 
to explore where fish are deep at the bottom of ocean and then to catch them.     
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The required capabilities do not consist of a small set of specialized knowledge to be 
learnt, but also an increasingly wide range of related technological areas. In addition 
system integration capabilities are the key to technological catch-up in complex 
industries in the latecomer context. The concept of latecomer system integration 
capability (LSIC) has recently been introduced to explain the role of system 
integrators in the catch-up of latecomer countries in complex products and systems 
(CoPS) industries (Kiamehr, 2012). That analysis highlights the key role of 
coordination and integration of parallel and distributed learning processes in multiple 
actors in the supply chain of the sector, in the process of technological catch-up in 
complex industries. What made this happen in Iran’s power plant industry, in this 
case (Kiamehr, 2012), has been strong government commitment to support learning 
and capability building processes through a variety of means. This includes 
preferential access to the local market, investment in skills development, acceptance 
of a scope of risk in the early stages of development – such as time and performance 
deviations, and encouragement for local sourcing.  
The experience of technological catch-up in petroleum industry in Norway and 
Brazil provides similar evidence. We observe the key role of latecomer systems 
integrators (Statoil and Petrobras) in support and coordination of learning processes 
in a wide network of supplier and partner companies, along with developing systems 
integration capabilities for themselves (Sæthe et al., 2011; Engen, 2009; Dantas and 
Bell, 2009, 2011). No individual company would have been willing to follow these 
parallel networked learning processes, without strong government support. In fact 
both Statoil and Petrobras were state-owned companies with national interests at the 
time of catch-up processes, although they were partly privatized later on. As a result, 
in addition to business oriented goals, they also were a policy tool to meet the 
national interests of their country.                  
In sum, systemic knowledge base complexity calls for an ‘additional’ role to be 
played by government in support of catch-up processes in complex industries, if 
innovation opportunities are to be seized in latecomer countries. This is ‘additional’, 
because technological learning and capability building processes are not generally 
encouraged by market based mechanism even in non-complex sectors at basic levels, 
let alone in complex industries. The experiences reviewed show that such extra roles 
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which involve integration and coordination of distributed learning, are often served 
through state-owned latecomer systems integrators as a policy tool for catch-up in 
complex industries. However there might be other instittutial arrangements doing 
similar jobs in other contexts. As Breschi and Malerba (2000) explain, both vertically 
integrated structures and geographically co-located dis-integrated structures may 
provide suitable coordination. For example, in advanced industrial countries where 
general innovation infrastructure is established, networked firms may govern 
innovation processes well. However, in a latecomer context where many knowledge 
inputs and infrastructure are missing, big integrated companies seem more efficient 
to compensate for institutional weaknesses.    
The evidence suggests that firms operating in complex industries in the latecomer 
context can face a vicious cycle preventing them from learning and building 
technological capabilities. This is because clients are often conservative in giving the 
complex project to the local systems integrators that are less experienced compared 
to international competitors. Local systems integrators are also reluctant to source 
their key components from local suppliers which are may be less competitive 
compared to their international counterparts. This tendency keeps the links of the 
value chain weak in the local market and prevents user-producer interactions 
(Lundvall, 2009) and accumulation of knowledge and capabilities over time. Limited 
learning feeds back to the capacity of local firms to explore and take advantage of 
innovation opportunities, creating a vicious circle. Governments can help to break 
this cycle, either as the main client at the top end of the value chain, or as state-
owned systems integrators one step back. This can be done through public 
procurements programmes in which the initial risks and lower performance of local 
suppliers are tolerated (Kiamehr, 2012).  
What seems common in all successful industrial policies is that they employ different 
kinds of tools and schemes to create an incentive structure favourable for “learning-
based” rent-seeking. To be effective however, they should also curb what has been 
called “rent-seeking tout court”. Management of balanced rent distribution with 
respect to both elements is one of the most difficult and challenging parts of any 
technological catch-up strategy (Cimoli, 2009b). This task is even more difficult in 
resources based countries, given the easy availability of natural resource rents which 
 244 
tend to distort balance in the cost of the former and in favour of the latter. It is up to 
the governments of these countries to choose the balance and get a better position in 
international distribution of learning capabilities.    
8.5. Limitations and suggestions for further research  
This research was an attempt to explore the dynamics of knowledge base complexity 
and its relationship with patterns of innovation at sectoral, organizational and 
international geographical levels. The findings have some limitations with respect to 
the conceptualization, the empirical setting, the data sources used, and the 
methodology employed. Each of these limitations could be seen as an opportunity for 
the extension of this research. 
With respect to conceptualization, I limited the scope of the analysis to the role of 
knowledge base complexity, from among other elements of technological regimes 
and characteristics of the knowledge base. As sectoral innovation systems approach 
broadly suggests, the dynamics of other elements of technological regimes such as 
the degree of tacitness, appropriability, etc. can also have impacts on the patterns of 
innovation at different analytical levels. In particular, it would be interesting to 
explore which characteristics in general facilitate knowledge diffusion and learning, 
and which of them hinder it. The broad lesson of this research is that the nature of 
knowledge base, as a collective and distributed system, matters for catch-up 
processes. Deep understanding of these characteristics could help to develop more 
effective strategies for latecomer firms to catch up with leaders, and strategies for 
governments aiming to speed up industrialization and catch-up processes. 
One other venue for the theoretical extension of this line of research is the 
development of theoretical formal models such as history-friendly (Malerba et al., 
1999; Malerba et al., 2001, Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002; Malerba et al., 2008) or 
agent-based models (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005) in order to explain the role of 
knowledge characteristics in catch-up processes. With particular focus on the role of 
complexity in petroleum industry, this research provides rich data and broad 
historical trends, in addition to the conceptual base required for these kinds of 
modelling. 
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The challenges of technological catch-up in the petroleum industry were analyzed in 
terms of a knowledge governance framework where accumulated complexity 
increases the entry barriers for latecomers. However, alternative readings may also 
be possible within other analytical frames.   
Technological catch-up could be analyzed in a political economy framework. This 
sector exemplifies an industry with high level of government intervention both at 
national and international levels. The critical role that the petroleum industry plays in 
the global economy implies financial, economic, technological and even social 
imperatives. These broad forces could be analyzed within a political economy 
framework exploring their role in shaping technological competences of different 
countries. For example, oil supply security has been an important driver towards 
investment in technological capabilities in this sector in many countries, such as 
France in the past and China more recently, On the other hand, one may argue that 
world powers use their technological dominance to reinforce the current political 
order against many oil producing countries. This acts to control oil markets and 
prevent instability in the global economy.   
 A different, but complementary perspective is to put firm business strategy and its 
role in formation of technological capabilities at the centre of the analysis. In many 
oil producing countries, national oil companies are the biggest source of government 
revenue. Increasing levels of production is often a much higher priority than 
increasing local technological capabilities. The source of production technology is 
often advanced international companies and national oil companies are only the 
users. Only when required technologies cannot be accessed from international 
markets, is there a strong driver to build internal capabilities. This happened for 
Petrobras when deep offshore technologies had not been developed while it 
expanded offshore production. The Iranian oil company is now initiating several 
technological programs, as they can no longer be sourced from foreign sources, due 
to imposed sanctions.        
In terms of its empirical setting, the findings of this research are based on the study 
of innovation processes in the upstream petroleum industry at the aggregated level. 
Surely, there are some particular technological areas within upstream petroleum 
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industry which do not follow the general argument. For example, the diffusion of 
ICT in some parts of the industry has facilitated knowledge codification, 
modularization and decomposition in some segments. This means that reduced 
systemic complexity has enabled the emergence of some specialized companies in 
other countries, for example in the data interpretation business, as a knowledge 
intensive segment in the value chain. However, this does not mean that the overall 
skewed distribution of learning and innovation capabilities have become more 
balanced among leading and latecomer countries.  Accordingly, one attractive 
research area would be to explore some examples of successful technological catch-
up in particular knowledge intensive segments of the upstream value chain by 
latecomer countries and the factors which enabled this to happen. Concrete 
understanding of these examples could contribute to the development of catch-up 
theories in the context of complex industries, which are not generally catch-up 
friendly. 
Also, we should be cautious about generalizing the findings, to other segments of the 
petroleum industry in mid or downstream, to other industries in general and to other 
resource based industries in particular. Crude empirical inter-sectoral generalizations 
could be misleading at best and harmful at worst, as the history of resource based 
theories in section 8.2 teaches us. It is misleading because it could provide an 
unrealistic picture of the developmental or anti-developmental capacities of 
unexamined industries. It is harmful, because endowed countries may lose their 
developmental opportunities next door, and look for them in inaccessible remote 
areas26
However, it is also true that these countries should be careful about industrial lock-in 
and follow smart but realistic diversification strategies. What is badly needed is deep 
investigation of innovation opportunities and the level of complexity in other 
. It is more realistic for resource based countries to build technological 
capabilities around natural resource industries using years of accumulated production 
experience. It is normally unrealistic to expect the formation of unrelated high-tech 
sectors without prior industrial experience, like a cathedral in a dessert.  
                                                          
26 There is a Persian poet saying: “The partner is at home, yet you are looking around the world; the 
water is in the jug, yet you are moving thirstily around”  
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industries, particularly other understudied natural resource based industries. This is 
an unexplored research area just emerging, looking at natural resource based 
industries from the learning and innovation perspective. Any new research in this 
direction is likely to create both theoretical contributions and policy relevant 
implications. For instance, it would be very interesting to see whether the full cycle 
of dis-integration and neo-integration observed in the upstream petroleum industry 
can be observed in other sectors. Is it a unique and sector-specific phenomenon or a 
more general pattern that can be observed in other sectors of the economy? In 
particular, the validity of the emerging hand vs. vanishing hand idea in other 
industries and its association with dynamics of knowledge complexity is an open 
question for future research.        
The potential role of policy in fixing the challenges of catch-up, particularly when 
systemic complexity is high and there are widespread inter-dependencies, is another 
critical line of enquiry. We need to know much more about how innovation and 
catch-up policies should be designed and implemented in these conditions. One 
important question is: what kind of institutional structures can support and facilitate 
long-term learning processes in complex industries for latecomer countries? We 
should move beyond the question of 'why industrial policy?' and try to answer ‘how’ 
an effective industrial policy should be designed and implemented (Rodrik, 2008). 
What are the main characteristics of institutional design (Rodrik, 2007) for 
successful catch-up in complex industries? Comparative analysis of both successful 
and unsuccessful industrial and innovation policies in complex industries could shed 
light on the main requirements of catch-up in latecomer contexts. 
The main data source for the current study was patent data, with its well-known 
limitations in representation of technological knowledge and innovation (chapter 2, 
section 2.5). With regard to this research, three limitations are important. First, the 
patent data in upstream petroleum industry tend to underestimate the level of 
innovativeness, because patents are not the major method of innovation protection, 
particularly in small and medium firms which can’t afford its costs. Nonetheless, this 
limitation creates over-confidence in the claims about innovativeness of the industry. 
Second, the measures of systemic complexity based on co-classifications also tend to 
underestimate the linkages and interactions between different innovations. This is 
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because some types of inter-relationships are not necessarily captured by patent co-
classifications. For example, many potential linkages and possible recombination 
opportunities are explored by companies and innovators long after patents are 
granted. Such linkages have not been visible to be captured by patent examiners at 
the time of the original innovation.  
Third, patents also may considerably underestimate the level of technological catch-
up by less developed latecomer countries. There are many difficult stages and a long 
path before companies in the latecomer context achieve the international knowledge 
frontier which creates patentable innovations. The implication is that some of those 
countries which have low positions in innovation rankings, and do not show catch-up 
patterns based on patent data, may have achieved certain levels of technological 
progress, below patentable innovations. As a result the complexity argument is 
directly valid for this world frontier level of knowledge production.  
Nonetheless, it is in principle extendable to lower levels of technological capabilities, 
as far as we look at patents as traces of knowledge (as explained in chapter 5), not 
just novel inventions. In other words, if the range of technological fields and their 
interactions are increasing over time, as reflected in patent data, a similar pattern 
would also be expected at lower levels of technological capabilities, for example at 
more imitative operational and production levels.  
What makes me relatively confident is that almost all the results here are drawn from 
trend analysis, rather than actual levels. Therefore, I expect that the three above 
mentioned limitations of the patent data and other under/over estimations have not 
considerably affected the conclusions. In other words, if the data is corrected for the 
under/over estimations, the trends should largely remain the same, even if the levels 
of the variables are affected. In addition, in-depth qualitative case studies are a 
complementary research strategy which can be employed in future research to 
triangulate the findings. I would personally recommend a qualitative case study 
about the factors driving the emergence of major big integrated service companies to 
recheck the validity of emerging arguments around coordination of increasingly 
complex knowledge.  
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With regard to the quantitative methodology, the proxies I used in this research may 
have their own limitations in capturing what they meant to capture. This is a general 
challenge of many quantitative studies in general, and patent statistics in particular. 
Noise and abrupt changes in the data are relatively high which sometimes makes 
interpretation difficult. While I tried to use best known techniques to develop reliable 
proxies and minimize noise, there is still a big opportunity to improve the quality of 
the proxies. For example, it is very important to scrutinize the analysis of dynamics 
of complexity in the three dimensions in future research, because this was the most 
novel aspect of the quantitative analysis carried out in this research. Limited 
availability of prior research on this topic was an important constraint for 
development of proxies and their interpretation.  
Development of this strand of research by examination of new proxies and use of 
other data sources is highly recommended. For example, in order to assess systemic 
complexity, other proxies can be designed and tested to capture different aspects of 
systemic complexity like coherence (Krafft et al., 2009) or decomposability of the 
knowledge base(Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Social network analysis is another 
analytical tool which could be helpful to understand the dynamics of the structure of 
the knowledge base (Kraft et al., 2011). The information embodied in patent citations 
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002; Brusoni et al., 2005 could be used to correct for the 
quality of inventions. Since they also reveal the knowledge flows and the vertical 
links between patents (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999), they could potentially be used to 
develop new proxies for systemic complexity. Another application is to analyse the 
role of international knowledge flows in catch-up processes in order to develop 
catch-up theories.  
There is large room for conceptual and theoretical, methodological and empirical 
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Appendix I: Derwent Classification Codes: Section H (Petroleum)27
Comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the oil and gas industry with limited 
coverage of competitive products e.g. coal and peat.  
 
Table A-1 Derwent Classification Codes: Section H (Petroleum) 
Derwent Class Codes are listed in the first column of the table below. Approximate IPC codes are 
given in parentheses. 
H01 Obtaining crude oil and natural gas - including exploration, drilling, well completion, production 
and treatment. General off-shore platform and drilling technology is included together with the 
treatment of tar sands and oil shales (C10G, E21B). 
H02 Unit operations - including distillation, sorption and solvent extraction (C10G). 
H03 Transportation and storage - only large scale systems are included. Road tankers and retail petrol 
station-type applications are excluded. Treatment of pollution from marine oil tankers is 
included. 
H04 Petroleum processing - including treating, cracking, reforming, gasoline preparation - 
biosynthesis based on hydrocarbon feedstocks is included (C10G). 
H05 Refinery engineering. 
H06 Gaseous and liquid fuels - including pollution control. Chemical aspects of catalytic exhaust 
systems for cars are included as well as liquid or gaseous fuels of non-petroleum origin eg 
methanol or ethanol-based fuels. Combustion improvement additives for liquid fuels are 
included (C10L). 
H07 Lubricants and lubrication - this excludes self-lubricating surfaces eg PTFE coated surfaces and 
lubrication systems in general. The section includes lubricants of non-petroleum origin eg 
silicone oils (C10M). 
H08 Petroleum products, other than fuels and lubricants - this includes hydraulic fluids and electrical 
oils even when of non-petroleum origin (C10M). 
H09 Fuel products not of petroleum origin - excluding coal handling, preparation or mining, but 
including coking, briquetting, peat processing synthesis, gas production, coal gasification. 
Combustion improvement additives for coal, peat and other non-hydrocarbon based fuels are 
included in this Section together with coal liquefaction and desulphurisation. 
 
 




Appendix II: Derwent Manual Codes for upstream petroleum industry 
(sub-section H01)  
Table A-2 Derwent Manual Codes for upstream petroleum industry (sub-



















Appendix III: Imperfections in geographical patent information  
In order to implement the geographical part of the analysis (answer to the third 
question of the research reported in chapter 7), we need to know the size of the 
contribution of each country in technological innovation and its change over time. As 
explained in the chapter 2, the number of international families invented within each 
country could be a reliable and comparable measure based on which we could trace 
the changing relative position of the countries. In other words, when the aim is to 
trace the inventive performance of the countries, residence country of inventor is the 
most suitable reference country to be attributed to the patent (OECD, 2009). It is 
important to note that, part of these inventions within a particular country might be 
owned by foreign and international companies. These are those innovations usually 
performed in R&D facilities of international companies in the countries other than 
their home country. 
One criticism might be that this measure overestimates the real role of host countries, 
because it attributes the innovations of foreign companies to their host countries. 
However, this innovative performance could be more the result of technological 
capabilities in the home country of international companies. Although this argument 
seems acceptable, it does not contradict the fact that increase in the innovative 
performance of international players within a particular country could be an 
‘indirect’ measure of innovative performance of that country. The decision of 
international players to establish innovation centres in other countries could have a 
strong relationship with R&D facilities, innovation infrastructure, professionals and 
knowledge externalities which is available in that country. Overestimation also 
would not seem serious problem as soon as our main concern is change of shares 
over time, not the absolute measures. Overall, there is a common agreement within 
patent statisticians that the best reference to measure inventive performance of 
countries is inventor’s country of residence (OECD, 2009). 
One alternative that might seem better at first glance is using applicants’ country 
rather than inventor country of residence. The argument in favour of this option is 
that ownership of innovation is more important regardless of where it is produced. In 
other words, it is more relevant to know who controls the production and application 
of innovations, not the location where they are innovated, particularly when the aim 
is to understand the position of different countries in a sectoral innovation system. 
Although reasonable, there are some important methodological challenges which 
downgrade the use of applicants’ country to compare innovative performance of 
different countries. First, given the major share of international and multinational 
companies in innovation processes, there is no reliable method to attribute their 
innovation to different companies. In fact, it is very difficult to assign these major 
players to any particular countries. Suppose Schlumberger Company with operations, 
affiliates and R&D facilities in a large number of countries. Originally, it was an 
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American and French company but is now a highly multinational company. Should 
innovations by this company be assigned to US or France as the country of origin? 
Should we assign the innovations to the country of the affiliate or the branch within 
which innovation happened? This is similar to ‘country of inventor’ issue discussed 
earlier. The relevant choice highly depends to the purpose of the study. 
The second important issue to work with the data of applicants’ country is noise in 
the data. In fact, for some important companies, registered applicants’ country is not 
either home country or inventor country. It is simply the country of those affiliates 
who are experts in the legal protection of innovations. This could be different from 
both headquarter country or invention country. Other factors such as regulations and 
financial considerations could distort the applicants’ country data from reflecting 
innovative performance of the countries. Virgin Islands (British), Panama, 
Netherlands Antilles are the countries whose ranking appears strange in table 7.1, 
because they appear higher than many important countries in the industry.  
Simple analysis of patent applicants in these countries shows that major 
multinationals have decided to report from these small countries, as their registered 
country, rather than their main county of origin for legal or tax related reasons. Given 
this noise in the applicants’ country data, the inventor’s country of residence seems 
the best choice. The country of inventor is the relevant field in the person’s table of 
PATSTAT database which assigns a patent application to one or several inventors. 
They are characterized by a standard code, name, and the address including the 
country of residence.  
Unfortunately, this table in our dataset has many missing values where the inventor 
record of a patent application is not available, or its country of origin is not reported. 
Overall, 266675 application-inventor combinations, which is about the 52 percent of 
total observations, are complete in their country field. Nonetheless, there are some 
possible alternative ways in which missing data could be completed with acceptable 
estimations. I introduce these alternatives, estimate the margin of error that might 
produce, and explain the number of records is filled using these strategies. 
Because our analysis is based on international patent families, not applications, and 
for each family there are several correspondent applications, each of which could 
display the inventor country of the family. Therefore, among 115104 total numbers 
of families within our dataset, 56944 (%49) families have reported inventor country 
from PATSTAT persons table. 
There are three potential sources by which we are able to complete the country field 
of other applications or patent families, and guess their country of invention with 
certain level of reliability. The first source is the priority country in which the patent 
application is first registered. The second source is the assignee countries where 
patent applicants come from. Third is the main invention country of patent applicants 
which means attribution of patents to a country in which patent applicants perform a 
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majority of their inventive activities. To explore the degree of confidence of these 
three sources, I evaluate error margins, in the observations we already know the 
country of inventions. In other words, I measure the degree of error in using the 
above mentioned sources to complete the data set, assuming more or less similar 
level of error is expected in the unknown subset. Then, I use the most reliable 
methods to complete the dataset. Sometimes these methods are used in combination 
to increase accuracy and decrease the possibility of error, as be seen below. 
1- Priority country as the source28
To evaluate the reliability of employing priority country as invention country, I 
measure the percentage of patent families with known inventors in which priority 
country is the same as that of inventors. To have tougher measure and reduce the 
error, I also calculate the same measure but for those families with the same priority 
and assignee country. Among 56925 patent families with known inventors, 52224 
families have same inventor and priority country which means about 92 percent 
accuracy. 
 
To increase the accuracy of estimation and reduce the error, I decided to apply a 
more tight criteria, using priority country as the inventor country where it is the same 
as the assignee country of the patent family. In fact this is the combination of first 
two sources of priority and assignee country to increase the reliability. The reason is 
that companies tend to first apply for a patent in their home country. Among 48770 
patent families which their inventors, assignees and priority country are known and 
priority and assignee countries are the same, 47889 have the same inventor country. 
This means that in more than 98 percent of families we could replace priority country 
as inventor country if it is the same as assignee country. This high degree of 
reliability does make sense because, it is highly unlikely for a company to do 
invention in one country, but first seek patent for this invention in other countries 
(priority country) where it is also different from assignee country. 
2- Assignee countries as the source 
To evaluate the reliability of using assignee countries of applications as their 
invention country, I selected all patent applications in our dataset with known 
assignee countries.  
Then I followed two different methods of estimations. In the first method, I have 
calculated the percentage of these application-assignee combinations in which 
inventor country of the application is the same as its applicant. This method 
measures the degree of error at invention level when all applications aggregated. This 
provides us an aggregate degree of confidence when using the assignee country 
                                                          
28 The priority country has been used in a recent study as the country of invention in ICT industry (see 
Antonelli, et al. 2010 p.57 for more information)  
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instead of inventor country. It calculates what percentages of inventions, assignee 
countries and inventor countries are the same. Employing this method, 102,835 out 
of 106867 applications had the same country and 4,032 had different countries. This 
means that this method has 96 percent of accuracy. Nonetheless, this percentage may 
not be uniformly distributed among assignees, because some assignees may just do 
their inventive activities in their home countries. Others, particularly international 
companies may do inventive activities in several countries but assign those activities 
just to their headquarters or important affiliates. Since application of this method 
tends to underestimate latecomer countries, it will not produce serious problem for 
our analysis when the aim is to analyze catch-up countries.  
In the second method, however, I measure the degree of error at the level of 
assignees. In other words, I calculate the percentage of patent applications in which 
inventor and applicant are the same for each assignee. The second method could help 
us to complete the inventor country just for those assignees which have high 
percentage of inventions in their own country of application. In other words, for 
those assignees where a high percentage of their inventions has been registered in 
their own countries, this completion process would be followed. In contrast, if some 
assignees do most of inventions outside of their attributed countries, we could not 
simply guess the country of invention from assignee countries when it is unknown. 
The threshold for the application of this method could be chosen at different 
percentages. The table temp.17 (in my dataset) is the list of PATSTAT assignees in 
upstream petroleum industry and the probability of each assignee to register a 
country as the location of inventor if its inventions attributed to that country as the 
assignee country. The threshold which set for this study is explained later where I 
describe the completion process of country of invention of the patent families. 
3- Main invention country of applicants as the source 
The degree of confidence for this method of estimation varies from company to 
company and is highest for local companies and lowest for international companies. 
The more the international inventive activities of the companies, the less reliable the 
estimation of invention country with main invention country. For example there are 
some very international companies where just below 50 percent of their patents are 
invented in their home country. Given the fact that the lions share of innovations are 
controlled by international companies, this method is reliable more in their main 
country of invention. Nonetheless, this estimation is not problematic for this study 
even in the case of multinational companies. This is because in the worse situation 
we attribute the international inventive activities of multinational companies to their 
home country where they usually run majority of their innovative activities. Given 
the fact that our aim is to analyze catch-up processes, this seems realistic to attribute 
the international innovative activities of multinational companies to their home 
country rather than the host country. This is because these technological capabilities 
are in fact the knowledge assets controlled by the parent company. 
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Completion of missed countries using above sources: 
The total number of application-inventor’ combination is 514674 of which 266675 
have a known invention country from the original PATSTAT database. These are 
equivalent to a total number of 115104 patent families of which 56944 have a known 
inventor country. Given the high degree of reliability of first method when combined 
with second method (using priority country as the invention country when agrees 
with assignees’ country), I first applied this method. 112390 more application- 
inventor combinations are assigned a country, which is equivalent to 35084 patent 
families. 
In the second stage I applied the second source, selecting the assignee country as the 
country of invention but just for those assignees which their country is 100% the 
same as country of invention. In other words, applicants’ country is replaced as 
invention country for those applications whose applicants do all of their inventive 
activities in the same country according to our dataset.  This process has completed 
10586 more application-inventor which corresponds to 5247 families. 
  Table A-3 Completion of missing country data by different sources   
Completion stage  Application -inventor Unique families (% of total) 
Original 266675 56944 (49.4% ) 
Stage 1 112390 35084 (30.4%) 
Stage 2 10586 5247   (4.6%) 
Stage 3 33688 18674 (16.2%) 
Stage 4 6687 1833 (1.6%) 
Stage 5 9371 3329 (2.9%) 
Complete numbers 439397 102548 (89.1%) 
Missed 75277 12556 (10.1%) 
Total 514674 115104 (100%) 
In the third and fourth stage, I used the combination of the first and third method to 
increase the degree of reliability. From our data we know that applying only the first 
method (priority country) might have about an 8 percent error. If combined with 
main invention country information, the error should be reduced. Suppose an 
international company does innovative activities in several countries including its 
home country which is its main invention country. The probability that for 
innovations performed in the home country, the patent is applied first in the home 
country is higher, compared to innovations performed abroad which might applied 
for their patents either from local patent authorises or international routes.  
Given the fact that the main country of invention could be produced both for 
Derwent and PATSTAT assignees, we could use this source from both databases. 
Therefore for the third stage I replace invention country with priority country when is 
the same as the main invention country, based on Derwent assignees. The fourth 
stage is the same as the third stage but PATSTAT assignees have been used to match 
priority country with main invention country of assignees. Applying these stages 
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respectively 33688 and 6687 application-inventor combination have been assigned a 
country of invention which correspond to 18674 and 1833 unique patent families.  
In the fifth stage, the third method has been applied. It means that for 9371 
application-inventor combinations which correspond to 3329 unique families, the 
main country of invention of Derwent assignees has been attributed as invention 
country. The summary of this completion process is shown in the table A-3 where we 
have 102548 patent families, which their country of innovation is known or 
estimated. All geographical analysis of patters of innovation has been based on this 
final completed table in this study, when inventors’ country is meant to be used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
